AT   THE    SUPREME 
WAR   COUNCIL 


Keystone  View  Co.,  Inc. 


MARSHAL    FOCH 


AT  THE  SUPREME 
WAR  COUNCIL 


BY 


CAPTAIN  PETER  E.  WRIGHT 

LATB   ASSISTANT   SBCRBTART,    SUPREME 
WAR    COUNCIL 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
Zbc   ■ftnicKerbocfter    press 

1921 


Copyright,  1921 

by 
Peter  E.  Wright 

Printed  in  the  United  Slates  of  America 


y"t^ 


W  Ua 


PREFACE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

Though  it  has  hardly  been  detected  by  the 

many  and  hostile  critics  of  this  book,  my  main 

object  in  writing  it  was  to  establish  the  truth  on  a 

niimber  of  points:  for  a  nimiber  of  plain  truths 

about  the  war  had  been  obscured  for  the  public, 

or  rather  never  revealed  to  it,  at  all.     Many  of  my 

views,  here  expressed,  are,  and  perhaps  always  will 

be,  debatable:  for  men  always  have,  and  always 

will,  argue  for  ever  about  battles,  and  no  estimate 

^  of  a  himian  character  can  be  fixed  or  final.    But 

g  there  is  one  fact  which  is  unshaken  and  imshak- 

^  able,  and  which  was  no  less  a  shock  to  the  public 

^  than  it  had  been  to  myself  when  it  came  to  my 

2  knowledge.     In  this  war  we,  the  Allies,  were  big 

and  our  enemies  small  during  almost  the  whole 

contest.    Yet  they  held  out  for  four  years,  and 

nearly  won. 

Now,  with  great  deference,  given  my  himible 
miUtary  rank,  I  find  a  moral  in  this,  of  great  im- 
port to  my  own  fellow-coimtrymen,  and  perhaps  of 


345578 


PREFACE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

tremendous  import  to  their  kinsmen  in  the  United 
States.  That  moral  is  rather  commonplace,  like 
all  morals,  and  it  is  that  you  cannot  improvise  in 
war:  like  all  other  vast  practical  enterprises  it 
needs  preparation  to  be  successful.  The  Anglo- 
Saxons  have  never  really  believed  this,  and  re- 
mained obstinately  opposed  to,  and  contemptuous 
of,  military  life.  They  are  likely  to  be  confirmed 
in  their  error  by  their  success:  for  now  the  Teu- 
tonic and  Slav  rivals  have  collapsed,  they  stand 
almost  as  the  pre-eminent  race.  If  they  can  win 
wars  without  being  military,  it  is  hardly  likely  they 
will  come  to  think  that  it  is  necessary  to  be  military 
in  order  to  win  wars. 

This  little  book  aims  at  telling  them  that,  in 
spite  of  a  vast  preponderance  in  ntimbers  as  well 
as  in  all  other  forms  of  military  strength,  they 
nearly  lost.  Reflecting  sincerely,  and,  I  hope, 
without  immodesty,  on  the  great  British  efforts,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  evil  of  improvisation,  and  the 
advantage  of  preparation,  do  not  lie  on  the  sur- 
face, and  cannot  be  easily  detected.  A  nation  of 
sportsmen  and  business  men  can  rapidly  create  all 
that  makes  a  great  army,  men,  officers,  material, 
and  enthusiasm.  One  thing,  however,  cannot  be 
created  ofifhand  and  at  will,  but  is  the  fruit  of  long 


PREFACE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

efforts  and  the  work  of  generations — command, 
great  leaders,  and  the  right  conceptions  of  strategy. 
The  greatest  problem  and  practice  we  had  ever 
given  our  Regtdar  Army  in  Europe  was  handling 
four  skeleton  divisions  at  autiimn  manoeuvres :  we 
then  required  them  to  handle  sixty  real  divisions 
on  a  real  battle-field.  It  was  like  asking  men  em- 
ployed to  build  cottages,  suddenly  to  construct  a 
cathedral.     Hence  the  long  duration  of  the  war. 

Paradoxical  and  unpalatable  as  this  truth  may 
be,  my  little  book  shows  that  the  Allies  ultimately 
won  when  they  were  weaker  than  their  adversary, 
after  failing  to  beat  him  for  years  during  which 
they  were  much  stronger:  it  also  endeavours  to 
show  the  simple  reason,  that  they  at  last  found  the 
right  method  of  command  and  the  right  com- 
mander, Foch.  But  Foch  and  Foch's  191 8  battle 
is  not  the  product  of  chance,  any  more  than 
Michael  Angelo  or  the  Sistine  frescoes  are.  He  is 
the  outcome  of  a  long  national  effort,  of  a  universal 
sacrifice  to  military  life,  of  a  passionate  conviction 
that  military  command  is  one  of  the  highest  arts, 
of  the  devotion  of  the  finest  French  minds  to  this 
profession,  of  the  unspoken  resolve  of  generations 
to  be  ready  for  this  struggle.  Only  at  this  price 
can  the  military  genius  that  decides  the  fate  of 


PREFACE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

nations  be  produced :  and  this  idea,  implicit  in  my 
book,  and  perhaps  as  disagreeable  to  most  Ameri- 
cans as  it  is  to  most  Englishmen,  I  offer  to  the 
serious  consideration  of  the  American  public. 

Peter  E.  Wright. 

May,  1921. 


CONTENTS 


I. — Foundation  of  the  Supreme  War  Council       9 
II. — The  Plan  of  Campaign  for  1918       .         .      53 


III. — The  Battle  of  St.  Quentin 
Appendix  A        .         .         . 
Appendix  B        .        .        , 
Appendix  C        .        .        . 


Ill 

151 
183 
191 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Marshal  Foch Frontispiece 

General  Gough 26 

Major-General  Sir  Frederick  B.  Maurice       .      42 

General  Robertson 58 

Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig       ....      90 

General  P^tain 122 

Rt.  Hon.  David  Lloyd  George  .        .        .156 

Colonel  Charles  Repington     .        .        .        .190 


AT  THE 
SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 


FOUNDATION  OF  THE  SUPREME 
WAR  COUNCIL 


Foundation  of  the  Supreme 
War  Council 

A  well-known  military  writer,  and  a  com- 
batant in  the  Great  War,  Major  Grasset,'  has 
lately  made  a  collection  of  extracts  from  the  two 
great  works  of  Foch,  written  more  than  twenty 
years  ago,  which  are  rather  too  voluminous  for 
the  ordinary  reader,  though  even  before  the  war 
curious  inquirers,  without  the  least  direct  interest 
in  military  affairs,  had  been  attracted  by  books 
which  treat  war  from  such  a  philosophical  height. 
These  short  extracts,  published  by  Major  Grasset 
in  book  form,  reveal  the  fiery  disposition  and  calcu- 
lating brain  which  Foch  always  points  out  as  the 
mark  of  a  military  leader.  But  prefaced  to  these 
extracts  is  a  short  study  of  the  life  of  Foch.  Now 
this  is  of  unusual  interest,  because  Major  Grasset, 

^  Precepts  and  Judgments  of  Marshal  Foch,  by  Major 
Grasset :  translated  by  Hilaire  Belloc.    (Chapman  &  Hall.) 

9 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

from  the  text  itself,  has  evidently  obtained  his  in- 
formation from  the  innermost  circles  of  the  French 
General  Staff;  some  expressions,  some  phrases  ring 
very  like  those  of  Foch  himself:  the  resemblance 
can  hardly  be  fortuitous.  But,  if  not  from  Foch 
himself,  then  the  information  must  come  from  the 
small  group  of  officers  who  have  always  been  imme- 
diately next  to  him  while  he  was  in  any  position  of 
high  command,  for  there  are  some  facts,  and  es- 
pecially some  dates,  which  can  only  be  known  to 
this  group.  And  as  some  of  this  information  is 
new,  and  throws  a  new  light  on  some  of  the  great 
events  in  which  our  armies  took  part,  and  especially 
the  battle  of  St.  Quentin,  it  is  of  the  highest  in- 
terest. Having  been  at  the  Supreme  War  Coimcil 
during  the  winter  I9i7-I9i8as  Assistant  Secretary, 
I  can  tell  at  first  hand  and  with  nimierical  precision 
the  events  of  that  period  which  he  relates  at  second 
hand  and  vaguely.^ 

The  world  knows  Foch  only  at  the  height  of  his 
achievements,  when  he  drove  the  Germans  before 
him,  and  would  have  destroyed  them  altogether 
had  not  his  final  and  fatal  blow  been  stopped  by 

^  My  authority  for  my  statements  has  been  questioned: 
a  fuller  description  of  my  functions  will  be  found  in  Ap- 
pendix A. 

10 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

the  armistice;  it  knows  him  at  the  moment  of  his 
success  when  his  position  was  at  its  highest,  but  it 
knows  little  of  him  in  adversity  when  he  himself 
was  at  his  greatest.  This  preface  of  Major  Gras- 
set's  book  tells  us  something,  but  not  enough,  of 
those  earlier  battles  in  which  he  rose,  between 
August  4  and  October  4,  19 14,  from  the  command 
of  a  corps  to  the  command  of  an  army  group,  and 
that  the  most  important,  and  foimd  himself,  in  the 
third  month  of  the  war,  commanding  the  generals 
who  had  commanded  him  during  the  first  month. 
During  the  first  period  of  the  war  he  was  far  greater 
than  in  the  last,  when  the  eyes  of  all  the  world  were 
fixed  on  him ;  when  he  took  all  the  tricks,  but  held 
all  the  cards.  During  the  first  period  he  held  no 
cards  at  all,  but  won  all  the  same.  Then,  as  later, 
the  words  of  the  greatest  of  ancient  historians, 
used  by  him  of  the  man  he  admired  most,  are 
applicable  to  Foch.  "He  gave  proof  of  a  power 
and  a  penetration  that  was  natural,  wonderful,  and 
infallible.  When  any  crisis  arose,  however  little 
he  expected  it,  and  without  any  examination,  a 
view  of  the  situation,  far  superior  to  that  of  any 
one  else,  sprang  from  him  at  once,  and  he  predicted 
the  subsequent  course  of  events  with  no  less  cer- 
tainty.   His  exposition  of  his  own  plans  was  most 

II 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

lucid;  his  criticism  of  other  men's  schemes  con- 
summate; and  however  incalculable  the  result 
might  seem,  he  always  knew  what  would  succeed 
and  what  would  not.  In  a  word,  uniting  the 
deepest  intellectual  grasp  with  a  lightning  rapidity 
of  decision,  he  was  the  model  man  of  action.'" 

Major  Grasset  gives  us  only  a  sHght  sketch  of 
Foch's  earlier  feats. 

At  his  second  battle,  the  Troupe  de  Charmes  in 
Lorraine,  August  24,  19 14,  he  and  Dubail  defended 
the  line  of  the  Meurthe  against  odds  at  least  ten 
to  one.  The  Marne  was  his  third  battle.  On  the 
last  day  of  August  he  was  put  at  the  head  of  the 
Ninth  Army  by  Marshal  Joffre.  This  army  was  to 
hold  the  French  centre  in  the  first  battle  of  the 
Marne,  and  it  was  against  the  centre  that  the  main 
attack  of  the  Germans  was  to  be  expected.  Foch 
had  70,000  men:  Von  Biilow  and  Von  Hansen,  who 
attacked  him  (or,  rather,  who  faced  him,  for  he  at- 
tacked them  at  once,  as  soon  as  they  came  within 
his  reach  on  September  6) ,  had  300,000  men.  Thus 
the  plan  of  the  battle  hung  on  whether  Foch  could 
hold  these  odds,  while  Maunoury  and  Lord  French 
enveloped  the  German  right ;  if  the  Germans  could 
have  rolled  him  over  and  cut  the  long  Allied  line 

^  Thucydides,  i.,  ch.  138, 

12 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

from  Verdun  to  Paris  in  two,  they  would  not  have 
been  even  endangered  by  this  enveloping  move- 
ment, for  they  would  have  destroyed  most  of  the 
French  armies.  So  the  whole  plan  of  the  Marne 
hung  on  Foch.  It  was  a  speculation  by  Joffre  that 
his  lieutenant  could  win  the  odds  of  more  than  four 
to  one.  "Victory  resides  in  will,"  writes  Foch. 
"A  battle  won  is  a  battle  in  which  one  has  not  ad- 
mitted oneself  defeated."  Von  Billow's  official 
report  has  been  published,  and  we  know  that,  for 
all  his  material  superiority,  he  was  a  beaten  man 
before  the  battle  began.  Twenty  years  before,  his 
spiritually  superior  adversary,  then  Colonel  Foch, 
had  written:  "Victory  always  comes  to  those  who 
merit  it  by  their  greater  strength  of  will  and 
intelligence." 

There  are  many  sayings  attributed  to  Foch  at 
the  Marne,  but  most  of  them  are  bom  of  the  French 
love  for  flowery  rhetoric,  not  Foch's  flinty,  scientific 
brain,  though,  like  flint,  the  hard  impact  of  events 
can  strike  the  brightest  spark  from  it.  There  is  one, 
however,  which  is  not  only  true,  but  very  like  him. 
On  the  last  day  of  the  battle,  as  he  watched  the 
Germans  come  on  for  the  seventh  time  to  the  at- 
tack of  Mondement,  the  key  of  the  French  position, 
which  the  Prussian  Guard  had  taken  time  after 

13 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

time,  only  to  lose  it  again  every  time  Foch  counter- 
attacked, he  said  cheerfully  to  his  staff:  "Well, 
gentlemen,  they  must  be  in  great  straits  some- 
where or  other  if  they  are  in  such  a  desperate  hurry 
here."  He  had  divined  rightly:  Maunoury  was 
creeping  behind  Von  Kluck,  and  Franchet  d'Es- 
perey  behind  Von  Bulow  and  Von  Hansen,  and 
Foch,  as  he  guessed,  only  had  to  cling  on  for  a  few 
more  hotirs  to  be  safe.  The  Germans  did  finally 
pierce  the  French  centre  by  the  capture  of  La  Fdre 
Champenoise  on  the  last  day  of  the  battle ;  but  Foch, 
though  he  had  no  reserves  of  any  kind  left,  would 
not  concede  it.  He  took  the  42nd  Division  out  of 
the  line,  risked  leaving  a  gap  in  the  French  front, 
and  stormed  La  Fere  just  as  the  Germans  were 
sitting  down  to  dinner,  thinking  the  battle  was 
over  and  won. 

Foch  had  only  one  week  between  the  first  and 
seventh  of  September  to  inspire  the  Ninth  Army, 
largely  composed  of  defeated  and  retreating  troops, 
with  his  determination  in  that  desperate  struggle. 
Almost  at  once  he  was  given  something  still  more 
difficult  to  do,  and  he  took  up  this  foiu'th  command 
even  more  swiftly.  In  the  beginning  of  October 
the  fall  of  Antwerp,  the  fortress  which  protected 
the  whole  of  the  Allies'  left  flank,  was  suddenly 

14 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

seen  to  be  imminent,  and  another  catastrophe 
impending.  Joflfre  immediately  turned  to  Foch. 
Late  in  the  evening  on  October  4,  Foch,  who  was 
at  Chalons,  was  told  over  the  telephone  that  he 
had  been  appointed  commander  of  the  north- 
western army  group.  He  left  Chalons  at  ten  o'clock 
in  the  night.  Between  four  and  six  o'clock  next 
morning  he  had  given  their  instructions  to  his  army 
commanders,  and  at  nine  o'clock  was  directing  the 
furious  battle  raging  round  Lens.  M.  Poincare 
said  in  the  speech  he  made  on  Foch's  admission  to 
the  Academy  that  it  was  his  view,  single  and  alone 
among  those  of  all  the  Allied  commanders,  that  the 
British,  few  in  nimiber  and  battle-worn  as  they 
were,  could  still  hold  Ypres,  that  gave  our  troops 
the  chance  of  winning  the  first  battle  of  Ypres,  the 
crowning  victory  of  19 14,  the  glorious  year  of  the 
war  for  both  the  Allies.  This  was  the  Foch  of  1 9 14. 
But  subsequent  years  of  the  war  are  far  less 
creditable  to  the  Allies  than  19 14,  for  never  again 
during  the  remaining  four  years  of  the  war,  except 
for  six  months  in  191 8,  were  the  Central  Powers 
to  be  superior  on  the  Western  European  front,  and 
that  superiority  not  only  short,  but  slight;  and 
during  that  period  in  191 8,  the  Germans  very 
nearly  won  the  war.    The  Entente  were  brought  to 

15 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

the  edge  of  defeat  by  disregarding  the  advice  of 
Foch,  and  again  saved  by  him.  We  can  never 
justly  allot  the  merit  of  winning  the  war,  or  learn 
the  errors  that  prevented  us  gaining  it  far  earlier, 
or  profit  by  the  lessons  of  the  struggle,  imless  we 
make  the  effort  to  discard  our  vanity  and  under- 
stand the  truth.  For  struggle  there  will  be  gain  in 
the  future,  if  not  in  the  immediate  present;  the 
evil  of  war  is  too  inherent  to  be  extirpated  by  the 
new,  fashionable,  but  delusive  ideas  with  which 
some  hope  to  cut  it  out. 

For  a  period  that  can  almost  be  called  of  years 
the  British  and  French  were  more  than  7  to  4  to 
the  Germans  in  men  on  the  Western  front,  and 
almost  double  in  material.  In  January,  191 7,  the 
Allies  had  178  divisions  on  the  French  front  to  the 
German  127,  which,  allowing  for  the  smaller  size 
of  the  German  division,  gives  more  than  the  pro- 
portion mentioned. 

The  dissolution  of  the  Russian  army  which  began 
after  the  Revolution  went  on  rapidly  during  19 17. 
But  in  May,  1916,  the  Russians  had  had  along  their 
European  front  140  divisions  of  infantry — each 
division  half  as  great  again  as  a  German  division, 
and  a  quarter  as  great  again  as  an  Austrian — -and 
33}4  divisions  of  cavalry.    One  portion  of  this  vast 

16 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

anny,  known  as  the  Northern  group,  had  consisted 
of  45  infantry  divisions  and  13  cavalry  divisions. 
This  Northern  group  had  sunk,  in  January,  191 8,  to 
175,000  men  all  told,  of  which  15,000  only  were  in 
the  fighting  line ;  and  the  rest  of  the  Russian  armies 
had  shrunk  in  the  same  proportion.  At  one  rail- 
road point  during  the  winter,  10,000  deserters  had 
been  counted  daily  going  home;  and  this  collapse 
left  the  Roumanian  army  with  a  fighting  strength 
of  18  infantry,  and  2  cavalry  divisions  exposed, 
unprotected,  and  helpless,  and  eventually  driven  to 
submission;  the  same  army  which,  after  the  defeat 
of  19 1 6,  had  sufficiently  recovered  themselves  to 
inflict  a  severe  defeat  on  the  Germans  in  191 7.  So 
towards  the  end  of  191 7  both  Russia  and  Roumania 
could  be  taken  as  out  of  it.  The  new  ally,  America, 
had  hardly  begun  to  come  in — -in  December,  19 17, 
there  were  only  3>^  American  divisions  in  France, 
each  of  them  being,  however,  two  or  three  times 
as  big  as  a  German  division.  But  in  the  interval 
between  the  exit  of  Russia,  an  empire  of  more  than 
160  million  people,  and  the  entrance  of  America,  a 
coimtry  of  more  than  100  millions,  the  Allies  were 
compelled  to  carry  on  the  war  with  diminished 
forces.     This   question,   therefore,   naturally  put 

itself  to  their  statesmen,  whether  or  not  they  could 
2  17 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

get  through  this  difficult  interval.  The  Germans 
might  be  strong  enough  to  snatch  a  victory  during 
this  period  of  our  weakness,  in  which  case  it  was  the 
duty  of  our  statesmen  to  make  peace  while  still 
undefeated ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  might  be  able 
to  resist  them  till  the  weight  of  the  Americans  in- 
clined the  balance  in  their  favour,  in  which  case  it 
was  their  duty  to  resist  till  that  moment.  Though 
no  peace  negotiations  were  ever  contemplated,  they 
took  stock  of  their  resources. 

The  course  to  be  steered  towards  the  end  of  191 7 
depended  upon  obtaining  as  accurate  a  calculation 
as  possible  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and  of  their  own, 
leaving  out  of  accoimt  Russia  and  America.  To 
the  making  of  this  calculation  a  War  Cabinet  Com- 
mittee applied  itself,  concentrating  all  the  figures 
obtainable  by  the  information  branches  of  all  the 
Allies.  This  Committee  on  Man  Power,  whose  con- 
clusions were  to  govern  the  Allied  policy,  reckoned 
these  were  the  forces  of  the  adversaries. 

The  combatant  strength  (not  the  ration  strength) 
of  the  British  and  the  French  in  all  the  existing 
theatres  of  war — in  France,  Italy,  the  Balkans, 
Palestine,  and  Mesopotamia — was  3,700,000  (three 
million,  seven  hundred  thousand)  men;  the  com- 
batant strength  of  the  Germans  in  all  theatres,  in- 

18 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

eluding  the  Russian  and  Roumanian  was  3,400,000, 
(three  million,  four  hundred  thousand)  men. 
Therefore  Britain  and  France  alone  in  December, 
191 7,  were,  and  had  been  for  two  years,  numerically 
stronger  than  Germany. 

The  total  of  the  combatant  Allied  forces — 
British,  French,  Italian,  Belgian,  Portuguese,  Ser- 
bian, Greek,  and  including  85,000  Americans — 
was,  in  December,  191 7,  5,400,000  (five  million, 
four  himdred  thousand)  men.  There  were  no 
Russians  or  Roumanians  reckoned  in.  But  the 
total  of  the  Central  Powers — German,  Austro- 
Htingarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish — was  only 
5,200,000  (five  million,  two  hundred  thousand) 
men.  This  included  more  than  i^  millions  who 
were  still  on  the  Russian  and  Roimianian  front.  ^ 

The  arrival  of  these  last  on  any  theatre  might 
create  a  momentary  risk  for  the  Allies,  though  they 
would  still  have  had  a  total  superiority,  but,  till 
that  transference  took  place,  their  number  on  every 
theatre,  in  December,  19 17,  was  higher.  In  the 
Turkish  lands  the  Allies  were  as  six  to  five  to  their 
opponents;  in  the  Balkans  as  four  to  three;  in  Italy 

^  The  historian  can  find  these  and  the  following  totals 
at  the  end  of  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Man  Power, 
in  the  archives  of  the  War  Cabinet. 

19 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

as  thirteen  to  eight ;  in  France  still  very  nearly  six 
to  foiir.  On  the  Western  front,  properly  under- 
stood, stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Adri- 
atic, the  number  of  their  field  gims  were  six  to  five 
of  the  enemy,  and  their  heavy  gims  as  seven 
to  six.  Everywhere  the  advantage  of  numbers, 
whether  considered  together,  or,  at  that  date,  in 
any  particular  place,  was  theirs. 

How  much  more,  and  how  crushing,  had  their 
superiority  been  when  more  than  190  (one  hundred 
and  ninety)  Russian  and  Roumanian  divisions — a 
body  of  men  far  more  numerous  than  the  whole 
German  army — were  fighting  on  their  side;  yet 
they  had  failed  to  win  the  war. 

The  plan  of  the  Allied  statesmen,  perhaps  indeed 
because  of  their  great  advantage  in  numbers,  had 
been  to  hope  for  the  best.  Now  enemy  reinforce- 
ments of  one  million  bayonets  might  appear  on  any 
of  their  fronts ;  for  German  and  Austrian  divisions 
had  begun  to  stream  westwards.  But  the  plan  of 
all  of  them — except  one,  Mr.  Lloyd  George — was 
still  to  hope  for  the  best,  till  the  arrival  of  the 
Americans  decided  the  war.  Even  M.  Clemenceau, 
the  least  inert  of  men,  was  of  this  opinion,  and  in 
January,  19 18,  told  the  assembled  military  and 
political  leaders  of  the  alliance,  that  the  date  of 

20 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

victory  would  be  the  auttunn  of  19 19,  for  then  the 
American  strength  would  be  at  its  height.  But  this 
American  giant,  though  he  intended  to  put  forth 
all  his  strength,  only  bestirred  himself  slowly. 
When  M.  Clemenceau  uttered  this  prognostic 
there  were  4^2  American  divisions  in  France,  huge 
American  divisions,  much  bigger  than  any  Euro- 
pean ;  but  only  one  of  these  was  in  the  line,  and  the 
American  Chief  of  the  Staff  could  then  only  promise 
that  there  would  be  four  fully  trained  by  July, 
19 1 8,  eight  in  October,  19 18,  and  twenty  in  April, 
1919. 

This  was  the  assistance  which  General  Bliss  in 
January,  191 8,  was  promising  to  the  Allies;  but  it 
would  not  be  fair  to  the  Americans  to  omit  saying 
they  ultimately  gave  much  more  after  the  mis- 
fortunes of  the  spring.  Both  the  dispatch  and  the 
training  of  troops  was  then  accelerated.  In  Janu- 
ary, when  this  estimate  was  given,  there  were  43^ 
American  divisions  in  France,  of  which  one  only 
was  trained  and  in  the  line.  In  Jime,  191 8,  there 
were  17  in  France,  of  which  7  were  trained.  On 
November  i,  191 8,  there  were  41  American  divi- 
sions in  France  and  Italy,  of  which  29  were  trained, 
and  had  taken  over  more  than  70  miles  of  front, 
thus  enabling  Foch  to  mass  the  bulk  of  the  French 

21 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

forces  on  the  upper  Moselle  for  the  death-blow;  but 
for  the  Armistice,  Castelnau,  at  the  head  of  three 
French  armies,  would  have  burst  into  the  Rhine 
valley,  and  placed  himself  between  Germany  and 
the  exhausted  German  armies  who  were  still  being 
hammered  far  away  west  of  the  Meuse,  and  Sedan 
would  indeed  have  been  avenged.  On  Armistice 
day  there  were  rather  more  Americans  than  British 
on  the  continent  on  the  Western  Front,  although 
the  rifle  strength  of  the  trained  American  troops 
was  about  half  our  own. 

The  one  statesman  who  had  refused  to  resign 
himself  to  this  policy,  or  this  absence  of  policy,  was 
Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

Immediately  on  coming  into  power  he  had  in- 
vented a  new  instrimient  of  government,  the  War 
Cabinet.  This  body  of  four,  sitting  continuously 
and  issuing  orders  to  all  the  ministries  through  its 
Secretary,  was  virtually  a  dictatorship,  and  in 
effect  a  personal  dictatorship;  and  though  this  is 
as  yet  unperceived,  this  concentration  of  power  in 
the  one  office  of  the  Prime  Minister  has  to  some 
degree  survived  the  war;  for  it  is  the  existence  of  a 
Secretariat,  both  in  the  War  Cabinet  and  the  larger 
cabinet,  innovation  as  it  is,  that  makes  him  almost 
absolute. 

22 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

For  in  both  these  small  executive  bodies  there 
are  no  fixed  rules  of  procedure  or  methods  of  voting 
like,  for  example,  at  a  Board  of  Directors.  In  the 
War  Cabinet,  and  apparently  in  the  Cabinet  that 
has  succeeded  it,  both  the  settlement  of  their 
agenda,  and,  what  is  still  more  important,  the  for- 
mulation of  their  decision,  was  left  in  the  hands  of 
the  Secretary,  largely  owing  to  his  skill  and  in- 
defatigable industry.  The  Secretary,  therefore, 
without  having  any  wish  to  do  so,  must  to  some 
extent  affect  their  decisions,  especially  as  in  many 
or  most  of  their  discussions  what  was  their  real 
decision  remains  very  doubtful. 

It  happens  that  the  only  holder  there  has  so  far 
been  of  this  post  has  acted  as  the  assiduous  attend- 
ant of  the  Prime  Minister,  so  that  the  War  Cabi- 
net's Secretariat  was  very  much  in  effect  the  Prime 
Minister's  Secretariat.  Through  this  Secretary, 
and  perhaps  without  any  design,  but  by  the  natural 
adoption  of  so  great  a  convenience,  the  will  of  the 
Prime  Minister  tended  to  be  the  will  of  the  War 
Cabinet.  This  growth  of  the  Prime  Minister's 
office  (to  which  other  causes  contributed,  such  as 
the  selection  by  him  of  ministers  who  had  never 
been  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  who,  therefore, 
could  only  consider  themselves  as  chosen  by  him 

23 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

alone)  is  the  great  constitutional  change  of  the  war. 
It  tends  to  make  the  office  more  and  more  like  an 
American  president,  absolute,  but  subject  to  selec- 
tion every  four  years.  Whatever  its  defects  and 
merits  in  peace,  it  is  only  with  this  authority  for 
immediate  and  imcontrolled  command  that  the 
war  could  really  be  carried  on.  In  war,  the  Prime 
Minister  during  the  whole  day  was  like  a  swimmer 
in  rough  seas — one  question  after  another,  like 
charging  waves,  and  no  sooner  was  one  breasted 
than  another  came  rolling  on,  and  every  question 
requiring  a  decision  without  delay,  when  it  was 
always  better  to  risk  taking  action  wrongly  than 
not  to  act  at  all. 

This  creation  of  a  central  and  supreme  authority 
had  averted  the  dangers  of  191 7.  We  had  passed 
from  one  extreme  to  another.  There  was  a  helms- 
man, who,  if  pluck  and  energy  are  the  qualities 
most  needed  by  the  pilot  who  is  to  weather  the 
storm,  has  no  equal  in  these  virtues,  still  less  a 
superior,  in  the  whole  history  of  our  Parliament, 
which,  by  a  singular  piece  of  good  fortime,  pro- 
duced him  just  when  we  needed  him  most ;  the  very 
opposite  in  this  respect  of  the  weak  and  wavering 
Mr.  Asquith.  And  there  was  a  new  helm  of  a  new 
pattern,  to  which  the  whole  ship  answered  at  a 

24 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

touch.  The  threat  of  starvation  made  by  the 
U-boats,  the  great  danger  of  191 7,  had  now  been 
averted  by  the  rapid  and  innumerable  edicts  of  the 
War  Cabinet,  which  in  one  year  had  almost  trans- 
formed our  social  system.  If  unity  of  command 
had  done  so  much  at  home,  it  was  natural  for  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  to  think  that  it  might  be  no  less 
effective  abroad. 

For  the  war  did  not  present  itself  to  the  national 
leaders  of  the  Alliance  in  the  same  shape  as  to  the 
public,  which  entertained,  and  still  entertains,  the 
flattering  idea  that  we  had  been  struggling  against 
immense  odds.  This  was  one  of  the  many  fictions 
with  which  it  had  always  been  considered  neces- 
sary to  drug  the  nation,  though  their  devotion 
always  had  been  equal  to  any  sacrifice,  and  their 
fortitude  to  any  deprivation ;  but  the  truth  was,  and 
could  not  appear  as  anything  else  to  the  leaders, 
that  we  were  big  and  our  adversaries  small.  For 
years  the  Germans  had  stood  at  bay,  surrounded 
by  more  numerous  enemies,  who  had  failed  to  over- 
come them. 

It  therefore  might  be  considered  that  the  Al- 
lied policy  had  been  wrong.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
thought  so  and  said  so,  though  the  other  lead- 
ers sitting  round  the  table  might  be  satisfied  to 

25 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

wait  until  the  knot  iintied  itself  instead  of  trying 
to  untie  it. 

There  was  a  remarkable  likeness  between  the 
three  Premiers — Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  and 
Orlando.  They  all  three  united  in  themselves  ab- 
solutely contrary  qualities.  Eloquent  men  have 
unguarded,  tmsuspicious,  impulsive  temperaments, 
and  cimning  men  are  inarticulate  and  ineloquent. 
But  they  all  three  were  both  incunng  and  eloquent, 
and  the  conjtmction  of  these  opposites  is  probably 
what  makes  a  great  parliamentarian,  as  they  all 
three  were.  This  is  perhaps  why  he  is  so  rare. 
Suspicious  and  circuitous  in  their  dealings,  the  most 
persuasive  and  real  rhetoric,  that  struggles  to  con- 
vince and  win,  quite  unlike  the  vapid  speech  of 
formal  public  utterance,  gushed  from  them  at  once. 

But  the  British  statesman  (and  Lord  Milner 
was  the  complement  of  Lloyd  George,  as  if  provided 
by  nature  to  supply  the  natural  deficiencies  of  the 
Prime  Minister)  siirpassed  all  the  others  both  in 
will  and  insight;  in  will,  because  they  were  resolved 
to  seize  and  mould  coming  events,  and  not  wait 
timidly  on  their  occurrence;  in  insight,  because 
they  could  see  the  whole  interests  of  the  Alliance 
as  well  as  the  British  national  interest.  The 
French  statesmen  were,  without  exception,  jour- 

26 


Keystone  View  Co..  Inc. 


GEN  ERAL    GOUGH 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

nalists,  and  far  better  at  discussing  than  doing. 
Clemenceau  was  the  most  amiable  of  old  men,  and, 
if  a  tiger,  as  he  was  called,  only  a  stuffed  nursery 
tiger,  more  endearing  than  formidable.  But, 
always  quivering  with  patriotic  emotion,  he  was  all 
haste  and  impulse,  and  would  apply  to  a  knot 
neither  the  patient  understanding  nor  steady  per- 
severance without  which  it  cotdd  not  be  unravelled. 
In  the  minds  of  almost  every  one  sitting  round  the 
red  baize  table  at  Versailles,  the  uppermost  thought 
was  the  security  of  their  own  place  and  the  advan- 
tage of  their  own  country.  This  was  transparent 
as  soon  as  they  opened  their  mouths.  But  the 
uppermost  thought  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  mind 
was  to  find  the  way  out  and  take  it  and  win  the 
war,  whatever  he  risked.  In  spite  of  his  oblique 
and  subterranean  methods;  his  inveterate  taste 
for  low  and  unscrupulous  men;  of  the  distrust  felt 
for  him  by  his  favourites,  even  at  the  height  of 
their  favour;  of  his  superficial,  slipshod,  and  hasty 
mind;  this  determination  of  character  made  him, 
without  any  assumption  on  his  part,  the  leader  of 
the  Alliance.  The  half-deified  chiefs,  whom  the 
prostrate  Germans  worshipped  as  idols,  never 
ceased  to  proclaim  what  magniloquently  they  called 
their  will  to  victory.    But  none  of  them  ever  had  it 

27 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

like  this  little  Welsh  lay  preacher  and  attorney, 
who  remained  so  deeply  stamped  with  the  charac- 
teristics of  these  early  occupations,  even  at  this 
sublime  elevation  of  power. 

Now  that  the  Russians  and  Roimianians  were 
out,  or  going  out,  the  Germans  were  sure  to  be  equal 
again  on  the  West,  and  during  the  summer  of  191 8 
to  be  rather  bigger. 

In  January,  191 7,  there  had  been  127  German 
divisions  in  France;  in  December,  191 7,  there  were 
151 ;  in  January,  19 18,  158.  It  was  like  watching  a 
river  rise,  which  rises  only  inch  by  inch,  but  which 
may,  after  a  certain  level,  flood  and  sweep  away 
everything.  After  keeping  off  so  many  enemies  at 
such  a  great  disadvantage,  the  Germans  might 
hope  to  overcome  them  now  the  advantage  lay  on 
their  side.  For  while  in  January,  191 7,  the  Allies 
had  had  178  divisions  in  France,  in  December,  191 7, 
they  had  only  169. 

Ludendorff  felt  certain  that  with  equal  numbers 
he  could  win  the  war  in  the  West,  and  that  winter 
he  told  the  main  committee  of  the  Reichstag  that 
the  odds  were  3  to  i  on  him.  This  assertion  must 
have  been  genuine,  for  he  never  could  have  im- 
posed another  effort  on  the  Germans,  exhausted  as 
they  were  with  the  desperate  struggle  of  three 

28 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

years'  war  on  so  many  fronts,  against  so  many 
opponents,  had  he  had  any  doubt  of  the  result. 
About  the  same  time  the  extent  of  this  exhaustion 
was  disclosed  at  those  secret  meetings  of  the  States 
of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy,  in  which  they  discussed 
their  foreign  policy,  known  as  the  Delegations. 
The  question  being  whether  and  how  to  continue 
the  war,  the  Delegations  were  told  what  were  the 
losses  of  the  Central  Powers.  But  some  of  the 
members  of  the  Delegations  were  Poles,  who,  as 
a  partitioned  people,  had  a  foot  in  each  camp. 
Through  this  leak  the  information  reached  the 
Allies.^ 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  whose  popula- 
tion at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  may  be  perhaps 
placed  at  55  million,  had  had  10,300,000  (ten 
million,  three  hundred  thousand)  men  of  military 
age.  Of  these,  7,600,000  (seven  million,  six  hun- 
dred thousand)  had  become  casualties. 

The  German  Empire,  whose  population  at  the 
outbreak  of  war  may  perhaps  be  placed  at  about 
70  million,  had  had  14  million  men  of  military  age, 
of  which  12,600,000  (twelve  million,  six  hundred 

*  The  historian  can  find  this  information  and  these  figures 
in  a  Foreign  Office  telegram,  from  Mr.  Lindley,  Petrograd, 
number  529,  and  dated  Feb.  27,  191 8. 

29 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

thousand)  had  been  passed  fit  for  military  service, 
out  of  whom  7,700,000  (seven  million,  seven  hun- 
dred thousand)  had  become  casualties. 

So,  in  rough  proportions,  the  Central  Empires 
turned  a  fifth  of  their  population  into  soldiers,  and 
had  had  a  tenth  of  them  killed,  hurt,  or  lost  in  three 
years.  These  figures,  if  right,  give  a  basis  for  an 
exact  calculation  how  much  wider  the  suffering  of  a 
modern  war  is  than  it  used  to  be  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Gibbon  laid  it  down^  that  the  highest 
proportion  of  soldiers  that  a  civilised  state  could 
maintain  was  one  hundredth  of  its  population. 
But  in  the  twentieth  century  that  proportion  had 
risen  to  a  fifth.  Thus  the  circle  of  those  exposed 
to  the  dangers  and  pains  of  war  had  been  enlarged 
twenty  times  by  our  increased  means  of  accumu- 
lating and  producing  wealth. 

In  the  autumn  of  19 17,  a  last  and  desperate 
attempt  of  the  Central  Powers  to  win  the  war  in 
the  ensuing  nine  months  was  to  be  anticipated. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  come  to  doubt  more  and 
more  whether  the  system  of  the  Allies,  which  since 
19 14  had  yielded  nothing  but  failure  and  disas- 
ter, could  meet  this  attack ;  if  it  failed  when  supe- 
rior in  numbers,   it  was  hardly  likely  to  succeed 

*  Decline  and  Fall,  Chap,  v.,  opening  sentences. 

30 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

when  inferior.  During  the  whole  of  19 17  he  and 
Lord  Milner  had  accepted  the  miHtary  adviser 
bequeathed  to  them  by  Mr.  Asquith — General 
Robertson. 

He  was  a  great  administrator,  with  the  great 
qualities  this  implies.  Lord  Kitchener  had  been  a 
great  symbol  of  our  greatness,  with  a  terrible  light 
of  African  victories,  Khartoum  and  the  Vaal, 
playing  round  his  head,  a  name  to  awe  our  enemies 
and  cheer  us  in  the  conflict ;  but  he  was  not  success- 
ful as  an  organiser,  contrary  to  common  opinion. 
Being  elderly,  he  naturally  kept  unchanged  the 
habits  of  his  whole  life,  spent  with  small  Eastern 
and  African  armies,  where  he  could  and  did  do 
everything  by  himself.  This  method  of  work  he 
applied  to  the  large  national  armies  he  was  raising, 
and  so  called  into  being  a  vast,  and  almost  im- 
fathomable,  administrative  chaos.  This  chaos 
General  Robertson  had  reduced  to  shape  and 
order;  but  his  peculiar  ability,  which  had  raised 
him  to  the  highest  rank,  after  his  start  at  the  lowest, 
had  been  acquired  and  exercised  chiefly  in  Ad- 
ministration and  Intelligence.  His  attainments  in 
this  sphere  could  be  no  other  than  very  exceptional 
to  lift  him  so  high  in  an  army  like  ours,  where  social 
advantages  push  on,  and  social  disabilities  hold 

31 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

back,  so  very  much;  but  the  absence  of  an  early 
liberal  education  deprived  him  of  one  of  the  few 
qualities  (if  not  the  only  one)  which  early  edu- 
cation can  confer,  flexibility  of  mind.  General 
Robertson's  plan,  and  he  had  no  other,  was  to  raise 
and  train  more  men ;  in  fact,  to  do  the  thing  he  was 
so  very  capable  of  doing.  If  the  two  sides  were 
allowed  to  go  on  killing  each  other  in  France  in- 
definitely, when  all  the  Germans  were  dead  there 
would  still  be  a  few  Allies  left,  and  they  would  win. 
This  was  his  simple  strategy,  as  far  as  can  be 
gathered  from  his  memoranda  to  the  War  Cabinet, 
to  which  the  future  historian  of  the  war  is  earnestly 
referred.  He  reveals  himself  in  them,  as  every  one 
must  reveal  himself  who  sets  his  pen  to  paper,  and 
shows  a  mind  keen  and  quick  in  the  highest  degree, 
but  narrow,  and  obstinately  entrenched  in  its  own 
narrowness;  on  questions  of  military  operations, 
too,  not  only  unreliable  and  mistaken,  but  evi- 
dently not  at  his  ease  at  all  with  that  kind  of  sub- 
ject. These  memoranda  reply  to  the  inquiries  of 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Lord  Milner  for  advice  with 
sullen  reluctance,  as  if  they  were  meddHng  in  what 
did  not  concern  them. 

Robertson's  military  ideas  are  to  be  foimd,  far 
more  tellingly  expressed  than  in  his  own  memo- 

32 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

randa,  in  the  contributions  to  the  Press,  of  the  writer 
whom  we  know  now  to  have  been  his  mouthpiece.' 
He  rejected  unity  of  command  as  a  "radical,  un- 
timely ,  dangerous ' '  change .  The  right  strategy  was 
raising  sixty  more  divisions,  in  addition  to  the 
seventy  odd  we  already  possessed,  and  "wearing 
the  Germans  down. ' '  ^  This  was  the  point  of  differ- 
ence between  him  and  the  War  Cabinet,  who  hesi- 
tated at  loading  us  (who  already  bore  almost  the 
whole  naval  and  financial  burden  of  the  war)  with 
an  army  almost  as  great  as  the  Germans,  and  who 
presimied  to  think  there  might  exist  a  less  primitive 
strategy,  especially  as  the  Allies  had  long  had  an 
overwhelming  preponderance  in  numbers  over  the 
Central  Powers,  without  attaining  to  any  result. 

On  such  an  adviser  the  War  Cabinet  had  had  to 
rely  for  advice,  not  only  as  to  the  conduct  of  opera- 
tions on  vast  and  various  fields,  but  on  subjects 
which  were  as  much  political  as  military,  and  re- 
quired the  judgment  of  a  statesman  as  much  as  that 
of  a  soldier.  They  had  endured  his  covert  opposi- 
tion, which  we  now  know  was  backed  with  incessant 

'  See  Appendix  A.  The  relations  between  General 
Robertson,  General  Maurice,  and  Colonel  Repington. 

^  The  Times,  Dec.  i8,  1917;  Nov.  24,  1917;  May  8,  1917; 
Aug.  II,  1917. 

^  33 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

intrigue  in  the  Press,'  for  a  whole  year,  and  the 
yields  of  his  policy,  compared  with  its  expenditure 
during  that  year,  did  not  seem  to  recommend  itself. 
The  following  figures,  strictly  speaking,  are  casual- 
ties on  all  fronts;  but  all  except  a  small  fraction 
were  incurred  in  France. 

The  Somme  (July  to  November,  inclusive,  1916) 
had  cost  us  22,923  (twenty-two  thousand,  nine 
himdred  and  twenty-three)  officers,  and  476,553 
(four  himdred  and  seventy-six  thousand,  five 
hundred  and  fifty- three)  men.''  In  191 7,  the  Arras 
offensive  (April  and  May)  gave  us  casualties  of 
9657  (nine  thousand,  six  himdred  and  fifty-seven) 
officers,  and  186,453  (one  hundred  and  eighty-six 
thousand,  four  hundred  and  fifty- three)  men;  but 
some  ground  was  gained.  In  Flanders,  at  Pas- 
schendaele  and  other  places,  and  at  Cambrai  (June 
to  December,  inclusive,  191 7)  we  had  got  little  or 
nothing  for  casualties  of  26,459  (twenty-six  thou- 
sand, four  hundred  and  fifty-nine)  officers,  and 
428,004  (four  himdred  and  twenty-eight  thousand 
and  four)  men  in  seven  months.  The  two  big 
battles  of  the  year  19 17  had  cost  us  altogether  the 

^  See  Appendix  A,  for  the  evidence. 
*  The  historian  will  find  these  figures  in  the  great  Statisti- 
cal Abstract  of  the  War,  in  the  Archives  of  the  War  Office. 

34 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

huge  amount  of  36,116  (thirty-six  thousand,  one 
hundred  and  sixteen)  officers,  and  614,457  (six  hun- 
dred and  fourteen  thousand,  four  hundred  and 
fifty-seven)  men. 

Even  at  first  sight  the  yield,  next  to  the  expense, 
seems  slender.  On  closer  view  it  seems  worse  stiU. 
This  more  exact  view  can  perhaps  be  got  by  making 
two  comparisons,  one  with  the  cost  of  our  last  vic- 
torious advance  in  191 8,  and  the  other  with  the  cost 
of  a  corresponding  French  attack. 

Our  victorious  advance  in  191 8  carried  our  armies 
from  a  desperate  situation,  where  they  were  pinned 
against  the  Channel  ports  and  the  Somme  estuary, 
within  reach  of  Germany,  almost  at  one  bound. 
From  August  to  November,  19 18,  inclusive,  our 
outgoings  were  17,426  (seventeen  thousand,  four 
hundred  and  twenty-six)  officers  and  340,745  (three 
hundred  and  forty  thousand,  seven  hundred  and 
forty-five)  men  in  casualties. 

Foch's  hundred  days*  battle  and  real  victory  cost 
us  three-quarters  of  what  the  paper  successes  of 
Flanders  battle  in  19 17,  or  of  the  Somme  in  191 6 
had  cost  us. 

But  a  better  comparison  still  is  with  correspond- 
ing French  expenses.  Our  Arras  battle  of  the 
spring,  191 7,  which  was  successftil,  corresponded 

35 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

with  a  French  attack  at  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  on 
a  far  grander  scale,  with  a  mass  of  manoeuvre, 
Nivelle's  Armee  de  Rupture,  equal  to  our  whole 
army,  which  failed  in  a  determined  attempt  to 
break  the  German  line.  After  this  failure  a  great 
body  of  French  troops  revolted  at  Soissons — the 
greatest  rebellion  in  the  war  on  our  side — and  pro- 
claimed they  would  no  longer  obey  orders  to  go  into 
such  "butchery,"'  and  after  this  Foch  and  Petain 
gave  them  a  rest  from  big  battles  during  that  year. 
But  Nivelle's  casualties  had  only  been  107,000 
(one  hundred  and  seven  thousand). 

No  belligerent,  in  my  opinion,  not  even  the  al- 
most unarmed  Russian  masses,  to  whom  the  Ger- 
man commimiqu6s  (the  real  communiques,  not 
those  given  to  us) ,  always  refer  in  the  same  way  as 
they  do  to  us,  "the  English  masses,"  were  ever 
slaughtered  at  the  same  profuse  rate  as  we  were, 
though  our  dogged,  dauntless,  and  devoted  armies 
were  the  only  belligerent  armies  who  at  no  time  in 
the  war  ever  showed  any  signs  of  rebellion  or  dis- 
solution, and  I  base  my  opinion  on  the  following 
two  sets  of  figtires. 

Every  front,  compared  to  the  French  front,  was 

^  The  cry  of  the  French  mutineers  was,  "A  bas  la  guerre! 
plus  de  boucherie." 

36 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

relatively  safe ;  out  of  every  nine  men  who  went 
to  France  five  became  casualties.  Therefore  the 
chance  of  escape  was  less  than  an  even  chance ;  but 
at  Salonika,  the  safest  front,  only  i  in  21  became 
casualties.  Thus  it  was  20  to  i  against  being  killed 
or  hurt  in  the  Balkans,  apart  from  disease;  it  was 
15  to  I  in  Egypt,  and  25  to  4  in  Mesopotamia.^ 
In  France,  too,  were  concentrated  the  great  bulk  of 
our  forces,  three-quarters  or  two-thirds  of  the  whole 
of  our  forces  overseas.  Therefore  our  losses  were 
almost  all  losses  in  France. 

The  great  national  armies  which  we  raised  only 
reall}^  began  to  fight  on  the  Somme;  the  first 
month's  casualties  at  the  Somme  (July,  191 6)  gave 
about  the  same  total  as  the  casualties  of  all  the 
previous  big  battles  put  together.  So,  roughly 
speaking,  our  national  armies  fought  for  little  more 
than  half  the  time  that  the  far  greater  French  na- 
tional armies,  half  as  big  again,  fought  on  their  own 
soil,  yet  the  final  total  of  killed  and  missing  (not 
casualties)  suffered  by  our  forces  in  the  war  is  little 
less  than  the  French  total.  In  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands it  is  II  (eleven)  to  their  13  (thirteen). 

The  published  German  official  figures  for  killed 

'  The  historian  can  find  these  figures  in  the  Statistical 
Abstract  of  the  War,  in  the  Archives  of  the  War  Ofifice. 

37 


34.5578 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

and  missing  is  1 7  in  the  same  units.  This  is  too  low 
to  be  credible;  other  figures  similarly  published, 
like  the  number  of  German  prisoners,  can  be 
checked  and  are  a  good  deal  below  the  real  figure, 
it  may  therefore  be  taken  that  this  figure  17  is  be- 
low the  real  figure.  But  even  if  a  large  addition  is 
made  to  it,  as  the  discoimt  of  official  misrepresenta- 
tion, the  German  rate  of  loss  must  have  been  far 
smaller  than  the  Allied  rate,  if  their  double  front, 
far  more  restricted  resources,  far  smaller  nimibers, 
and  far  more  numerous  battles  and  campaigns  are 
taken  into  account.  Such  is  the  advantage  in  hu- 
man lives  gained  by  previous  preparation,  however 
wicked,  and  the  price  paid  for  improvisation,  how- 
ever wonderful,  in  war. 

Before  the  war  the  Director  of  Military  Opera- 
tions at  Army  Headquarters  had  been  Sir  Henry 
Wilson,  and  in  the  natural  course  of  events  the 
position  of  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
held  by  General  Robertson,  would  have  come  to 
him ;  but  he  had  been  passed  over,  in  spite  of  his  high 
reputation,  by  Mr.  Asquith,  who  condemned  the 
part  he  had  played  at  the  War  Office  dining  the 
Irish  crisis  of  19 14.  For  under  a  ponderous  man- 
ner and  a  portentous  phraseology  Mr.  Asquith 
concealed  a  capricious  petulance;  but  so  much  do 

38 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

appearances  govern  the  world  that  a  pompous  ex- 
terior is  sufficient  to  keep  a  reputation  for  deliber- 
ate judgment  and  weighty  prudence.  Sir  Henry- 
had  predicted  and  prepared  for  this  war  all  his  life. 
He  had  been  over  this  ground  on  which  it  was  to  be 
fought  time  after  time  on  his  bicycle,  and,  for  ex- 
ample, had  chosen  the  billets  our  Headquarters 
were  to  occupy  in  one  place  during  the  Mons  retreat 
long  before  the  war.  Whatever  his  value  as  an 
officer  commanding  in  the  field,  of  which  only  a 
professional  can  judge,  he  was  far  superior  to  any 
British  general  officer  who  ever  attended  the  Su- 
preme War  Council  in  intelligence  and  imagination, 
of  which  any  man  can  judge.  Perhaps,  indeed;> 
his  native  brilHance  and  effervescent  Irish  gaiety 
were  too  great  not  to  damage  him  in  the  eyes  of 
the  soimd  but  rather  stolid  sportsman,  the  British 
Regular.  He  was  not  only  diplomatic  but  diplo- 
matic to  excess.  But  this  very  fault  was  his  great- 
est advantage.  For  we  have  always  been  compelled 
to  fight  our  continental  wars  in  co-operation  with 
or  by  means  of  the  troops  of  other  nations,  and  our 
great  leaders,  like  Marlborough  or  Wellington,  had 
to  be  diplomats  as  well  as  strategists.  Their  part 
has  always  been  to  imit  and  guide  the  troops  of 
various  nations  through  or  with  whom  we  have 

39 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

always  acted.  Any  one  present  at  the  debates  of 
the  Supreme  War  Council,  whether  civil  or  mili- 
tary, became  at  once  aware  why  only  an  English- 
man could  give  the  Alliance  as  a  whole  a  true  direc- 
tion; it  was  because  England  was  uninvaded. 
None  of  our  Allies  could  take  a  general  view.  The 
occupations  of  their  soil  by  the  Germans  really 
frenzied  them,  and  prevented  them  seeing  an3rthing 
else.  It  was  pitiful  to  see  their  rage  at  the  thought. 
No  doubt  we  should  not  have  been  otherwise  had 
we  known  that  in  Kent  and  Norfolk  young  women, 
or  even  little  girls  in  their  teens,  were  being  out- 
raged by  gross  German  brutes.  One  village  in 
their  country  was  more  to  them  than  empires  in 
the  East.  "If  only,"  Sir  Henry  Wilson  used  to 
exclaim  in  mock  despair,  "if  only  we  could  make 
the  French  understand  where  Mesopotamia  is." 
The  sea,  also,  was  as  unintelligible  to  them  as  the 
rest  of  the  world  was  imimportant.  The  French 
generals,  superb  as  was  their  conception  of /a  grande 
guerre  in  European  fields,  and  dazzling  beyond  be- 
lief their  exposition  of  it,  seemed  to  have  gained  this 
intensely  professional  (and  therefore  perhaps  neces- 
sarily narrow)  capacity  by  excluding  everything 
else  from  their  minds.  They  spoke  of  the  sea  as  if 
it  was  a  smooth,  flat,  and  safe  surface  along  which 

40 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

divisions  and  their  supplies  could  be  moved  about 
as  draughts  are  across  a  draught-board.  Yet  half 
the  questions  arising  had  a  naval  complication. 
Half  the  debates  ended  on  a  phrase,  which,  like  a 
stupid  joke  in  a  pantomime,  became  amusing  by- 
its  mere  recurrence.  This  phrase  was  "C'est  tou- 
jours  ime  question  de  tonnage,"  which  Sir  Henry- 
used  to  guffaw  in  his  John  Bull  French.  But  an 
English  soldier-statesman  like  Sir  Henry  could  not 
but  understand  both  the  East  and  the  sea,  because 
they  had  always  been  the  main  factors  in  all  his 
problems.  Sir  Henry  had  all  the  merits  if  he  had 
some  of  the  defects  of  his  idiosyncrasy ;  he  was  ur- 
bane, adroit,  unalterably  patient,  and  endlessly 
painstaking  in  the  pursuit  of  his  ends,  which  he 
followed  with  coiling,  serpentine  vigilance.  So 
well  did  he  understand  and  manage  the  French, 
that  in  191 7  the  French  Government  had  formally 
stipulated  in  their  written  agreements  that  he 
should  be  the  liaison  officer  between  the  two 
armies.'  They  never  forgot  the  dexterity  with 
which  he  composed  the  dispute  between  Lord 
French  and  Gallieni  in  the  hours  before  the  Mame, 
when  a  quarrel  might  have  been  disastrous.    For 

^  See  M.  Briand's  despatch  quoted  in  Appendix  B,  "Unity 
of  Command  in  1917." 

41 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

though  not  good  at  French,  he  understood  some- 
thing far  more  difficult  than  their  language,  the 
free,  violent,  rhetorical  modes  of  speech  used  by 
Latins,  always  baffling,  usually  shocking,  and  some- 
times exasperating  to  grave,  contained,  romantic 
northerners.  His  Irish  ebullience  was  as  much  to 
their  taste  as  it  had  always  been  disconcerting  to 
his  fellow  officers.  He  came  into  Clemenceau's 
room  one  morning  the  press  had  been  criticising 
Clemenceau's  age,  snatched  him  up,  and  whirled 
him  dancing  round  the  room  till  the  old  man's 
black  indoor  skull-cap  fell  off,  "just,"  he  said,  "to 
show  them  how  young  we  really  are."  In  a  debate 
he  knew  very  well  how  to  use  their  predilection  for  a 
jest,  and  promptness  to  laugh.  He  had  a  singular 
gift  of  seeing  things,  persons,  or  situations  in  a 
simple  and  direct  way,  and  expressing  his  views 
with  brevity  and  clearness;  the  short  and  lucid 
logic  of  his  memoranda  for  the  War  Cabinet,  to 
which  the  historian  is  again  referred,  constitute 
models,  either  as  advice  or  orders.  It  is  sad  to 
think  that  both  he  and  Foch,  who  had  devoted — 
perhaps  in  the  case  of  Foch  one  may  say  conse- 
crated— their  lives  to  a  preparation  for  this  great 
struggle,  were — Wilson  in  spite  of  his  accomplish- 
ments, and  Foch  in  spite  of  his  achievements — 

42 


% 


©  Press  Illustrating  Service,  Inc. 
MAJOR-GENERAL    SIR    FREDERICK    B.    MAURICE 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

kept  in  subordinate  positions  and  minor  tasks  till 
its  fourth  year,  when,  by  the  will  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  taking  charge  of  our  affairs  at  their  very 
worst,  all  our  advantages  having  been  wasted  or 
thrown  away,  they  yet  ended  in  a  few  months  an 
apparently  interminable  contest. 

General  Wilson,  in  effect,  maintained — 
"The  fault  of  the  Allies'  system  has  always  been 
that  there  was  no  system  at  all ;  their  political  has 
never  been  adjusted  to  their  military  action;  if  it 
had  been,  Bulgaria  might  in  19 15  have  been  made 
to  come  in  on  our  side.  Their  military  action  has 
not  been  connected ;  if  it  had  been,  the  intervention 
of  Roumania  in  19 16  might  have  been  decisive. 

"If  the  war  had  been  directed  by  a  central  and 
supreme  body,  co-ordinating  political  with  military 
effort,  and  army  with  army,  instead  of  these  being 
connected  by  temporary  arrangements,  missions, 
liaisons,  the  Central  Powers  would  have  succumbed 
long  ago.  But  the  absence  of  unity,  for  want  of 
which  we  have  failed  to  attain  victory,  is  now  going 
to  give  it  to  them.  They  have  now  one  instead  of 
two  fronts,  and  free  on  the  East,  they  are  going 
to  throw  their  whole  weight  on  the  West.  That 
front,  which,  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic, 
forms  a  single  front,  has  never  been  treated  as  such. 

43 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

It  is  just  possible  for  the  British,  French,  and  Italian 
armies  to  act  separately  when  on  the  offensive,  as 
they  have  been  most  of  the  time.  But  now  they 
will  have,  till  the  Americans  arrive  in  force,  to 
stand  on  the  defensive.  The  armies  of  the  Central 
Powers  will  crush  each  separately,  unless  there  is  a 
single  central  command  to  give  the  whole  strength 
of  the  other  two  Allied  armies,  at  once,  and  with  no 
delay,  to  the  third." 

These  prognostics  were  too  soon  justified.  As 
Major  Grasset  says,  "the  thunderbolt  fell  without 
so  much  as  the  warning  of  the  lightning  flash." 

On  October  25,  191 7,  the  Germans  broke  through 
the  Italian  front  at  Caporetto,  and  in  the  ensuing 
retreat  General  Cadoma  lost  a  quarter  of  a  million 
men  in  casualties  and  a  qiiarter  of  a  million  men  in 
prisoners.  His  army  almost  entirely  dissolved.  So 
the  first  German  offensive  in  the  West  had  almost 
destroyed  the  Italian  army. 

Foch  was  then  Chief  of  the  French  General 
Staff,  having  been  called  back  in  the  spring  of 
19 1 7 — after  Nivelle's  failure — from  his  retirement. 
For  retired  in  19 16,  he  had  been  given,  as  Major 
Grasset  tells  us,  the  special  task  of  planning  the 
defence  of  Switzerland.  As  soon  as  the  Russian 
Revolution  had  taken  place,  and  a  prospect  of  a 

44 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

German  offensive  in  the  West  therefore  appeared, 
the  Swiss  Government  (so  small  was  their  faith  in 
German  professions)  had  anticipated  that  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  would  violate  its  neutrality  in  order  to 
turn  the  Allied  right  in  France.  Foch  had  produced 
a  plan,  exquisite  in  its  subtle  simplicity,  by  which 
the  troops  of  the  Swiss  confederation,  after  acting 
as  covering  troops,  would  have  retired  to  the  cen- 
tral, inexpugnable  massif  of  their  country,  while 
fifty  French  divisions  would  have  caught  in  flank 
the  German  armies  pouring  through  the  flat  cor- 
ridor of  the  Aar  Valley,  too  narrow  for  them  either 
to  deploy  or  retreat,  while  the  Swiss  army  hung  on 
the  other  flank.  This  famous  plan  is  known  as 
"Le  plan  H.'"  An  apprehension  about  Switzer- 
land, sharpened  perhaps  by  the  memory  of  the 
French  mistake  about  Belgium  in  19 14,  never  left 
the  minds  of  Foch  and  Petain  and  affected  all  their 
dispositions  in  the  winter  1917-1918,  as  those  dis- 
positions themselves  show. 

But  the  blow  fell  in  Italy,  not  Switzerland. 
Within  twenty-four  hours  of  hearing  the  news  of  the 
break  through,  Foch  had  begun  entraining  French 
troops  to  go  to  Cadoma's  help ;  six  French  followed 

'  The  historian  can  find  an  abstract  of  it  in  the  Registry 
at  Versailles. 

45 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

by  five  English  divisions  had  hurried  there.  Even 
with  this  assistance  Cadoma  intended  abandoning 
the  line  of  the  Piave,  fearing  the  position  could  be 
turned  from  the  Alps,  and  retreating  to  the  line  of 
the  Mincio.  Foch  hastened  to  his  headquarters 
and,  as  Major  Grasset  politely  puts  it,  "persuaded 
Cadoma  that  he  had  not  suffered  definite  defeat, 
and  that  the  enemy  could  be  checked  on  the  Piave." 
Foch  really  bulUed  him  so  that  he  thought  it  prefer- 
able to  stand  and  face  the  Austrians  than  retreat 
and  face  Foch.  Had  Foch's  decision  not  been  so 
rapid,  for  he  had  given  orders  for  the  French  di- 
visions to  be  moved  towards  Italy  before  Cadoma 
asked  for  help,  the  line  of  the  Piave  would  cer- 
tainly not  have  been  retained.  But  the  next  line, 
that  of  the  Mincio,  gave  a  very  long  front  to  the 
Italians,  instead  of  the  short  line  of  the  Piave  from 
the  Alps  to  the  sea.  As  Cadoma  was  never  tired  of 
repeating  when  he  went  to  Versailles,  not  eleven, 
but  twenty  or  thirty  Anglo-French  divisions  would 
have  been  required  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Mincio. 
This  would  have  been  so  serious  a  diminution  of 
the  Anglo-French  forces  in  France,  that  it  might 
have  seemed  preferable  to  abandon  the  Italians 
altogether.  Only  Foch's  promptitude  prevented 
Caporetto  from  being  a  blow  fatal  to  Italy. 

46 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

Foch  insists  in  his  Principles  of  War  that  a  battle 
is  a  "crisis,"  a  "swift  and  bloody  drama."  But  in 
his  ordinary  language  and  unconsciously,  he  always 
uses  a  word  that  is  even  more  expressive  of  his  con- 
ception of  the  pace  at  which  the  events  of  a  battle 
proceed  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  quick  de- 
cision. He  never  says  a  battle  "begins,"  he  always 
says,  rather  strangely,  "a  battle  is  off,"  using  the 
word  properly  applicable  to  horses  starting  in  a 
race  ("une  fois  la  bataille  partie"). 

But  it  is  some  of  the  subsequent  discussions  that 
took  place  between  Foch  and  Cadoma  that  show 
the  faults  of  the  Allied  system  more  than  the  battle 
itself.  The  eleven  Anglo-French  divisions  in  Italy 
were  a  definite  diminution  of  the  Allied  forces  in 
France,  but  they  were  a  definite  loss  only  because 
of  the  insufficient  railroad  commimication  between 
France  and  Italy. 

So  defective  were  these  that  some  of  the  French 
divisions  coming  to  the  help  of  Cadorna  had  had  to 
cross  the  Alps  on  foot,  or  else  they  would  have 
arrived  too  late.  When  the  whole  Western  front 
was  treated  as  one,  this  defect  was  evident  at  once ; 
an  indefinite  number  of  Italian  divisions  could  have 
come  to  France,  or  Anglo-French  divisions  to  Italy, 
if  the  railroad  communication  had  been  improved 

47 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

sufficiently  to  shift  them  back  again  shuttle-wise 
whenever  and  wherever  they  were  wanted.  A  few 
weeks  before  the  191 8  campaign  began  it  was  too 
late  to  start  construction.  Whenever  Weygand, 
Foch's  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and  Cadoma  at  Versailles, 
discussed  the  subject  at  the  meetings  of  the  Mili- 
tary Representatives,  they  used  to  lament  and 
shrug  and  sigh  over  its  being  too  late.'  But  if  a 
central  military  organ  of  command  for  the  whole 
front  between  the  North  Sea  and  the  Adriatic  had 
existed  before,  the  necessity  for  the  improvement 
would  have  appeared  as  soon  as  they  started  dis- 
cussing, and  it  could  easily  have  been  carried  out 
in  the  early  part  of  the  war. 

Caporetto  decided  Mr.  Lloyd  George;  at  a  Con- 
ference held  at  Rapallo  in  the  beginning  of  Novem- 
ber, the  Supreme  War  Council  was  founded  as  a 
central  directing  political  body  for  the  whole  alli- 
ance; it  was  a  monthly  meeting  of  the  principal 
ministers  of  each  country  at  Versailles.  There  was 
a  permanent  staff  of  Military  Representatives  at 
that  place  to  act  as  their  military  advisers,  and  to 

^  I  speak  from  personal  knowledge:  it  gradually  became 
my  duty  to  act  as  sole  interpreter  to  the  Military  Repre- 
sentatives at  their  formal  meetings,  as  well  as  being  a  mem- 
ber of  the  joint  inter-Allied  Secretariat. 

48 


FOUNDATION  OF  WAR  COUNCIL 

co-ordinate  the  action  of  all  the  Allied  forces. 
These  military  advisers  were  Sir  Henry  Wilson; 
Weygand,  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  Foch  in  Paris; 
General  Cadoma;  and  later  General  Bliss,  Amer- 
ican Chief  of  the  Staff.  "This,"  as  Major  Grasset 
says,  "was  a  hesitating  but  not  less  decisive  step 
towards  \mity  in  command." 


49 


II 

THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 


51 


II 

The  Plan  of  Campaign  for  191 8 

The  Supreme  War  Council,  at  their  December 
Session,  directed  all  commanders  of  all  Allied  ar- 
mies and  staffs  to  give  the  Military  Representatives 
all  possible  information.  A  constant  liaison  be- 
tween all  the  main  centres  of  the  war  and  Versailles 
was  established;  for  example,  a  permanent  tele- 
phonic communication  with  the  War  Cabinet  and 
with  G.H.Q.  From  all  these  quarters  information 
came  pouring  into  Versailles  without  cessation.' 
During  December  and  January  a  number  of  inter- 
Allied  questions  of  great  importance  were  referred 
to  it  which  the  Military  Representatives  decided 
by  means  of  joint  notes,  signed  by  all  of  them,  and 
presented  to  their  respective  Governments.    They 

'  Again  I  speak  from  personal  knowledge.  I  was  the 
first  Allied  officer — after  the  French  Camp  Commandant — 
to  get  into  the  building  assigned  to  the  Supreme  War  Coun- 
cil and,  owing  to  my  dual  position  of  secretary  and  inter- 
preter, was  busily  employed  in  this  organization. 

53 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

tiimed  out  these  joint  notes  at  the  rate  of  two  or 
three  a  week.  But  the  main  plans  elaborated  be- 
tween Foch  and  Sir  Henry  Wilson  at  Versailles  can 
be  better  understood  if  the  forces  in  opposition,  as 
they  were  to  be  between  the  middle  and  the  end  of 
February,  191 8,  when  the  fighting  was  expected  to 
begin,  are  known. 

By  the  flow  of  divisions  from  the  East,  the  Ger- 
mans in  France  then  had  178  divisions,  estimated 
at  1630  battalions,  1,232,000  rifles,  and  24,000 
sabres;  8800  field  rvms  and  5500  heavy  guns.  The 
AUies  had  available  97  French,  57  British,  10  Bel- 
gian, I  American,  and  2  Portuguese;  altogether  167 
divisions,  estimated  at  1585  battalions,  1,480,000 
rifles,  74,000  sabres ;  8900  field  gims  and  6800  heavy 
guns.  So  the  Allied  totals  were  still  superior  to  the 
German,  the  German  imits,  divisions,  and  battalions 
being  smaller  than  the  Alhed.  The  rate  at  which 
their  divisions  could  be  brought  from  the  East, 
where  they  still  had  58,  of  rather  inferior  quality, 
was  about  10  a  month.  Of  those  perhaps  40  at  the 
most  could  be  expected  to  appear  in  France,  and 
so  their  maximum  strength,  between  200  and  210 
divisions,  would  be  reached  in  May.  But  the 
American  divisions  (of  which  one  only  was  now  in 
the  line  and  coimted)  were  beginning  to  come  in; 

54 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

so  that  at  no  time  would  the  German  superiority  in 
number  over  the  AlHes  be  near  so  great  as  the  Allied 
superiority  over  the  Germans  had  been  for  at  least 
one  and  a  half  years.  There  ought,  therefore,  to 
have  been  no  cause  for  anxiety. 

On  the  Italian  front  there  were  still  the  1 1  Anglo- 
French  divisions  sent  there  after  Caporetto,  and  50 
Italian  divisions;  764  battalions,  633,000  rifles, 
6400  sabres;  3700  field  guns  and  2100  heavy  guns. 
The  enemy  had  only  43>^  Austrian  and  3  German, 
a  total  of  46>^  divisions ;  439,000  rifles,  3400  sabres ; 
3000  field  gims  and  1500  heavy  guns.  On  the  Ital- 
ian front,  therefore,  we  are  still  6  to  4  in  spite  of 
Caporetto. 

In  the  East  the  Austrians  had  34  divisions,  some 
of  which  might  be  expected  to  come  to  Italy;  but 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Italians  had  not  yet  put  into 
the  line  all  the  divisions  they  had  reconstructed  out 
of  their  defeated  troops  during  the  winter,  out  of 
which  they  were  ultimately  to  form  the  Sixth  Army. 

In  the  Balkans  there  were  23  Bulgarian,  2  Ger- 
man, and  2  Austrian  divisions,  a  total  of  27;  294 
battalions,  228,000  rifles,  3000  sabres;  972  field 
gims  and  353  heavy  guns.  On  our  side  8  French, 
4}/^  British,  ij4  Itahan,  3  Greek,  6  Serbian,  i  Ital- 
ian in  Albania,  23  divisions  in  all;  271  battalions, 

55 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

219,000  rifles,  7000  sabres;  iioo  field  guns  and  380 
heavy  guns.  Here  the  enemy  was  slightly  superior, 
but  the  Greek  mobilisation  was  not  finished;  later 
in  the  spring  the  size  of  their  contingent  would  be 
doubled  or  trebled ;  this  would  leave  the  advantage 
to  the  Allies  again. 

In  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia  the  Allies  were 
overwhelmingly  larger  than  the  Turks,  whose  bat- 
talions, by  the  time  they  reached  the  front,  were 
all  reduced  to  200  or  300  by  desertion.  General 
Allenby  in  Palestine  had  7  British  and  i  Indian 
divisions;  117  battalions,  100,000  rifles,  16,000 
sabres;  410  field  guns  and  93  heavy  gims.  Facing 
him  were  1 1  Turkish  divisions  and  i  second-class 
German  division  at  and  south  of  Damascus;  107 
battalions,  but  only  29,000  rifles  and  3000  sabres 
and  perhaps  200  or  300  gims.    We  were  3  to  i . 

In  Mesopotamia,  i  British  and  5  Indian  divi- 
sions; loi  battalions,  125,000  rifles,  9000  sabres; 
300  field  guns  and  50  heavy  guns.  Against  these 
the  Turks  had  nominally  5  divisions  and  47  battal- 
ions; but  these  only  amounted  to  18,000  rifles,  1000 
sabres,  and  no  more  than  100  gims.  Here  we  were 
6  to  I. 

This  survey  wotild  not  be  complete  without  a 
mention  of  Lettow-Vorbeck  in  East  Africa,  with 

56 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

his  250  Europeans  and  1500  Africans.  A  British 
and  native  force  of  12,000  rifles,  with  a  ration  (not 
a  combatant)  strength  of  55,000,  were  kept  busy- 
chasing  him. 

All  military  information  from  all  Allied  sources 
was  concentrated  by  the  Inter-Allied  Staffs  at 
Versailles;  each  week,  for  the  convenience  of  the 
Military  Representatives,  tables  were  prepared  in 
the  British  section  showing  the  forces  on  each  side 
in  every  theatre ;  the  historian  will  find  these  figures 
in  these  tables. 

So  the  Allies,  in  spite  of  losing  the  Russians  and 
Roumanians,  kingdoms  of  millions  of  men,  who  had 
thrown  into  the  balance  more  than  190  divisions, 
in  spite  of  not  having  more  than  one  American 
division  at  their  side  from  a  country  which  had 
actually  registered  25  million  men  as  capable  of 
military  service,  in  spite  of  these  deductions,  at  the 
beginning  of  191 8,  still  had  the  advantage. 

War  abstracts  the  world  into  a  chess-board  where 
each  piece  is  measured  in  divisions.  At  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  M.  Venizelos 
harangued  it  for  an  hour  on  the  past,  present,  and 
future  glories  of  Hellas;  but  when  he  stopped 
drenching  his  audience  with  his  eloquence,  the  only 
voice  raised  was  that  of  General  Robertson,  who 

57 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

just  asked,  "How  many  divisions  can  you  give  us 
in  the  spring?"  From  the  height  of  the  Supreme 
War  Council  the  number  of  divisions  Greece  could 
supply  was  all  Greece  stood  for. 

The  plan  of  campaign  for  191 8  was  the  work  of 
Foch,  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  in 
the  sense  that  while  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  Alli- 
ance favoured  some  parts  of  it,  and  others  others, 
they  were  in  favoiu*  of  all  of  it  and  imposed  it  on 
all  the  other  leaders.  They,  in  effect,  said  to  the 
Supreme  War  Council — 

"We  will  stand  on  the  defensive  on  the  Western 
front  till  the  Americans  arrive ;  on  the  defensive,  if 
we  give  the  Allied  armies  on  the  front  from  the 
North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic  a  single  organ  of  com- 
mand, we  should  be  able  to  resist  the  enemy,  if  they 
were  able  to  resist  us.  But  let  us  take  the  offensive 
in  Palestine;  Turkey  is  exhausted,  and  a  defeat  in 
Palestine  will  knock  Turkey  out.  Such  a  result  will 
have  further  consequences  which  we  cannot  foresee* 
but  which  might  be  decisive." 

There  were  thus  two  parts  to  this  plan,  a  central 
command  in  the  West  and  an  offensive  in  Palestine. 

A  central  command  seems  easy  to  create.  The 
French  solution  was  that  it  should  be  given  to  a 
French  general,  a  natural  claim  on  a  front  where 

58 


Press  Illustrating  Service,  Inc. 


GENERAL    ROBERTSON 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

they  had  103  divisions  to  62  British  and  50  ItaHan; 
but,  as  Sir  Henry  Wilson  always  insisted,  the  right 
to  command,  when  complete  and  entire,  involves 
the  right  to  dismiss,  and  therefore  it  was  a  right 
which  in  simple  entirety  could  not  be  given  to  any 
general  of  any  single  nation,  for  no  army  of  any 
nation  would  bear  having  its  leaders  dismissed  by 
a  foreigner. 

In  effect,  the  function  of  a  generalissimo  would 
have  been  to  fix  the  quantity  and  use  of  the  Allied 
Reserve,  if  this  whole  front  was  treated  as  a  single 
front.  This  would  have  been  his  work  in  a  defen- 
sive campaign,  such  as  was  anticipated.  Assum- 
ing that  any  point  or  points  were  threatened  by  the 
enemy,  such  a  generalissimo  would  have  decided 
the  number,  place,  and  movement  of  units  from  the 
rest  of  the  front  that  were  to  go  to  the  defence  of 
that  point. 

Foch  and  Sir  Henry  Wilson  put  forward  a  simple 
and  ingenious  proposal,  with  the  object  of  giving 
the  three  Allied  armies  all  the  advantages  of  a  gen- 
eralissimo without  the  objections;  the  three  Com- 
manders-in-Chief were  to  remain  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  but  at  Versailles  there  was  to  be  formed  an 
Executive  War  Board,  with  Foch  as  Chairman, 
General  Cadoma  as  the  Italian,  and  General  Bliss 

59 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

as  the  American,  members,  and  a  British  General 
as  British  member.  This  Board  was  to  have  the 
right  to  demand  from  each  Commander-in-Chief 
a  certain  number  of  divisions  which  it  could  control. 
Divisions  placed  in  the  General  Reserve  would 
be  ear-marked,  and  not  to  be  used  by  any  Com- 
mander-in-Chief without  permission  of  the  Execu- 
tive War  Board,  which  had  authority  to  fix  their 
number,  place,  movement,  and  use. 

The  Executive  War  Board,  brought  into  exist- 
ence to  handle  the  General  Reserve,  gave  each 
Commander-in-Chief  the  advantages  of  a  generalis- 
simo; the  General  Reserve  was  a  banking  accoimt 
on  which  each  could  draw  if  he  was  attacked;  his 
drafts  would  be  fixed  by  the  War  Board,  according 
to  their  judgment.  On  the  other  hand,  he  had  none 
of  the  disadvantages  of  a  generalissimo.  No  Com- 
mander-in-Chief could  suspect  his  forces  were  being 
exploited  for  the  benefit  of  an  ally's  forces,  which 
had  always  been  the  real  obstacle  to  imity  of  com- 
mand ;  for  each  nation  had  its  representative  on  the 
War  Board.  Sir  Henry  Wilson  and  Foch  in  effect 
argued — 

"The  system  by  which  each  Commander-in- 
Chief  attacks  separately  is  possible  when  on  the 
offensive.    But  we  must  now  stand  on  the  defen- 

60 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

sive.  Ludendorff  will  have  about  200  divisions; 
he  will  leave  100  in  the  line,  and  attack  one  of  the 
three  Commanders-in-Chief,  French,  British,  or 
Italian,  with  a  mass  of  manoeuvre  of  100  divisions; 
no  single  Commander-in-Chief  parts  with  his  re- 
serves willingly.  There  will  be  discussions  and 
consequent  loss  of  time  that  may  be  disastrous. 
There  must  be  some  superior  authority  to  decide 
at  once  how  much  each  of  the  others  must  con- 
tribute to  help  the  one  attacked.  The  Executive 
War  Board,  by  means  of  the  General  Reserve,  will 
do  this." 

The  French  and  British  members  of  the  Execu- 
tive War  Board  were,  in  fact,  joint  generalissimos 
of  the  Allied  armies,  and  its  membership  became 
the  greatest  of  military  positions,  the  precious 
apple  of  gold  the  possessor  of  which  might  reap  all 
the  glory  of  the  war,  and  it  therefore  at  once  be- 
came an  apple  of  discord  as  well  as  an  apple  of  gold. 
But  Sir  Henry's  first  proposal  was  that  Foch  and 
Robertson,  the  French  and  British  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
should  be  the  French  and  British  members.  Of 
course,  Robertson  eagerly  welcomed  and  adopted 
the  scheme. 

Linked  to  this  creation  of  a  central  command  was 
the  extension  of  the  British  front.     After  a  very 

61 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

close  consideration,  it  had  been  decided  by  the 
Military  Representatives  subject  to  the  creation 
of  a  General  Reserve,  to  extend  that  front  as  far  as 
the  Ailette,  though  the  French  wanted  it  carried  as 
far  as  Berry  au  Bac.  Taking  all  the  factors,  and 
there  were  many,  into  consideration,  they  decided 
this  was  a  point  to  which  the  British  armies  ought 
to  go.  Proceeding  on  entirely  different  methods  of 
calculation,  both  General  Cadoma  and  Sir  Henry 
Wilson's  staffs,  working  independently,  fixed  on 
the  point  as  giving  them  their  just  extension. 

But  Haig  and  Petain  decided  together  on  Barisis 
as  the  point,  and  this  compromise  was  adopted  by 
the  Supreme  War  Council.  Haig  did  not  cover  the 
new  space  he  thus  had  to  fill  by  widening  the  front 
held  by  each  division  in  the  line,  and  so  stretching 
out  the  front  held  by  each  of  his  armies.  The  front 
of  every  British  division  was  narrower  than  the 
space  covered,  under  similar  conditions,  by  a 
French  or  German  division.  When  the  question  of 
the  extension  of  the  line  was  being  discussed  this 
was  a  great  argument  in  the  mouths  of  the  French. 
But  Haig  filled  in  the  new  space  down  to  Barisis  by 
drawing  on  his  reserves,  thus  depleting  them,  and 
yet  leaving  the  Fifth  Army  imder  Gough,  that  went 
into  this  new  space,  imduly  extended  and  weak. 

62 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

The  Military  Representatives  at  Versailles  ar- 
gued— 

"If  the  Allied  line  in  France  was  treated  as  one 
front,  it  could  not  be  equally  strong  at  every  point. 
Some  portion  must  be  thiner  than  others.  But  the 
creation  of  the  General  Reserve  made  this  particu- 
lar point  a  matter  of  indifference.  For  if  the  weak 
point  was  attacked,  the  General  Reserve  could  be 
drawn  there  at  once,  and  the  War  Board  had  the 
authority  to  make  the  General  Reserve  as  large  as 
it  liked,  drawing  from  all  armies.  So  the  weakest 
point  could  at  once  be  made  the  strongest." 

Besides,  Gough's  army  was  at  the  point  of  junc- 
tion of  the  Franco-British  lines.  They  considered 
it  rather  an  advantage  that  this  point  should  be  the 
weakest.  It  was  evident — and  the  papers  demon- 
strating this  are  in  existence  at  Versailles — that  if 
the  German  attack  was  met  (in  the  only  way  it 
could  be  met)  by  both  British  and  French  troops 
fighting  shoulder  to  shoulder  at  whatever  point  the 
attack  came,  then  the  most  convenient  point  for  us, 
and  the  worst  for  Ludendorff,  was  the  point  of 
jimction  of  the  French  and  British  lines,  just  where 
Gough  was,  and  for  this  reason:  French  and  Eng- 
lish, having  each  their  own  type  of  arms  and  supply, 
had  each  to  have  lines  of  communication  of  their 

63 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

own.  It  would  be  very  inconvenient  for  us  to  es- 
tablish these,  say,  to  Switzerland,  or  for  the  French 
to  do  so,  say,  to  Ypres.  But  this  difficulty  did  not 
arise  if  the  fighting  took  place  at  the  point  of  junc- 
tion; to  that  point  they  already  existed  for  both 
armies. 

The  other  part  of  the  plan  of  campaign  was  the 
Palestine  offensive;  Allenby  already  had  an  over- 
whelming preponderance  over  the  Turks.  That 
preponderance  was  to  be  further  increased :  he  was 
to  be  reinforced  from  Mesopotamia  with  forces 
originally  fixed  at  a  higher  figure,  but  ultimately 
amoimting  to  one  Indian  division.  An  Indian 
cavalry  division  in  France  was  to  be  sent  to  him. 
His  forces  were  so  large  that  the  real  difficulty  was 
supplying  him,  and  his  capacity  for  hitting  hard 
depended  much  more  upon  the  rate  at  which  the 
railroad  from  Egypt  could  be  pushed  forward.  But 
with  a  little  time,  and  a  great  deal  of  railroad  ma- 
terial, it  was  reckoned  he  ought  to  be  able  to  annihi- 
late the  very  inferior  Turkish  forces  in  front  of  him. 

At  a  Session  held  at  the  end  of  January,  the 
French  members  of  the  Supreme  War  Coimcil  at 
first  presented  some  opposition  to  this  Eastern 
project,  but  assented  on  condition  that  no  white 
troops  were  removed  from  France  for  this  attempt. 

64 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

There  was  also  opposition  to  it  from  General 
Robertson,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff. 
General  Robertson  was  also  proposed  as  the  British 
member  of  the  Executive  War  Board  at  this  Ses- 
sion, but  was  excluded  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who 
placed  General  Sir  Henry  Wilson  there  instead. 
So  the  golden  prize  which  had  hung  before  Robert- 
son was  neatly  made  to  fall  into  Sir  Henry's  mouth; 
Robertson,  not  unnatvirally,  was  furious.  This  was 
quite  visible.  Long  after  the  Supreme  War  Coun- 
cil had  risen,  after  passing  this  resolution,  and  only 
a  few  secretaries  being  left  in  the  room,  Robertson 
still  remained  sitting  alone  in  his  place,  motionless, 
his  head  resting  on  his  hand,  glaring  silently  in 
front  of  him. 

This  plan  of  campaign,  in  its  two  parts,  a  central 
command  in  France,  and  an  offensive  in  Palestine, 
was  in  effect  the  plan  that  carried  the  Allies  to  vic- 
tory in  the  autumn;  Allenby's  annihilation  of  the 
Turkish  army  in  front  of  him  knocked  out  the 
comer  stone  of  the  edifice  of  the  enemy's  power,  and 
Foch's  conduct  of  the  operations  in  France  led  to 
a  result  that  no  one  had  anticipated.  But  the  first 
winter  edition  of  the  plan  was  better  both  in  means 
and  conception  than  its  autimm  successor.  Allen- 
by's British  troops  were  taken  from  him  after  the 
«  65 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

disaster  of  the  spring,  and  Indian  divisions  sub- 
stituted. Foch's  authority  as  Chairman  of  the 
Executive  War  Board  was  better  conceived  and 
clearer  than  his  authority  as  Generalissimo,  which 
was  never  exactly  defined.  If  the  second  edition 
of  this  plan  of  campaign  finished  the  war,  the  first 
edition  would  have  done  it  even  more  surely.  So 
great  in  war  is  the  importance  of  a  good  plan,  that 
as  soon  as  it  was  foimd  and  carried  out,  the  war 
ended .  In  the  winter  ofi9i7-i9i8,a  friend  talking 
of  the  difficulties  in  front  of  the  Allies,  said  to 
Foch's  Chief  of  Staff,  Weygand — 

"However  bad  our  situation  may  seem  now,  it 
was  worse  for  you  and  General  Foch  at  the  Mame ; 
for  you  were  heavily  outnumbered,  and  we  will  still 
be  superior  till  the  month  of  April." 

Weygand  answered — 

"Our  situation  is  much  worse  now;  for  then  we 
had  the  magnificent  plan  of  Marshal  Joffre,  and 
now  we  have  no  plan  at  all . " 

Many  legends  exist  about  almost  every  event  of 
war,  especially  of  modern  war ;  any  true  account  of 
any  of  these  events  would  be  voluminous,  or  rather 
interminable,  if  it  were  attempted  to  dispute  and 
destroy  the  legendary  cloud  that  surrounds  it. 
But  it  was  asserted  at  that  time,  and  some  people 

66 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

continue  not  only  to  repeat,  but  to  write,  that  dur- 
ing this  winter  191 7-19 18  the  army  was  being 
starved  of  men,  and  that  our  statesmen  endangered 
our  soldiers  and  brought  defeat  on  them,  by  refus- 
ing to  reinforce  them  or  to  raise  the  men  necessary 
to  reinforce  them.  This  is  not  the  case ;  it  is  a  false 
view,  invented  and  circulated  for  a  particular  pur- 
pose, that  of  explaining  away  repeated  and  almost 
constant  failure  of  generalship.  It  continues  to  be 
repeated  by  simple  people  who  at  all  times  are  dis- 
posed to  think  that  wars  are  not  won  by  brains,  and 
that  those  who  do  the  thinking  without  risking  Hfe 
or  limb  must  always  be  wrong,  and  that  those  who 
risk  life  and  limb  must  always  be  right,  however 
little  they  may  think.  The  first  set  of  figures  dis- 
proving this  legend  are  the  totals  of  the  expedition- 
ary force  on  the  Western  front,  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Adriatic,  including  all  ranks  and  units. 
On  July  I,  191 5,  there  were  603,803  (six  himdred 
and  three  thousand,  eight  hundred  and  three)  men; 
on  January  i,  191 7,  1,591,745  (one  million,  five 
hundred  and  ninety-one  thousand,  seven  hundred 
and  forty-five  men;  on  January  i,  1918,  1,937,719 
(one  million,  nine  hundred  and  thirty-seven  thou- 
sand, seven  hundred  and  nineteen)  men;  on  April 
1, 1918,  2,019,773  (twomilhons,  nineteen  thousand, 

67 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

seven  hiindred  and  seventy-three)  men ;  on  Novem- 
ber II,  1918,  1,939,529  (one  million,  nine  himdred 
and  thirty-nine  thousand,  five  htindred  and  twenty- 
nine)  men.  The  legend  in  this  case  is  not  only  dis- 
torting, but  is  the  opposite  of  the  truth.  The  spring 
of  19 1 8  is  the  high-water  mark  reached  by  otir 
armies  on  the  Western  front.  The  second  set  of 
figures  are  the  totals  of  all  our  forces  at  home  and 
abroad,  including  British,  Colonial,  Indian,  native, 
and  local  troops  (but  excluding  labour  battalions) 
in  every  theatre  of  war.  In  November  of  the  year 
19 1 6,  this  total  was  149,226  (one  hundred  and 
forty-nine  thousand,  two  himdred  and  twenty-six) 
officers,  and  4,061,628  (four  million,  sixty-one 
thousand,  six  himdred  and  twenty-eight)  other 
ranks;  in  December  of  the  year  1917,  208,583  (two 
himdred  and  eight  thousand,  five  himdred  and 
eighty- three)  officers,  and  4,698,585  (four  million, 
six  hundred  and  ninety-eight  thousand,  five  hun- 
dred and  eighty-five)  other  ranks;  in  March  of 
the  year  191 8,  220,770  (two  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand,  seven  hundred  and  seventy)  officers,  and 
4,761,484  (four  million,  seven  hundred  and  sixty- 
one  thousand,  four  hundred  and  eighty-four)  other 
ranks;  at  the  Armistice,  193,102  (one  hundred  and 
ninety-three   thousand,    one   hundred   and   two) 

68 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

officers,  and  4,197,099  (four  million,  one  hundred 
and  ninety-seven  thousand,  and  ninety-nine)  other 
ranks.  The  spring  of  191 8  is,  therefore,  also  the 
high-water  mark  reached  by  all  the  military  forces 
of  the  Crown.'  If  we  suffered,  it  was  not  because, 
according  to  the  cant  phrase,  the  politicans  be- 
trayed our  soldiers. 

The  Supreme  War  Council  adopted  this  plan  for 
19 1 8,  at  a  session  in  the  last  days  of  January  and 
the  first  days  of  February,  1918.  The  utmost  pre- 
cautions of  secrecy  were  adopted;  for  some  of  the 
sittings  most  of  the  secretaries  were  excluded  from 
the  room.  The  copies  of  the  plan  of  campaign  and 
of  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  were  limited  to  a  few 
copies  and  put  in  the  hands  of  only  a  few  people. 
For  Ludendorff ,  as  he  has  now  told  us,  was  as  anx- 
ious about  being  attacked  as  the  Allies  were.  His 
position,  a  few  weeks  before  the  campaign  could  be 
expected  to  open,  was  anxious  and  precarious;  on 
almost  every  front  he  was  outnimibered.  The  col- 
lapse of  any  of  the  mmierous  fronts  meant  the  loss 
of  an  ally  whose  fall  would  probably  bring  down 
another,  till  the  four  Central  Powers  knocked  each 
other  down  like  skittles.    Through  the  two  main 

^  The  historian  can  find  these  figures  in  the  Statistical 
Abstract  of  the  War,  in  the  Archives  of  the  War  Office. 

69 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

channels,  Danish  and  Swiss,  along  which  the  indis- 
cretions of  the  enemy  reached  the  ears  of  the  Allies, 
they  could  know  his  apprehensions,  which  he  con- 
fesses in  his  published  memoirs.  Verdun,  close  to 
the  line  of  railroad  which  gave  them  lateral  com- 
mimication,  was  a  sensitive  point  in  the  German 
defensive  system,  and  here  the  German  General 
Staff  anticipated  an  attack  by  the  Allies  that  would 
forestall  theirs.  There  was  no  secret  more  precious 
than  where  the  Allied  attack  was  coming.  The 
various  theatres  of  war,  in  which  the  system  of  the 
Central  Powers  lay,  were  strimg  out  along  an  awk- 
ward line,  separated  by  nature,  and,  in  the  East, 
connected  by  railroad  lines  of  communication  in- 
sufficient, defective,  and  slow.  Ignorant  where  the 
aim  of  the  Allies  was,  no  portion  could  be  firmly 
defended  by  Ludendorff  imless  information  was  ac- 
quired where  the  blow  was  intended  to  faU;  then 
forces  sufficient  to  meet  it  might  be  concentrated 
in  that  quarter.  The  information  was,  therefore, 
inestimable. 

Public  opinion  in  France  and  Italy  had  been 
canvassing  the  question  of  a  Supreme  Commander 
in  the  field  during  the  whole  winter,  and  was  natur- 
ally concerned  at  the  disconnection  between  the 
three  armies  defending  its  soil.    To  reassure  this 

70 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

opinion,  the  news  that  these  armies  had  been  given 
a  certain  unity  under  Foch  was  published  in  the 
papers,  but  in  a  vague  and  misleading  way.  The 
other  decision,  to  overwhelm  the  Turkish  armies  in 
Palestine,  was  guarded  with  greater  precautions  of 
secrecy  than  any  other  decision  ever  taken  by  the 
Supreme  War  Coimcil. 

An  extraordinarily  brilliant  writer  on  military 
matters,  perhaps  the  very  best.  Colonel  Repington, 
had  till  the  beginning  of  January  been  military 
correspondent  of  the  Times;  at  that  date  he  left  the 
Times,  which  had  grown  critical  of  General  Robert- 
son, and  became  miHtary  correspondent  of  the 
Morning  Post.  He  has  lately  published  two  large 
volumes  of  War  Diaries,  which  shed  a  flood  of  un- 
expected light  upon  the  relations  of  this  journalist 
with  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  Gen- 
eral Robertson,  and  with  his  chief  Staff  Officer  and 
inseparable  attendant.  General  Maurice,  the  then 
Director  of  Military  Operations,  who  in  May,  1918, 
was  compulsorily  retired  from  the  Army.^  The 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  combined  evi- 
dence of  Repington 's  newspaper  articles  and  these 

^  See  Appendix  A :  "  The  relations  between  General 
Robertson,  General  Maurice,  and  Colonel  Repington"  for  a 
full  discussion  of  their  relations. 

71 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Diaries  are  these.  During  Robertson's  tenure  of 
office,  Repington  was  the  instrument,  the  very 
effective  instrument,  of  Robertson  and  his  assist- 
ant Maurice  in  the  Press.  Robertson  criticised  to 
Repington  the  Government,  of  which  he  was  the 
technical  miHtary  adviser,  and  thus  violated  his  duty 
to  his  superiors;  disclosed  to  him  all  our  essential 
military  secrets ;  and  disparaged  our  Allies  to  him. 
Repington's  services  to  Robertson  were  public 
adulation;  press  agitation  in  favour  of  Robert- 
son's ideas;  and  public  denunciation  of  Robert- 
son's superiors  for  the  advantage  of  Robertson. 
Thus  the  closest  connection  existed  between  them. 
The  evidence  to  this  effect  is  long  and  rather  te- 
dious, and  will  be  found  elsewhere.' 

On  February  ii,  an  article  by  Repington  was 
published  in  the  Morning  Post.  This  article  was  a 
detailed  and  accurate  account  of  the  decisions  and 
discussions  of  the  last  Session  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council.  It  described  with  fulness  the  Executive 
War  Board  as  "The  Versailles  soldiers  imder  the 
presidency  of  General  Foch,"  controlling  and  di- 
recting the  reserves,  and  reveals  the  machinery 
by  criticising  it.  He  describes  what  he  calls  "the 
side  show,"  in  the  very  words  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 

^  In  Appendix  A. 

72 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

as  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  Session,  as  "the 
delivery  of  a  knock-out  blow  to  Turkey."  So  as 
to  leave  nothing  in  doubt,  he  indicates  the  theatre 
of  war  where  the  side  show  is  to  take  place:  "The 
Turks  will  retire  in  front  of  us  from  Damascus  to 
Aleppo."  The  article  also  tells  LudendorfE  what 
AUenby's  real  difficulty  was,  the  very  point  of  the 
discussion  that  the  Supreme  War  Council  had  had, 
"how  long  will  it  take  for  our  broad-gauge  railway, 
at  the  rate  of  half  a  mile  a  day,  to  reach  Aleppo?" 
It  also  suggested  to  Ludendorff  the  best  means  of 
parrying  the  blow,  "to  evade  AUenby's  offensive 
by  retiring,  and  bring  the  U-boats  down  the  Dan- 
ube to  Constantinople."  The  article  is  a  summary, 
a  very  excellent  and  concise  summary,  of  the  prin- 
cipal discussions  and  decisions  that  had  taken  place, 
at  a  Session  when  the  Supreme  War  Council  had 
refined  on  their  usual  precautions  for  secrecy,  ex- 
travagant as  these  usually  were.  It  can  only  have 
been  written  by  some  one  who  had  the  records  of 
the  Session  in  front  of  his  eyes.  This  is  also  true  of 
many  entries  in  the  Diaries.  This  charge  made  by 
me,'  of  disclosing  all  these  military  secrets,  has  not 
been  disputed  by  Repington;  in  an  article^  he  not 

^  In  Blackwood's  Magazine,  Sept.  issue,  1920. 
*  See  Nineteenth  Century,  Oct.  issue,  1920. 

73 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

only  admits  it,  but  seems  gratified  by  it  as  a  tribute 
to  his  own  importance. 

Repington  not  only  made  disclosures:  the  dis- 
closures themselves  are  pretexts  for  an  attack  on 
Mr.  Lloyd  George.  He  hopes  "that  Parliament 
will  extract  a  definite  promise  from  Mr.  Lloyd 
George"  that  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council  will  not  be  carried  out.  He  invites  Parlia- 
ment and  the  Army  Council  as  well  to  act,  and  act 
according  to  his  own  opinion,  that  "Mr.  Lloyd 
George  had  clearly  and  finally  proved  his  incapacity 
to  govern  England  in  a  great  war."  His  object  in 
revealing  our  military  secrets  is  to  overturn  the 
Government. 

The  first  decision  of  the  War  Cabinet  was  to  seize 
the  printing-presses  of  the  Morning  Post,  and  to 
suppress  it  entirely.  But  after  a  talk  with  his  At- 
torney-General, Sir  Gordon  Hewart,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  adopted  a  course  much  more  astute.  Rep- 
ington and  the  editor  of  the  Morning  Post  (whose 
patriotic  intentions  are  above  suspicion)  were 
prosecuted  only  for  an  offence  imder  the  Defence 
of  the  Realm  Act,  and  Sir  Gordon  took  care,  during 
the  prosecution,  to  make  only  the  disclosures  about 
the  General  Reserve  a  subject  of  complaint;  the 
passage  about  the  side  show,  which  revealed  the 

74 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

secret  of  the  Allies,  he  treated  as  inoffensive.  This 
artful  treatment  may  have  attenuated  the  effect  of 
the  publication. 

A  violent  dispute  had  arisen  between  Robertson 
and  the  War  Cabinet  on  the  Versailles  decisions 
in  the  second  week  of  February.  On  Thursday, 
February  14,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  decided  to  replace 
Robertson  by  Sir  Henry  Wilson  as  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff. 

Repington's  article  revealing  the  Versailles  de- 
cisions and  the  military  plans  of  the  Alliance  ap- 
peared during  the  second  week  of  February,  on 
February  1 1 .  He  invited  the  House  of  Commons  to 
withdraw  their  confidence  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
because  he  had  participated  in  these  decisions  and 
formed  these  plans. 

On  February  5,  the  then  leader  of  the  Opposition, 
Mr.  Asquith,  had  asked  the  Government  what  the 
Versailles  decisions  had  been,  but  had  been  refused 
all  information.  Not  knowing  what  they  were,  he 
could  not  make  them  the  ground  of  an  attack  on  the 
Government.  On  February  12  the  business  of  the 
House  was  to  be  the  Debate  on  the  Address,  which 
always  gives  the  Opposition  the  opportunity  of 
attacking  the  Government  on  any  grounds  it  likes 
to  choose.   Repington's  article  on  February  1 1  gave 

75 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Mr.  Asquith  the  knowledge  he  required,  and,  armed 
with  it,  he  attacked  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  February 
12,  but  without  success. 

The  Repington  article  therefore  was,  in  fact, 
used  inside  the  House  of  Commons  against  the 
Government  at  a  moment  when  Robertson  was 
quarrelling  with  the  Government  outside  it,  and  his 
dismissal  was  impending.  On  February  2 1  Reping- 
ton was  convicted  and  fined  at  Bow  Street.  In  his 
Diaries  (February  26,  191 8),  he  publishes  a  letter 
from  Robertson,  dated  February  25  (and  too  in- 
imitably in  Robertson's  style  to  be  other  than  gen- 
uine) ,  which  is  worth  reading  with  the  greatest  care.  ^ 

In  this  letter  Robertson  congratulates  Reping- 
ton on  his  conduct,  as  the  noble  work  of  a  patriot, 
and  condoles  with  him  on  his  conviction;  and  sub- 
sequently, according  to  the  Diaries,  he  remained  on 
terms  of  cordial  friendship  with  him. 

Further,  this  letter  very  strongly  suggests  that 
during  the  preceding  month  Robertson  and  Reping- 
ton had  been  collaborating  in  a  common  enterprise, 
called  "sordid "  by  Robertson  himself,  of  which  the 
object  was  to  upset  the  Government,  and  that  the 
publication  of  Repington's  article  had  been  part  of 
this  enterprise. 

*  For  text  of  this  letter,  see  Appendix  A. 

76 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

Repington's  explanation  of  where  he  got  his  in- 
formation cannot  be  accepted,  for  reasons  set  out 
elsewhere.'  As  it  is  diffictilt  to  accept  Repington's 
explanation  that  he  got  his  information  from  the 
French  source  he  mentions;  as  the  only  possible 
source  of  his  information  was  copies  of  the  records 
of  this  Session  in  the  hands  of  General  Robertson ; 
as  he  expressed  in  his  article  the  views  of  Robert- 
son ;  as,  in  his  letter  of  February  25,  Robertson  uses 
language  strongly  suggesting  that  the  publication 
of  the  article  was  intended  to  assist  Robertson  in 
upsetting  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  it  was,  in  fact, 
so  used  in  the  House  of  Commons.  These  consid- 
erations, taken  together  with  the  previous  and  sub- 
sequent relations  existing  between  them,  form  a 
mass  of  circumstantial  evidence  pointing,  with  un- 
deviating  finger,  at  General  Robertson  himself  as 
having  supplied  Repington  with  the  information  he 
divulged  to  the  enemy. 

If  this  supposition  seems  shocking,  it  is  no  more 
shocking  than  the  fact  that  Robertson  approved  of 
Repington's  action,  both  by  his  words  and  his  acts. 
The  difference  in  culpability  between  applauding 
and  instigating  such  conduct  is  faint  and  shadowy, 
if  it  exists  at  all.     The  same  censure  applies  to 

'  See  Appendix  A  again. 

77 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Maurice,  who  is  so  hardened  in  these  practices  that 
even  now  he  writes  as  if  unconscious  that  the  pub- 
Hcation  of  one's  country's  mihtary  plans  to  the 
world  in  time  of  war  is  wrongful,  however  obtained 
and  whatever  the  object.' 

The  Executive  War  Board — Foch,  Wilson,  Bliss, 
Cadoma — got  to  work  at  once.  Foch  proposed 
that  the  General  Reserve  should  begin  by  being  a 
seventh  of  the  total  Allied  force  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Adriatic,  and  fixed  it  at  thirty  divisions; 
and  on  February  6,  letters  were  addressed  to  each 
Commander-in-Chief  asking  him  if  he  would  con- 
tribute his  quota,  proportionate  to  the  nimiber  of 
divisions  he  commanded,  to  the  General  Reserve. 
On  February  14,  Sir  Henry  Wilson  succeeded  Sir 
William  Robertson  as  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff  in  London,  and  was  succeeded  at  Versailles  by 
General  Rawlinson. 

Foch,  when  he  came  to  Versailles,  was  an  old 
man,  tmwell  and  worn  with  anxiety,  and  beginning 
to  lose  his  trim  horseman's  figure.  He  shone  in 
debate  as  much  as  he  did  in  action.  In  his  pro- 
foimd  grasp  of  any  question;  in  his  capacity  for 
dealing  at  once,  and,  conclusively,  with  any  op- 

^  See  his  article  on  this  subject  in  Oct.  issue,  1920,  of 
National  Review. 

78 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

posite  point  which  he  rejected:  in  the  skill  with 
which  he  exposed  the  fallacy  of  an  unsound  argu- 
ment; in  the  flexible  readiness  with  which  he 
adapted  his  attitude  to  any  contrary  idea  he  felt 
unable  to  refute;  in  the  facility  and  rapidity  with 
which  he  evolved  schemes  to  reach  a  common  agree- 
ment ;  in  the  closely  woven  and  orderly  logic  of  his 
thought ;  in  the  rapid,  almost  exuberant,  flow  of  his 
speech;  in  the  flashing  power  of  illustrating  his 
meaning;  in  his  ruthless  contempt  for  weaker  dia 
lecticians;  in  all  these  he  resembled  a  great  Chan- 
cery special.  In  the  simplicity  of  his  ways — he  had 
not  even  an  A.D.C.,  and  he  used  to  arrive  alone, 
his  papers  under  his  arm,  with  an  absence  of 
ceremony  astonishing  to  any  one  accustomed  to 
the  pomp  that  surrounds  even  a  brigadier — in 
the  roughness  of  his  ways,  a  strong  contrast  to  the 
gentlemanly  English,  and  grand  manner  of  the 
Italians;  in  his  extreme  piety;  in  all  these  he  was 
like  a  rustic  French  cure,  redolent  of  the  soil,  the 
true  soil  of  France,  the  soil  of  peasants  and  soldiers, 
descendants  of  those  who  accomplished  the  Gesta 
Dei  per  Francos,  very  different  from  the  glittering 
foam  of  Paris.  In  sheer  intellect,  he  towered  above 
everyone  at  the  Supreme  War  Coimcil  as  much  as 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  did  in  cotirage. 

79 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Bliss  and  Cadoma  were  not  quite  on  the  same 
level  as  the  other  members;  for  Bliss  had  not  yet 
got  his  army,  and  Cadorna  had  lost  his.  Cadoma 
had  this  advantage,  that  he  was  the  only  member 
who  had  ever  been  a  Commander-in-Chief:  this 
gave  him  an  ease  and  sureness  of  judgment,  a  sort 
of  light  touch,  which  in  these,  as  in  other  great 
affairs,  only  experience  can  give.  But  he  was  a 
beaten  general,  and  the  French  never  let  him  forget 
it,  and  trampled  on  him  ruthlessly.  "Defend  the 
Piave,"  thundered  Foch  in  a  voice  roughened  by 
half  a  century  of  command,  as  Cadoma  began  his 
eternal  plaints  and  his  eternal  petitions  for  more 
guns,  more  men,  more  coal,  more  of  everything. 
"  I  tell  you  how  I  would  defend  the  Piave;  I  would 
put  a  few  sentries  along  the  bank."  Then  after  a 
pause  and  a  reflective  pull  at  his  moustache,  "And 
even  then  I  would  only  put  wooden  sentries." 
Bliss  had  the  goodwill,  the  industry,  the  sagacity, 
the  massive  bulk  and  slow  movement  of  an  ele- 
phant. He  would  have  been  the  pillar  of  this  or 
any  other  council,  for  he  brought  to  the  Alli- 
ance, where  the  members  of  every  Inter-Allied 
team  all  pulled  different  ways,  what  it  needed  most, 
rigid  impartiality,  even  towards  its  own  govern- 
ment.   "Very  well,  let  Bliss  arbitrate"  ("Eh  bien, 

80 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

prenons  Bliss  comme  juge  de  paix"),  Foch  used  to 
exclaim,  when  a  discussion  got  too  heated;  and  Bliss 
listened  like  a  sage  and  benevolent  pachyderm. 
But  once  his  mind  was  made  up,  he  stuck  his  hoofs 
in  the  groimd  and  was  immovable.  Even  Foch 
dashed  at  him  in  vain.  There  was  something  very- 
fine  about  his  character,  as  there  was  about  all 
American  leaders,  like  Pershing  and  Sims  (and 
about  their  subordinates),  who  came  to  Versailles; 
they  seemed  determined  to  make  their  disinter- 
estedness cancel  their  inexperience.  They  were  all 
quite  imtouched  by  the  taint  of  bad  faith  and  per- 
sonal calculation  that  seems  to  load  the  air  where 
the  great  are.  In  the  Great  War  the  New  World 
not  only  came  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old, 
but  to  set  it  an  example. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  month  of  February, 
the  German  scheme  of  attack  became  clearer.  The 
Allied  and  the  German  lines  formed  an  angle,  and 
the  German  divisions  in  large  masses  began  to  ac- 
cumulate towards  the  point  of  the  angle:  here  also 
appeared  Von  Hutier,  at  the  head  of  an  army.  He 
was  a  specialist  in  surprise  attacks ;  and  at  the  cap- 
ture of  Riga,  in  the  preceding  autimm,  the  Ger- 
mans had  used  a  new  manoeuvre  invented  by  him. 
As  soon  as  he  appeared  the  Grand  Etat-Major 
9  81 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

cir ciliated  a  minute  analysis  of  the  Riga  attack.' 
Instead  of  collecting  their  attacking  divisions  in 
front  of  the  point  at  which  it  was  aimed  to  break 
through,  these  were  kept  very  far  back  from  the 
line,  and  brought  up  to  the  point  stealthily  the 
night  before;  so  that  the  enemy,  though  he  might 
guess  the  region,  could  not  guess  exactly  where. 
While  these  divisions  were  at  this  distance  from 
the  line,  they  practised  over  ground  artificially 
made  to  resemble  the  real  point  of  attack.  This 
sudden  concentration  was  an  invention  appropri- 
ate to  the  German  genius  for  secret  and  tireless 
organisation. 

Foch  in  effect  said  to  the  Executive  War  Board — 
"Ludendorff  must  launch  his  mass  of  attack 
either  westward  or  southward,  either  towards  the 
British  side  of  the  angle  in  the  Cambrai  region,  or 
towards  the  French  side  of  the  angle  and  the 
Rheims  region.  But  if  he  is  successful  and  drives 
one  or  other  of  these  lines  back,  he  himself  presents 
an  unguarded  and  open  flank;  and  the  more  suc- 
cessful he  is,  and  the  more  he  enlarges  the  angle,  the 
longer  and  therefore  the  more  open  and  unguarded 
his  flank  will  be. 

"I  will,  therefore,  divide  my  General  Reserve 
^  The  historian  can  find  it  in  the  Registry  at  Versailles. 

82 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

into  three  portions,  of  different  sizes.  The  smallest 
portion  I  will  place  in  Dauphinee,  close  to  the  best 
crossing  into  Italy:  the  largest  I  will  concentrate 
round  Paris;  the  third  portion  I  will  place  round 
Amiens.  From  the  concentration  of  German  troops 
the  attack  must  come  in  the  Rheims  or  Cambrai 
region;  therefore  the  bulk  of  the  General  Reserve 
round  Paris  is  best  situated  to  come  to  the  help  of 
either  region.  The  Amiens  portion  stands  behind 
the  British  Fifth  Army,  the  weakest  point  of  the 
line,  and  ready  to  support  it.  The  Dauphinee  por- 
tion is  situated  so  as  to  be  able  to  go  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Swiss  or  the  Italians,  in  the  unlikely 
event  of  their  being  attacked,  or  to  rejoin  the  rest 
of  the  General  Reserve."' 

Foch  did  no  more  than  outline  the  part  to  be 
played  by  the  General  Reserve,  for  it  never  was 
to  come  into  existence.  Major  Grasset  quotes 
Napoleon  as  saying  that  the  art  of  war  is  simple 
enough  to  understand ;  it  is  doing  it  that  is  difficult. 
The  outline  of  Foch's  plan  was  perfectly  simple: 
Ludendorff  had  formed  his  mass  of  manoeuvre  near 

*  My  authority  for  this  account  has  been  questioned.  I 
may  therefore  say  that  I  acted  as  sole  interpreter  and  as 
joint  secretary  to  the  Executive  War  Board  in  all  its  meet- 
ings; heard  him  say  it,  and  saw  him  mark  the  places  with 
his  blue  pencil  on  the  map. 

83 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

the  apex  of  the  angle  formed  by  the  front  in  France ; 
it  could  only  be  used  to  drive  in  the  French  side  of 
the  angle  or  the  British.  He  could  only  do  one  of 
two  things,  push  back  the  British  to  and  over  the 
Somme,  or  the  French  over  the  Aisne  towards  the 
Mame;  in  either  case  he  exposed  himself  to  a 
counter-attack  on  his  open  flank,  from  Foch's  mass 
of  manoeuvre  concentrated  round  Paris.  Which- 
ever he  did,  he  had  delivered  himself  into  Foch's 
hands. 

In  March  he  chose  the  British  side  and  fiimg 
himself  at  Cough's  Fifth  Army.  LudendorfE  has 
also  told  us  why  he  chose  this  line  of  attack;  the 
Alhed  line  was  weakest  there,  and  he  chose  the  line 
of  least  resistance. 

His  strategy  was  the  "buffalo  strategy"  Foch 
has  always  mocked.  For  Foch  first  attracted 
attention  twenty  years  ago  when  he  taught  his 
pupils  of  the  French  Staff  College  that  Moltke, 
acting  on  a  fixed  plan,  adopted  blindfold,  ought  to 
have  been  beaten  in  1870  and  only  won  by  luck.^ 
In  his  various  public  utterances  made  since  the 
Armistice,  he  has  invariably  lavished  praise  on  the 
German  soldier  ("ce  sont  d'admirables  soldats") 

^  See  Les  principes  de  la  Guerre,  by  Colonel  Foch  (Berger- 
Levrault,  Paris),  Ch.  VIII.,  "La  s(irete  strategique." 

84 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

and  organisation,  but  always  derided  "la  strategie 
d'outre-Rhin." 

Ludendorff's  plan,  thus  fixed,  the  prescience  of 
Foch  had  divined  when  he  intended  to  put  the  bulk 
of  the  General  Reserve  round  Paris  and  Amiens. 
The  buffalo  was  rushing  into  the  trap.  But  the 
General  Reserve  was  never  constituted,  so  Foch 
never  carried  out  his  plan. 

The  letters  sent  to  the  Commanders-in-Chief 
by  the  Executive  War  Board,  asking  them  to  con- 
tribute their  quota  to  the  General  Reserve,  were 
dated  February  6' ;  by  February  19  the  French  and 
Italian  answers  were  received,  assenting. 

On  February  22  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  Retain 
met  at  the  Grand  Quartier-General  and  arranged 
another  scheme  of  defence  on  a  completely  different 
principle  to  that  of  the  General  Reserve.  It  was 
the  principle  that  if  one  army  was  attacked  the 
other  should  assist  by  taking  over  part  of  its  line. 
Under  the  General  Reserve  Plan,  an  authority 
higher  than  any  of  the  Commanders-in-Chief  de- 
cided what  assistance  one  of  them  could  receive 
from  the  other.  Under  the  arrangement  of  Feb- 
ruary 22  every  Commander-in-Chief  decided  for 

'  I  adjusted  the  French  and  English  text  of  these  letters 
as  the  Executive  War  Board  decided  it. 

85 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

himself  what  assistance  he  would  give  a  colleague. 
It  was  the  principle  upon  which  the  offensives 
against  the  Germans  had  been  conducted  in  France, 
and  which  the  Military  Representative  at  Ver- 
sailles had  considered  was  imsuited  to  a  defensive 
plan. 

This  new  scheme  certainly  would  not  have  been 
initiated  by  Retain,  as  it  was,  without  the  assent  of 
M.  Clemenceau.  But  it  was  unknown  to  Foch, 
who  waited  patiently  for  the  English  answer  the 
whole  of  February. 

The  fighting  was  expected  to  begin  the  first  week 
in  March,  when  the  plan  of  campaign  was  adopted 
during  the  session  of  the  Supreme  War  Council. 
"You  will  be  attacked  on  March  i,"  Clemenceau 
had  said  to  Haig  during  a  dialogue,  if  this  conver- 
sation could  be  called  a  dialogue,  where  Clemen- 
ceau never  stopped  even  to  take  breath,  and  Haig 
never  uttered  a  single  word.^ 

On  March  3  (and  it  is  the  knowledge  of  this  date 
that  shows  how  well  informed  Major  Grasset  is)  a 
letter  from  Sir  Douglas,  dated  March  2,  written  in 
answer  to  a  letter  dated  February  6,  and  therefore 

^  They  were  standing  next  to  where  I  sat  writing  at  a 
table.  The  contrast  between  the  whirling  volubility  of  the 
one,  and  the  blank  muteness  of  the  other,  was  amusing. 

86 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

evidently  kept  back,  reached  the  Executive  War 
Board  refusing  to  contribute  any  divisions  to  the 
General  Reserve,  except  British  divisions  in  Italy, 
which  were  not  under  his  command.'  The  his- 
torian is  referred  to  this  letter,  and  should  observe 
the  style  and  thought  of  the  British  Commander- 
in-Chief.  The  Italian  Military  Representative 
immediately  declared  the  Italian  contribution  to 
the  General  Reserve  must  be  considered  as  with- 
drawn, if  there  was  to  be  no  English  contribution. 
The  General  Reserve  thus  vanished,  and  with  it 
the  Executive  War  Board  faded  away,  for  it  had 
been  brought  into  existence  to  handle  the  General 
Reserve,  and  for  no  other  purpose.  Though  for 
some  time  it  continued  to  discuss,  it  never  was  to 
act.  Major  Grasset  says,  not  quite  accurately — 
"Finally,  in  their  Session  of  March  3,  and  in 
spite  of  the  energetic  protests  of  General  Foch, 
the  Coimcil  went  so  far  as  to  decide  upon  an  im- 
portant reduction  of  the  Inter- Allied  Reserve,  and 
to  envisage  nothing  more  than  resisting,  as  well  as 

^  My  accuracy  as  to  this  letter  has  been  questioned:  I 
may  mention  I  myself  translated  it  into  French,  and  com- 
municated it  to  the  French  section  on  its  arrival;  and  acted 
as  interpreter  and  secretary  to  the  meeting  of  the  Executive 
War  Board  which  discussed  it,  and  drafted  the  minutes  of 
the  meeting. 

87 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

might  be,  the  German  effort,  though  this  threat- 
ened to  be  of  the  most  formidable  type." 

The  refusal  of  Haig,  which  was  communicated 
to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  from  Versailles,  came  as  a 
surprise  and  a  violent  shock  to  him;  but  it  cannot 
altogether  have  come  as  a  surprise  to  Sir  Henry 
Wilson. 

The  Supreme  War  Council  had  created  the  Exe- 
cutive War  Board,  with  the  two  Commanders-in- 
Chief  in  attendance,  and  without  even  a  protest 
on  their  part.  In  any  event,  even  if  they  had  pro- 
tested, it  was  an  order.  This  order  they  determined 
to  disregard,  and  fight  the  battle  according  to  the 
method  they  preferred,  as  separate  commanders  of 
separate  armies,  instead  of  as  one  army,  because 
one  army  meant  an  authority  above  their  own. 
But  to  evade  it,  each  used  a  different  manner. 
Petain  answered  Foch's  letter  of  February  6, 
granted  the  number  of  divisions  demanded  of  him, 
and,  I  believe,  identified  and  even  allocated  them. 
They  were  the  Third  Army  imder  Himibert,  and 
the  First  under  Debeney,  between  fourteen  and 
twenty  divisions.  He  relied  on  his  colleague,  who 
had  had  previous  experience  in  evading  these  or- 
ders, to  make  this  obedience  void.  At  the  Calais 
Conference  on  February  27,  191 7,  Lloyd  George 

88 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

had  established  Nivelle  as  supreme  authority  over 
Haig.  When  Nivelle  issued  orders  to  him,  a  few- 
days  later  on  March  4,  Haig  repudiated  his  author- 
ity, causing  a  serious  crisis  between  us  and  our 
French  ally.^  But  he  had  then  made  his  repudia- 
tion immediate,  and  not  waited  for  the  attack, 
which  Nivelle  had  fixed  for  April,  to  begin.  He 
now  improved  on  this  method.  He  did  not  even 
protest  at  the  supreme  authority  placed  above  him 
by  the  Supreme  War  Council,  but  kept  back  his 
repudiation  till  March  3,  that  is  to  say,  till  the 
fighting  was  about  to  begin,  and  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  replace  him.  These  were  the  coils  in 
which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  constantly  wrapped, 
and  against  which  he  struggled  so  resolutely,  amid 
such  a  storm  of  obloquy. 

The  Protocol,  the  Minutes,  as  we  say,  of  the 
plan  between  him  and  General  Petain  as  drawn  up 
at  the  Grand  Quartier-General,  are  contained  in 
docimient  No.  5476  of  the  Operations  Branch  of 
the  G.  H.  Q.  (3ieme  Bureau).  This  document  has 
only  to  be  placed  next  to  the  Resolutions  of  the 
Supreme  War  Coimcil,  creating  the  Executive  War 

'  For  the  full  text  of  the  French  Prime  Minister's  protest 
to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  on  March  6,  see  Appendix  B,  "  Unity 
of  Command  in  1917." 

89 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Board  and  the  General  Reserve,  for  the  inconsist- 
ency to  appear.  It  was  impossible  to  carry  out 
both  plans. 

This  arrangement  was  made  on  February  22, 
but  this  document,  No.  5476  of  the  3ieme  Bureau, 
Grand  Quartier-General,  was  not  drawn  up  till 
March  5,  and  is  dated  March  5,  and  reached  Ver- 
sailles much  later.  There  must  be  some  reason  for 
this  delay  in  making  minutes,  which  should  natur- 
ally be  made  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  event 
they  record.  It  is  easy  to  find  the  reason.  Petain, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  at  the  front,  did  not  want 
Foch,  the  Chief  of  the  Staff,  at  the  Boulevard  des 
Invalides  in  Paris,  to  know  of  this  agreement, 
which  destroyed  the  scheme  of  the  General  Reserve, 
till  it  was  too  late  to  protest.  The  fighting  was 
expected  to  begin  in  March,  and  the  drafting  of  the 
minute  was  delayed  till  then .  So  was  Haig' s  answer 
to  a  letter  dated  February  6.  So  far  as  Foch  was 
concerned,  the  agreement  was  a  secret  agreement, 
and  he  was  therefore  the  victim  of  an  intrigue,  a 
most  himiiliating  intrigue.  Speaking  of  the  catas- 
trophe that  was  to  follow,  Major  Grasset  says: 
"There  was  needed  this  extreme  peril  and  the 
crushing  force  of  this  blow  to  open  men's  eyes  and 
to  silence  certain  vanities."     Mr.  Belloc  has  here 

90 


®  Press  Illustrating  Service,  Inc. 
MARSHAL   SIR    DOUGLAS    HAIG 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

misunderstood  and  therefore  mistranslated  Major 
Grasset's  allusion. 

The  Supreme  War  Council,  in  a  Session  held  in 
London  in  the  first  half  of  March,  assented  in  effect 
to  the  rejection  of  the  plan  adopted  at  the  previous 
Session.  For  it  gave  only  the  eleven  Anglo-French 
divisions  as  General  Reserve  to  the  Executive  War 
Board,  which  faded  away.  Foch  protested  to  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  demanded  a  supreme  com- 
mand with  an  Inter- Allied  Staff,  and  was  heavily 
snubbed.  Clemenceau  forbade  Foch  to  argue  with 
Haig  about  his  refusal  to  contribute  to  the  General 
Reserve.  But  on  March  15,  before  the  Supreme 
War  Council  separated,  Foch,  with  his  own  terrible 
and  leonine  vehemence  of  speech,  warned  the  dis- 
mayed leaders  of  the  Alliance  of  the  coming  disaster, 
if  they  persisted  in  divided  command  and  scattered 
reserves.    This  was  six  days  before  the  battle. 

The  scheme  of  the  General  Reserve,  which  Sir 
Douglas  thus  rejected,  gave  him  the  right  to  the 
assistance  of  his  two  colleague  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  and  a  delicately  adjusted,  almost  automatic, 
machine,  the  Executive  War  Board,  for  asserting 
this  right.  With  this  machine  he  could  extract 
their  reserves  from  these  colleagues  in  the  quantity 
and  in  the  way  he  required,  with  an  impartial  arbi- 

91 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

trator,  the  Executive  War  Board,  to  fix  the  quan- 
tity and  method  as  soon  as  he  appealed  to  it,  and 
which,  before  even  he  appealed  to  it,  weeks  before 
the  battle,  had  already  contemplated  putting  assist- 
ance that  would  probably  have  been  equal  to  a 
third  or  a  half  of  his  whole  army  in  close  proximity 
to  it.  He  rejected  this  plan,  and  with  Petain 
adopted  another  plan  of  operations.  The  Versailles 
principle  was  to  treat  the  three  fronts,  British, 
French,  and  Italian,  as  one  front,  and  to  engage  the 
enemy  wherever  he  came  on,  with  British,  French, 
and  Italian  forces.  Haig  and  Petain  adopted  quite 
another  principle;  according  to  the  old  method, 
each  of  the  fronts,  British  or  French,  was  treated 
as  a  separate  front,  and  the  enemy  might  be  en- 
gaged under  certain  contingencies  by  each  army, 
French  or  British,  separately.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  about  the  plan  of  operations  they  adopted; 
for  it  was  embodied  in  a  written  agreement  made 
between  the  two.'  Presumably  in  most  battles 
commanders  have  kept  their  main  idea  inside  their 
own  head,  but  in  this  case  it  exists  in  writing. 

The  agreement  provides  that  they  are  to  assist 
each  other,  but  in  one  way,  and  one  way  only :  the 

'  The  historian  can  easily  find  it  in  the  Registry  at  Ver- 
sailles. The  reference  number  in  the  Registry  is  file  26/E./6. 

92 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

extreme  French  left  met  the  extreme  British  right 
at  Barisis,  the  point  of  jimction  of  the  two  lines. 
Whichever  of  the  two  was  attacked,  the  other,  in 
case  of  need,  agreed  to  help  his  colleague  by  ex- 
tending his  own  line,  but  by  extension  only.  The 
helper  would  thus  relieve  a  certain  number  of  his 
colleague's  division,  who  would  be  released  for  use 
elsewhere.  But  it  was  by  extension  only.  If  we 
were  attacked,  for  example,  on  our  left,  at  Ypres, 
the  French  relieved  divisions  on  our  extreme  right ; 
but  they  were  not  bound  to  come  and  fight  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  us  at  Ypres.  Similarly,  if  Petain 
was  attacked  on  his  extreme  right,  in  Switzerland, 
for  example,  we  were  under  an  obligation  to  begin 
taking  over  the  line  on  his  extreme  left,  but  not  to 
fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  French  in  the 
Jura.  The  exact  dimensions  this  extension  of  either 
the  French  left  or  the  British  right  was  to  take  had 
to  be  left  unfixed,  and  depended  on  the  judgment 
and  goodwill  of  the  helper.  Further,  Petain  natur- 
ally did  not  want  to  be  called  upon  to  take  over 
portions  of  line  on  which  a  battle  was  actually 
proceeding.  So  he  stipulated — and  the  stipulation 
is  expressed  in  the  plainest  terms — that  he  was  only 
bound  to  extend  his  extreme  left  if  we  were  attacked 
at  a  portion  of  our  line  other  than  our  extreme  right. 

93 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Though  the  Supreme  War  Council  had  issued 
orders  to  all  Commanders-in-Chief  to  send  all  plans 
of  operations  at  once  to  Versailles,  this  agreement 
could  not  be  obtained  from  G.H.Q.  till  the  fight- 
ing had  actually  begun.  On  its  arrival  these  criti- 
cisms were  at  once  made  of  it. 

First:  Either  Petain  or  Haig,  according  to  this 
scheme,  might  have  to  fight  Ludendorff  alone, 
which  was  impossible.  For  his  200  divisions  must 
sooner  or  later  by  their  mere  rotation  (roulement) 
in  the  line,  and  quite  apart  from  their  mass,  have 
exhausted  even  Petain's  97,  still  more  Haig's  57. 
In  the  event,  Ludendorfif  burst  the  British  with  one 
giant  charge  of  his  whole  mass. 

Secondly:  Neither  Petain  nor  Haig  was  botind 
to  make  any  preparation  beforehand  to  assist  the 
other,  because  neither  could  know  whether  he  was 
to  be  helper  or  helped.  In  the  event,  neither  of 
them  did  make  any  preparation,  as  the  map'  shows 
at  a  glance. 

^  See  map  at  end  of  book.  "  Map  showing  position  of  all 
Allied  Divisions  in  France  in  the  third  week  of  March,  1918, 
before  the  battle  of  St.  Quentin."  The  position  of  the  Brit- 
ish divisions  was  obtained  from  G.H.Q. ;  the  position  of  the 
French  divisions  from  the  French  section  of  the  Supreme 
War  Council,  and  is  undoubtedly  correct.  I  mention  this 
because  the  G.H.Q.  map  was  marked  to  show  a  number  of 

94 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

Thirdly:  As  the  helper  was  left  to  decide  the 
amoimt  of  help,  it  was  certain  that  the  Com- 
manders-in-Chief would  haggle  and  dispute,  every 
general  by  nature  clinging  to  his  reserves  like  a 
miser  to  his  money.  Naturally,  for  the  safety  of 
the  troops  for  which  he  is  responsible  is  his  para- 
mount motive.  So  delay  would  occur  that  might 
be  disastrous.  In  the  event,  there  was  prolonged 
haggling,  and  consequent  disastrous  delay. 

Fourthly:  As  Petain  was  bound  to  assist  Haig 
by  extending  his  left,  and  in  that  way  only,  and  as 
it  was  stipulated  that  P6tain  was  not  bound  to 
make  this  extension  if  the  German  attack  occurred 
at  Haig's  extreme  right,  it  followed  that  Haig  had 
dispensed  the  French  from  assisting  him  at  all  if 
he  was  attacked  on  his  extreme  right,  even  if 
attacked  by  the  whole  German  army.  In  the  event, 
he  was  attacked  by  the  whole  German  army,  on 
his  extreme  right. 

In  a  word,  Haig's  plan  of  operations  contem- 
plated that,  under  certain  contingencies,  he  would 
fight  Ludendorff ,  who  was  more  than  three  times  as 
strong  as  he  was,  all  alone.     Those  contingencies 

French  divisions  round  Paris,  which  were  really  near  Rheims 
and  the  Aisne.  This  struck  our  officers  who  had  charge  of 
these  maps  at  Versailles  very  forcibly. 

95 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

arose.  Ludendorff  attacked  him  from  Barisis 
northwards  with  his  whole  army.  If  the  historian 
is  incredulous  about  this  plan,  as  he  may  well  be, 
he  is  referred  to  the  document.  Besides,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  plan,  the  British  army,  as  will  be 
shown  later,  did  in  fact  engage  the  entire  Ger- 
man army  for  a  whole  week  with  assistance  from 
the  French  so  small  and  tardy  as  to  be  almost 
useless. 

There  appears  also  to  have  been  a  further  verbal 
agreement  by  which  Haig  undertook,  whatever 
happened,  not  to  require  any  help  from  Petain 
till  the  fourth  day  of  the  battle.  So  the  French 
Operations  officers  at  Versailles  declared  most  em- 
phatically, and,  though  there  was  means  of  check- 
ing their  statement,  there  is  no  reason  whatever 
to  reject  it. 

The  press,  the  scene  of  so  many  of  our  military 
triimiphs,  raised  the  clamour,  and  still  in  some  very 
partial  quarters  continues  to  do  so,  that  this  soldier 
was  not  reinforced  by  the  politicians  as  he  ought 
to  have  been,  and  was  kept  short  of  men.  The 
only  way  in  which  the  politicians  could  have  en- 
abled this  soldier  to  execute  the  plan  of  operations 
he  had  himself  conceived  would  have  been  to  treble 
his  army. 

96 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

General  Staffs,  in  times  of  modem  war,  when  the 
nation  becomes  an  army,  are  the  most  powerful 
organisms  in  the  State,  for  almost  every  one  must 
obey  them,  and  they  tend  to  supersede  the  State 
itself.  Through  their  huge  patronage  they  lay 
hands  on  the  legislature  and  the  press.  But  above 
all,  public  opinion  is  theirs  to  shape  it  as  they 
please;  for  that  great  two-handed  engine  of  decep- 
tion, the  censorship  which  conceals  the  truth,  and 
propaganda  which  creates  the  false,  is  in  their 
hands.  This  machine,  created  originally  for  one 
purpose,  to  deceive  the  enemy,  had  come,  perhaps 
unavoidably,  to  be  used  for  deceiving  everybody, 
soldiers  and  civilians.  Keeping  up  the  morale,  in 
the  jargon  of  the  war,  is  the  purpose  of  this  second 
deception,  as  if  men  who  give  their  lives  with  such 
generosity,  without  hesitation,  needed  lies  as  a 
further  inducement  to  do  so.  It  is  an  easy  and 
efficient  engine  to  work,  for  people  are  left  far  more 
iminstructed,  and  are  far  more  misled  by  news- 
papers in  our  enlightened  period  than  ever  they 
were  by  rumour  in  the  past,  before  the  spread  of 
education  had  made  it  possible  to  induce  people 
to  believe  anything  by  printing  it.  Germans  were 
sure  half  London  was  burnt  and  in  ashes;  and  we 

have  never  heard  of  German  victories,  like  Pil- 
7  97 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

kallen,  when  they  took  as  many  as  100,000  Russian 
prisoners. 

But  falsehood,  however  indispensable  (and  per- 
haps in  this  case  it  is  unavoidable),  exacts  its  price; 
and  here  it  recoils  in  an  unexpected  direction. 
Generals  can  have  great  reputations  which  are 
entirely  artificial.  They  do  not  have  to  win  vic- 
tories or  campaigns;  the  subject  press  bureau  and 
the  tame  herd  of  special  correspondents  or  special 
press  agents'  do  it  for  them.  It  is  in  the  High 
Command,  and  not  in  the  line,  that  the  art  of 
camouflage  is  most  practised,  and  reaches  to  high- 
est flights.  All  chiefs  everywhere  are  now  kept 
painted,  by  the  busy  work  of  numberless  publicists, 
so  as  to  be  mistaken  for  Napoleons — at  a  distance. 
Canny  Scots  soon  discover  that  having  the  brother 
of  the  editor  of  the  leading  newspaper  of  the  major- 
ity party  of  the  legislatiure  as  a  chaplain-general  is 
a  greater  piece  of  luck  than  breaking  the  German 
line,  and  a  long  visit  from  an  influential  newspaper 
proprietor  preferable  to  a  good  plan  of  operations. 
Criticism  and  doubt  becomes  scandalous  or  illegal 
outside  the  armies,  and  (quite  rightly)  indiscipline 
and  insubordination  within  them.  It  ceases  to  be 
necessary  for  Generals  to  win  even  wars ;  they  wiU 

*  See  Appendix  A. 

98 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  1918 

be  almost  as  victorious  if  they  lose  them.  This  is 
not  fanciful,  for  almost  the  whole  German  people 
believe  Hindenburg  unvanquished  and  invincible; 
they  believe  he  never  was  defeated,  but  broke  off 
the  fight  and  submitted  because  Germany's  allies 
deserted  her.  In  spite  of  the  Armistice,  he  is  just 
as  much  a  conqueror  to-day  as  when  his  authority 
extended  from  Dunkirk  to  Kieff;  and  before  we 
deride  them  as  dupes,  it  is  as  well  to  remember  that 
a  great  many  sensible  people  here  are  sure  that  the 
retreat  of  the  Fifth  Army  in  March,  19 18,  was 
an  ingenious  manoeuvre,  and  most  people  consider 
that  what  the  Germans  call  the  Bloodbath  (das' 
Blutbad)  of  the  Somme  was  an  Allied  triumph, 
though,  being  almost  twice  as  strong  as  the  Ger- 
mans, they  could  only  gain  a  few  miles  of  ground 
at  a  stupendous  cost.  Joffre,  whose  mistakes  in  the 
first  weeks  of  the  war  nearly  lost  it,  remains  seated 
in  the  hearts  of  the  French  as  a  national  hero, 
however  much  commissions  of  inquiry  may  expose 
him.'  No  doubt  if  Haig  had  been  driven  into  the 
sea  in  April,  191 8,  as  seemed  likely,  he  would  have 

^  See  the  report  of  the  "  Commission  parlementaire  d'en- 
qudte  sur  le  role  et  la  situation  de  la  metallurgie  en  France," 
which  made  a  searching  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  opera- 
tions in  August,  1914. 

99 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

remained  just  as  immortally  glorious  and  some  one 
else  would  have  been  to  blame.  A  new  doctrine 
has  come  to  prevail  that  Commanders-in-Chief 
can  do  no  wrong  and  are  not  responsible. 

Statesmen,  of  course,  know  the  truth.  Any  one 
in  the  room  at  the  Supreme  War  Council  who  knew 
these  heroes  remote  from  their  godlike  state,  bright 
pomp  of  swarming  obsequious  Staff  Officers,  mil- 
lionaire A.D.C.s  and  attendant  Major-Gen- 
erals,  motors  and  mounted  orderlies,  secretaries 
and  cooks,  with  the  foimtains  of  official  eulogy 
playing  on  them  in  ceaseless  glittering  streams, 
could  measure  their  real  stature,  in  all  its  naked 
and  tragic  mediocrity:  naked,  because  the  working 
of  their  confused,  slow,  and  narrow  minds  revealed 
itself  without  chance  of  concealment  in  those  keen 
debates  with  masterly  heads  like  Sonnino  or  Foch ; 
and  tragic,  because  these  incapables  and  intriguers, 
thus  decorated  and  exalted,  disposed  haphazard 
of  all  those  brilliant  young  generations  that  were 
being  mowed  in  swathes  by  the  German  scythe. 
If  any  one  could  do  so,  very  much  more  could 
minds  as  quick  and  piercing  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George's, 
or  deep  and  experienced  as  Lord  Milner's,  estimate 
them.  But  these  fictitious  conquerors  are  unshak- 
able and  cannot  be  uprooted,  so  deep  is  their  real 

lOO 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

hold  on  the  army  and  the  nation.'  The  French 
Prime  Minister  protested  in  vain  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  in  191 7  against  Haig's  "repeated  tenden- 
cies to  evade  the  instructions  given  to  him, "  and 
his  "constantly  renewed  tendency  to  call  into  ques- 
tion the  plan  of  operations  adopted  by  the  Confer- 
ence,"  but  Mr.  Lloyd  George  could  do  nothing. 
It  becomes  almost  impossible  to  displace  these 
Napoleons,  whatever  their  incompetence,  because 
of  the  enormous  public  support  created  by  hiding 
or  glossing  failure,  and  exaggerating  or  inventing 
success. 

This  is  probably  true  of  every  belligerent.  Sal- 
andra,  for  example,  the  Italian  Prime  Minister,  was 
overthrown  in  191 6  for  daring  to  doubt  Cadoma, 
though  Cadorna  had  never  done  anything  but  fail.' 
Salandra  the  politician  ventured  to  think  Cadorna 
the  soldier  was  not  invincible,  on  no  other  ground 
except  that  Cadoma  was  always  beaten.  So  Ca- 
doma continued  muddling  away  thousands  of  lives 
in  his  blundering  offensives,  and  his  bubble  repu- 
tation continued  to  grow  bigger  and  brighter  till 

^  See  the  account  of  Haig's  refusal  to  obey  the  decisions  of 
the  Calais  Conference  in  1917,  in  Appendix  B,  "Unity  of 
Command  in  1917." 

^  See  La  Nostra  Guerra,  by  Generale  E.  Vigano;  Firenze: 
F.  Le  Monnier. 

lOI 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Caporetto  burst  it;  even  then  his  sycophants  in  the 
press  clamoured  that  the  defeat  and  the  loss  of  half 
a  million  men  was  not  due  to  Cadoma,  but  to  some- 
thing else. 

And  no  one  else  was  as  loyal  and  long-suffering 
as  we  were.  Falkenhayn  had  to  go  after  Verdun, 
and  Nivelle  after  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  in  spite 
of  all  their  laurels.  But  Haig  survived  the  Somme, 
and  Passchendaele,  and  St.  Quentin,  and  their 
huge  slaughters,  next  to  any  one  of  which  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  failure — where  Nivelle  only 
just  missed — is  inconsiderable  or  trivial.  Haig's 
reputation  survived  the  loss  of  very  nearly  half  a 
million  men  in  Picardy  in  191 6,  and  another  loss  of 
very  nearly  half  a  million  men  in  Flanders  in  191 7; 
when,  in  a  speech  made  at  the  end  of  191 7,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  hinted  at  dissatisfaction  with  our 
High  Command,  a  universal  cry  of  reprobation 
went  up  from  the  whole  country.  He  called  this 
superstition  the  military  Moloch.'  We  cannot 
complain  if  we  so  blindly  adored  the  idol  that  de- 
voured us. 

But  the  most  insidious  and  worst  effect  of  this 
so  highly  organised  falsity  is  on  the  generals  them- 
selves: modest  and  patriotic  as  they  mostly  are, 

'  To  Repington.    See  Repington's  Diaries,  Oct.  21,  1916. 

102 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

and  as  most  men  must  be  to  take  up  and  follow  the 
noble  profession  of  arms,  they  themselves  are  ulti- 
mately affected  by  these  imiversal  illusions,  and, 
reading  it  every  morning  in  the  paper,  they  also 
grow  persuaded  they  are  thunderbolts  of  war  and 
infallible,  however  much  they  fail,  and  that  their 
maintenance  in  command  is  an  end  so  sacred  that 
it  justifies  the  use  of  any  means.  There  were 
strange  happenings  in  London  when  Sir  Henry 
Wilson  succeeded  General  Robertson  as  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff.  The  War  Cabinet  took 
their  decision  on  Thiu'sday,  February  14;  but  Gen- 
eral Robertson,  not  for  the  first  time,  treated  them 
and  their  decisions  as  if  they  did  not  exist.  For 
several  mornings  Sir  Henry  went  down  to  the  War 
Office  to  find  his  room  still  occupied  by  General 
Robertson,  carrying  on  as  usual  and  ignoring  him 
entirely.  As  is  evident  from  his  press,  General 
Robertson,  who  had  felt  strong  enough  to  try  and 
turn  Mr.  Lloyd  George  out  with  the  help  of  Rep- 
ington  on  February  12,  anticipated  that  the  House 
of  Commons,  which  was  to  discuss  the  new  appoint- 
ment on  Tuesday,  February  19,  would  dismiss  the 
Prime  Minister  who  had  dared  to  dismiss  him;  as 
indeed  Robertson's  chief  Staff  Officer,  Maurice, 
was  publicly  to  incite  the  House  of  Commons  to 

103 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

do  in  May.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  Lord  Derby,  to  eject  him;  but  he 
had  pledged  himself  to  both  sides,  and  remained 
timidly  neutral,  tremulously  uncertain  which  cause 
it  would  be  most  advantageous  to  desert,  and  wait- 
ing anxiously  to  see  which  party  was  the  strongest. 
It  was  not  imtil  the  House  of  Commons,  on  Tues- 
day afternoon,  February  19,  omitted  to  carry  out  a 
revolution  in  his  favour  and  the  Army  Council  also 
omitted  to  "go  over  the  top"  (as  Repington,  on 
February  11,  exhorted  them  to  do),  that  General 
Robertson  abdicated  and  took  up  the  new  com- 
mand to  which  he  had  been  appointed.  Sir  William 
Robertson  sincerely  believed  his  departure  was  a 
national  catastrophe.' 

These  various  conditions,  of  which  this  great 
deceit  is  the  greatest,  at  last  emancipates  all  Gen- 
eral Staffs  from  all  control.  They  no  longer  live 
for  the  nation:  the  nation  lives,  or  rather  dies,  for 
them.  Victory  or  defeat  ceases  to  be  the  prime 
interest.     What  matters  to  these  semi-sovereign 

*  See  his  letter,  dated  Feb.  25,  to  Repington,  which  I  have 
set  out  in  Appendix  A.  See  also  his  curious  letter,  dated 
Feb.  19,  1918,  written  from  the  War  Office,  and  quoted  in 
full  in  the  issue  of  the  Morning  Post  of  Feb.  22,  1918,  p.  6, 
column  7:  "I  have  done  what  I  have  done  in  the  interest 
of  my  countrymen,"  he  says. 

104 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

corporations  is  whether  dear  old  Willie  or  poor  old 
Harry  is  going  to  be  at  their  head,  or  the  Chant  illy 
party  prevail  over  the  Boulevard  des  Invalides 
party.  So  much  is  this  the  case  that  two  branches 
of  a  staff  can  get  more  hostile  to  each  other  than 
to  the  enemy,  and,  for  example,  at  the  Grand 
Quartier-General,  Intelligence  and  Operations  spent 
their  time  thwarting  each  other.  The  Central 
Powers  (as  can  be  seen  very  clearly  from  Count 
Czemin's  Memoirs)  suffered  from  these  conditions 
even  more  than  the  Allies:  the  German  General 
Staff  treated  Emperors  and  Chancellors  as  if  they 
were  valets,  claimed  to  control  everything,  even  the 
birth-rate,  and  ruined  their  country  by  overriding 
Bethmann-Hollweg  in  the  winter  1916-1917.  "The 
misfortimes  of  Germany  and  Austria,"  says  Czer- 
nin,'  a  temperate  judge,  well  placed  to  see  things 
as  a  whole,  "arose  from  the  acts  which  the  military 
party  imposed  upon  the  Government."  Bern- 
storff,  the  able  German  Ambassador  in  the  U.  S.  A., 
also  attributes  the  failure  of  Germany  to  its 
soldiers,  who  ought  to  have  been  kept  "more 
thoroughly  within  boimds,  just  as  they  were  by 

^  See  In  the  World  War,  by  Count  Ottokar  Czernin  (Gas- 
sell,  1919),  and  My  Three  Years  in  America,  by  Count 
Bernstorff  (Skeffington,  1920). 

105 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Bismarck."  But  tough  and  slippery  as  they  might 
be  with  us,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  more  so,  and 
kept  war  a  function  of  politics,  and  victory  as  the 
end  of  war. 

Before  the  campaign  of  191 8  began,  of  the  plan 
of  campaign  which  may  be  attributed  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  Foch,  and  Wilson,  one  part  had  been  pub- 
lished to  the  world  certainly  with  the  hearty  ap- 
proval, and  very  probably  at  the  instigation,  of 
the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  Robertson ; 
the  other  half  had  been  nullified  by  an  intrigue 
of  which  the  French  Commander-in-Chief  was 
the  author,  and  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  the 
instrument,  and  to  which  the  other  leaders  of  the 
Alliance  assented  or  were  compelled  to  assent. 

Meanwhile  in  front  of  our  line  the  mightiest 
army  ever  assembled  by  the  mightiest  military 
nation  of  our  age,  and  perhaps  the  mightiest  army 
any  nation  has  ever  put  forth,  was  preparing  to 
attack;  commanded  by  idolised,  and  hitherto  in- 
vincible, chiefs ;  exultant  over  its  fabulous  victories 
in  the  East,  where  its  colossal  adversary  lay 
shattered  and  dismembered;  elate  with  hope, 
though  with  a  veteran  hope,  sobered  by  years  of 
struggle  against  great  odds,  and  no  longer  fresh 
and  gay  as  during  the  first  intoxicating  weeks  of  the 

106 


THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  FOR  191 8 

war;  confident  that  with  one  last  and  collected 
effort  they  could  repay  themselves  for  incalculable 
sufferings  and  losses,  and  lay  the  world  at  their 
country's  feet.  On  March  i,  the  day  before  Haig 
wrote  his  letter  destroying  the  General  Reserve,  a 
German  General,  Von  Morgen,  met  Hindenburg 
and  Ludendorff  at  the  Grossen  Haupt  Quart ier, 
then  at  Kreuznach.  Hindenburg  said  to  him 
jubilantly — 

''The  drama  is  nearing  its  close;  now  comes  the 
last  act.  "^ 

^  See    Meinen    Truppen    Heldenkdmpfen,    by    General- 
lieutnant  Curt  von  Morgen  (Berlin:  Mittler,  1920). 


107 


Ill 

THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 


109 


Ill 

The  Battle  of  St.  Quentin 

The  Allies  had  gone  back  to  the  position  in  which 
they  had  been  during  the  preceding  autumn,  and 
the  consequences  their  three  leaders — Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  and  Foch — had  rightly 
anticipated  and  feared  from  that  position  unrolled 
themselves  at  once,  and  in  an  aggravated  form; 
aggravated  because  only  one  part  of  their  military 
plans  was  left  intact — the  extension  of  the  British 
line.  This  portion  of  their  design  was  sound,  even 
advantageous,  if  connected  with  the  Executive 
War  Board  and  the  General  Reserve.  It  was  cal- 
culated to  draw  the  enemy  to  where  we  could  hit 
him  best,  and  it  did  draw  him;  but  though  the 
reserve  was  never  formed,  and  the  Board  never  had 
any  functions,  the  British  line  remained  extended ; 
and  there  from  its  extremity  at  Barisis  northwards 
to  Gouzeaucourt,  lay  our  Fifth  Army  under  Gough, 
composed  of  only  fourteen  infantry  divisions  and 

III 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

three  cavalry  divisions,  striing  out  over  42  miles, 
on  an  average  front  of  6750  yards  to  each  division; 
this  was  (for  the  British  army)  very  thin.  The 
Third  Army,  Byng's,  immediately  to  the  north, 
had  one  division  on  every  4200  yards. 

While  within  the  apex  of  the  great  angle  formed 
by  the  front  Ludendorff  was  concentrating  his  re- 
serves, a  mass  of  manoeuvre  of  eighty  divisions, 
the  Allied  line  near  this  apex,  the  French  running 
along  the  Aisne,  and  the  British  facing  St.  Quentin, 
had  not  the  support  of  even  the  most  moderate 
number  of  divisions  within  reach.  The  reserve  di- 
visions of  the  Allies,  as  the  map  at  the  end  of  this 
volimie  shows,  were  scattered  everywhere  on  no 
evident  principle,  even  to  the  civilian  eye,  except 
that  of  trying  to  be  strong  everywhere,  with  the 
result  of  being  really  strong  nowhere.  Gough's 
army,  in  front  of  St.  Quentin,  was  helpless,  as  can 
be  seen.  But  if  Ludendorff's  mass  of  manoeuvre 
had  rolled  south  instead  of  west,  the  French  were 
hardly  less  so. 

Early  in  March  orders  were  issued  to  Allenby 
to  advance,  and  he  at  once  proceeded  to  execute 
them.    Our  Eastern  attack  began. 

The  Germans  also  prepared  their  onset.  The 
German  divisions  from  the  East  were  still  flowing 

112 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

into  France  in  March,  but  had  at  the  beginning  of 
the  month  not  yet  risen  to  the  level  of  the  Allies. 
On  March  13,  Ludendorff  had  186  divisions  at  his 
disposal,  of  which  79  were  in  reserve;  this  gave  him 
1,370,000  rifles  and  15,700  guns.  But  the  167 
Allied  divisions  (58  in  reserve)  gave  them  1,500,000 
rifles  and  16,400  guns.'  They  still  had  the  odds. 
On  March  21,  Ludendorff  had  192  divisions,  of 
which  85  were  in  reserve;  this  made  him  equal  in 
rifle  strength,  but  perhaps  still  inferior  in  guns.^ 

On  the  night  of  Wednesday,  March  20,  the 
villages  of  Picardy  within  the  enemy  lines  rang  all 
night  with  the  lovely  triumphant  German  battle- 
songs  which  the  Germans  sang,  in  spite  of  strict 
orders,  as  their  hosts  marched  up  in  the  dark  for 
the  last,  the  Emperor  battle;  and  early  on  Thurs- 
day,   March   21,    the   innumerable   multitude   of 

*  These  figures  have  been  questioned.  They  are,  of 
course,  the  figures  agreed  by  the  French  and  British  Intelli- 
gence. As  such  they  were  furnished  by  the  War  Office  to  the 
War  Cabinet,  and  the  historian  will  find  them  recorded  in 
the  Minutes  of  the  Meeting  of  the  War  Cabinet  held  on 
March  13. 

*  The  figure  192  is  to  be  found  in  the  Summary  of  Intelli- 
gence of  G.H.Q.,  No.  446,  dated  March  22.  The  Report  by 
the  War  Office  to  the  War  Cabinet  that  the  forces  were 
equal  will  be  found  in  the  Minutes  of  the  371st  Meeting  of 
the  War  Cabinet  held  on  March  23. 

«  113 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

Ludendorff's  immense  mass  of  manoeuvre  flung 
itself  against  the  southern  portion  of  the  British 
army  Hke  the  sea  against  the  shore.  The  battle 
began  "with  a  crash,"  as  Ludendorff  says,  against 
the  Fifth  and  part  of  the  Third  British  Armies; 
64  German  divisions,  a  total  higher  than  the  whole 
British  army  of  57,  were  set  in  motion  against  this 
sector.  On  that  first  day  of  battle,  against  two- 
thirds  of  the  line  held  by  Cough's  14  divisions,  40 
of  these  64  Cerman  divisions  were  set  in  motion: 
and  against  one-fifth  of  the  line  held  by  him,  Von 
Hutier  brought  off  his  Riga  manoeuvre.  On  the 
Wednesday  this  sector  had  had  4  German  divisions 
in  line;  spread  fan-wise  behind  them,  with  the 
furthest  tip  of  the  fan  40  miles  away,  Von  Hutier 
had  19  other  divisions.  These  were  brought  up  in 
the  night  between  the  20th  and  the  21st  of  March, 
and  the  whole  23  were  swimg  against  a  front,  just 
in  front  of  St.  Quentin,  of  3  or  4  British  divisions. 

On  the  first  day  the  casualties  of  the  Fifth  and 
Third  British  Armies  were  estimated  at  40,000; 
but  Gough,  though  his  line  was  badly  dented  in 
three  places,  was  by  no  means  broken.  The  Ger- 
mans were  still  "firmly  held  in  the  battle  zone." 
The  British  troops,  as  the  German  commimiqu6s 
announced,  had  resisted  with  their  "usual  tenac- 

114 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

ity."  But  no  soldiers  could  struggle  against  this 
avalanche  of  numbers  for  ever  without  being  re- 
lieved or  receiving  reinforcements.  All  Cough's 
divisions  had  been  engaged  on  the  Thursday. 
Now  Haig  and  Petain's  armes  were  equal  to  Luden- 
dorff's,  and  our  Fifth  Army  the  weakest  part  of  the 
line.  If  their  dispositions  were  such  as  to  afford 
proper  support  to  Gough,  their  dispositions,  and 
they  themselves,  and  their  plan,  were  justified; 
if  not,  condemned.  This  result,  in  a  defenvSive 
action,  must  be  the  test.  This  help  could  come 
either  from  the  British  or  French. 

The  Despatches  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig  are  written 
in  a  style  very  different  from  his  own,  as  it  appears 
in  his  personal  commimication  to  the  War  Cabinet 
and  the  Supreme  War  Council,  to  which  the  his- 
torian of  the  war  is  again  earnestly  referred.  They 
look  like  the  hand  of  the  professional  propagandist, 
and  are  far  from  candid.^  They  omit  the  most  im- 
portant facts.  One  is  that  Gough  learned  on 
Thursday,  after  appealing  for  help  to  G.H.Q., 
that  he  was  not  to  expect  any  British  reinforce- 
ments for  seventy-two  hours,  that  is  until  Sunday 

'  Rumour — by  no  means  unreliable  in  so  small  and  intri- 
cate a  body  as  the  General  Staff — names  quite  different 
authors,  and  is  corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  style. 

115 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

morning^ ;  that  it  would  not  amount  to  more  than 
one  division ;  and  that  the  second  instalment  would 
be  another  division  which  would  reach  him  Wed- 
nesday morning.  This  the  Despatches  omit. 
Another  fact  is  that  the  first  British  reinforcement 
to  reach  Gough  was  the  8th  Division,  which  only 
came  into  action  Sunday  morning.  This  the  De- 
spatches omit.  Another  fact  is  that  Gough  from 
Thursday,  March  21,  when  the  battle  began,  to 
Thursday,  March  28,  when  he  ceased  to  command 
an  army  which  had  ceased  to  exist,  never  received 
any  other  British  reinforcements  than  this  single 
division.  Some  units  of  the  35th  Division  did 
indeed  come  to  his  help  on  Sunday  afternoon,  but 
were  transferred  to  Byng's  Army  on  Monday. 
This  the  Despatches  omit.  Another  fact  is  that  not 
only  were  no  general  directives  issued  to  Gough 
before  the  battle,  but  that  during  the  whole  week 
of  the  battle  he  received  no  orders  or  directions 
from  G.H.Q.  at  all,  and  had  only  one  or  two  com- 
munications with  it:  he  was  left  almost  entirely  to 
himself,  and  to  act  on  his  own  initiative.  This  the 
Despatches  omit.  But  their  language  not  only 
omits:  it  also  suggests.     "It  became  both  possible 

'See  Appendix  C,  "General  Gough's  Confidential  Re- 
port." 

116 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

and  necessary,"  the  Despatches  say,  "to  collect 
additional  reserves  from  the  remainder  of  my  front 
and  hurry  them  to  the  battlefield  " ;  also,  "my  plans 
for  collecting  reserves  from  other  parts  of  the 
British  front  were  put  into  immediate  execution." 
This  is  a  stirring  picture :  the  British  reserves  spring- 
ing to  arms  and  hurrying  into  battle.  But  so  far 
as  the  Fifth  Army  is  concerned,  it  is  mythical.  A 
single  division  arrived  in  a  week.  And  these  plans, 
whatever  they  were,  and  if  they  existed  at  all, 
must  be  most  curious.  For  this  single  division, 
coming  to  assist  troops  fighting  on  the  Somme,  had 
to  be  brought  all  the  way  from  St.  Omer.  The 
plans  that  can  produce  such  a  result  must  be  worth 
publication,  and  should  not  be  left  to  moulder  in 
obscurity.  Even  the  second  instalment  promised 
on  Thursday  21st,  and  due  on  Wednesday  27th, 
never  came.  Haig  refused  to  send  any  troops 
south  of  the  Somme,  where  the  remainder  of  the 
Fifth  Army  were  then  fighting.  Gough  was  just 
abandoned. 

Then  there  were  the  French — Petain  with  his 
ninety-seven  divisions.  Petain,  of  course,  accord- 
ing to  the  joint  plan  of  operations.  Sir  Douglas's 
own  plan,  was  not  bound  to  give  any  help  at  all, 
for  the  attack  was  on  our  extreme  right;  besides, 

117 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

by  his  verbal  agreement,  he  was  not  bound,  what- 
ever happened,  to  afford  us  any  assistance  for  the 
first  three  days  of  the  battle.  "On  different  occa- 
sions as  the  battle  developed, "  says  the  Despatches 
"I  discussed  with  him  the  situation  and  the  policy 
to  be  followed  by  the  Allied  army."  This  is  a 
courteous  expression  of  a  disagreeable  fact.  Petain 
did  not  stand  on  his  rights,  and  British  G.H.Q. 
and  the  Grand  Quartier  did  begin  discussing  how 
many  French  divisions  Petain  would  give,  but 
Petain  maintained  that  this  was  not  Ludendorff's 
main  attack,  which  was  to  be  towards  Rheims, 
where  a  violent  preliminary  bombardment  had 
taken  place.  This  feint  of  Ludendorff  was,  of 
course,  meant  to  divide  the  two  wills  which  were 
opposed  to  his  own,  and  it  did.  On  Saturday  morn- 
ing the  two  Commanders-in-Chief  were  still  argu- 
ing, and  P6tain  had  got  no  further  than  granting 
three  divisions.  General  Clive,  head  of  our  Mili- 
tary Mission  at  the  Grand  Quartier-Gen6ral, 
expressed  their  usual  relations  very  happily.  Clive 
said,  "Haig  and  Petain  were  like  two  horsecopers, 
one  of  whom  is  prepared  to  give  more  than  he  offers, 
and  the  other  to  accept  less  than  he  asks,'"  and 

'  He  said  this  to  Repington.    See  Repington's  Diaries, 
Oct.  8,  1917. 

118 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

this  relation  they  maintained  even  during  the 
battle.  Meanwhile,  on  Friday,  the  front  of  our 
Fifth  Army  had  given  way  under  the  pressure  of 
the  enormous  masses  in  front  of  it,  and  Gough, 
who  so  far  had  received  no  reinforcements  of  any 
kind,  British  or  French,  gave  the  order  to  retreat, 
necessarily  bringing  back  the  Third  Army  with 
him.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  at  the  Saturday  meeting 
of  the  War  Cabinet,  expressed  his  regret  over  the 
General  Reserve  so  bitterly  and  emphatically  that 
the  secretary  made  a  record  of  it. 

During  the  night  between  Friday  22nd  and 
Saturday  23rd  a  single  French  division,  the  125th, 
arrived  on  the  battlefield  without  guns  and  fifty 
rounds  of  ammimition  a  man  only.  They  had 
marched  far  and  fast,  and  with  a  few  gallant  com- 
panies from  our  i8th  Division,  counter-attacked 
(with  no  success)  on  the  Crozat  Canal  at  6  a.m.  on 
Saturday.  With  it  was  the  ist  French  Cavalry 
Division,  which  seems  subsequently  to  have  been 
dismounted  and  amalgamated  with  it.  They  were 
the  first  reinforcement  to  reach  the  Fifth  Army. 
This  the  Despatches  omit,  but  take  refuge  in  their 
unfailing  magniloquence.  "As  the  result  of  a 
meeting  held  in  the  afternoon  of  March  23, "  they 
make  Sir  Douglas  say,  "arrangements  were  made 

119 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

for  the  French  to  take  over  as  rapidily  as  possible 
the  front  held  by  the  Fifth  Army  south  of  Peronne, 
and  for  the  concentration  of  a  strong  force  of 
French  divisions  on  the  southern  portion  of  the 
battle-front."  At  the  hoiu*  when  these  arrange- 
ments were  made,  the  "strong  force"  amount  to 
this  one  tired  and  almost  unarmed  division.  But 
Ludendorff  did  not  wait  on  these  arrangements; 
Von  Hutier's  army  had  been  sweeping  forward 
during  Friday  and  the  morning  of  Saturday,  driv- 
ing before  it  Cough's  army,  which  was  losing  its 
cohesion  more  and  more.  At  midday  on  Saturday 
the  Germans  had  found  a  gap  at  Ham  and  crossed 
the  Somme;  so  that  the  sector  the  Allied  Com- 
manders decided  on  Saturday  afternoon  that  the 
French  should  take  over  had  already  been  occupied 
by  the  Germans  when  the  decision  was  taken.  Only 
the  "usual  tenacity  "  of  the  British  troops  had  kept 
Von  Hutier  till  Saturday  evening  reaching  the  objec- 
tives assigned  to  his  troops  for  Thursday  evening. 
The  Despatches  never  analyse  the  composition 
this  "strong  force  of  French  divisions"  was  to 
have,  nor  mention  the  date  of  its  arrival.  This  is 
left  conveniently  vague,  and  the  battle  thus  no  less 
conveniently  unintelligible.  The  Despatches  do 
not  mention  the  arrival  of  the  125th  French  divi- 

120 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

sion  on  Saturday  morning,  and  units  of  the  9th  and 
loth  on  Saturday  afternoon;  that  only  the  62nd 
French  division  and  elements  of  the  22nd  arrived 
on  Sunday;  that  only  the  133rd  French  division 
arrived  on  Monday;  that  only  the  35th  Division 
arrived  on  Tuesday;  and  that  only  the  56th,  162nd, 
and  1 66th  arrived  on  Wednesday,  March  2']. 

Thus,  during  this  week  of  continuous  fighting, 
when  we  were  attacked  by  the  whole  German  army, 
only  ten  French  divisions  came  into  action,  and 
then,  in  General  Gough's  own  words,  "without 
their  guns,  their  transport,  or  any  sufficient  signal 
or  staff  organisation,"  and  probably  incomplete. 
This  is  the  "strong  force"  of  the  Despatches,  and 
these  the  moments  of  its  arrival.  The  published 
French  official  accoimts  conceal  these  precise  num- 
bers and  dates  no  less  than  the  British,  and  for  the 
same  reason.  Given  the  numbers  engaged,  this 
assistance  is  so  small  and  tardy  as  to  be  almost 
useless.  Therefore  the  scheme  of  co-operation 
between  the  two  commanders  was  such  that  the 
German  army  was  able  to  engage  the  British  army, 
about  a  third  of  its  own  size,  almost  quite  alone  for 
a  whole  week.  This  condemns  their  leadership,  and 
this  is  the  reason  these  numbers  and  dates  are 
unpublished. 

121 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

If  a  look  is  taken  at  the  map,  and  the  scattered 
distribution  of  Retain' s  reserves  in  the  third  week 
of  March,'  it  is  surprising  that  even  this  number 
were  able  to  reach  the  battlefield.  This  assistance 
would  have  been  smaller  and  later  still  but  for  the 
headlong  ardour  with  which  the  French  army  and 
divisional  commanders  hurled  their  troops  into 
battle  as  soon  as  they  could  get  them  to  the  battle- 
field, and  the  energy  with  which  the  French  trans- 
port organisation  poured  them  on  to  it.  The 
French  generals  rushed  on  to  the  battlefield  almost 
alone.  On  Sunday  morning,  Humbert,  who  was  to 
command  a  French  army,  burst  into  Fifth  Army 
Headquarters.    Gough  said  to  him — 

"I  hope  you  are  bringing  me  an  army.'* 

Humbert  replied — 

"I  am,  but  I  have  only  got  my  standard-bearer 
with  me."    ("  Je  n'ai  que  mon  f anion.") 

This  help  was  much  earlier  than  had  been  con- 
sidered possible  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  when 
Gough  seems  to  have  thought  that,  after  the  Satur- 
day instalment,  Tuesday  would  be  the  day  on 
which  the  second  instalment  of  French  divisions 
would  reach  him. 

The  error  in  the  G.H.Q.  map  that  came  to  Ver- 

^  See  Map  at  end  of  book. 

122 


GEN  ERAL    RETAIN 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

sailles,  on  which  the  French  reserves,  actually  near 
Rheims  and  the  Aisne  at  the  outset  of  the  battle, 
were  marked  as  being  near  Paris,  is  most  curious. 
For  if  Petain  had  intended  to  deceive  Haig,  this  is 
exactly  the  trick  he  would  have  practised :  he  would 
have  got  him  to  believe  the  French  army  were 
taking  risks  so  as  to  be  in  a  position  to  help  him, 
while  in  fact  the  French  army  was  taking  no  risks 
but  putting  itself  in  a  position  where  it  could  give 
no  immediate  help  to  Haig.  If  this  is  the  case, 
Petain  first  used  Haig  to  get  rid  of  Foch's  superior 
command;  then  induced  Haig  to  enter  into  the 
necessarily  disastrous  agreement  of  February;  and 
lastly  duped  him  in  the  execution  of  it. 

If  either  three  or  four  divisions,  French  or  British 
(and  not  much  in  a  battle  where  more  than  350 
divisions  were  on  that  front  on  both  sides),  had 
reached  Gough  on  Thursday,  March  21,  he  might 
have  been  safe.  This  small  figure  was  only  reached 
on  Sunday,  March  24,  more  than  three  days  after 
the  beginning  of  the  attack.  If  six  divisions  had 
reached  him  on  Thursday,  March  21,  he  would 
certainly  have  been  safe.  This  figure  was  only 
reached  on  Monday.  This  is  the  opinion  of  Gen- 
eral Gough  himself,  expressed  a  considerable  time 
after  the  writing  of  his  confidential  report. 

123 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

According  to  Foch's  projected  concentration  of 
the  General  Reserve,  more  than  twenty  divisions 
would  have  massed  near  Amiens  and  north  of  Paris, 
within  easy  proximity  of  Gough. 

Thus  during  the  week-end  the  Germans  drove 
on  towards  Amiens,  pushing  before  them  the  shreds 
of  Gough's  army;  if  they  reached  Amiens  the 
British  and  French  armies  were  separated,  for  no 
real  commimication  could  be  established  between 
them  on  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Somme  below 
Amiens.  Once  separated,  Ludendorff  could  take 
breath,  and  fling  his  mass  of  manoeuvre  of  loo 
divisions  against  each  separately  and  in  turn, 
either  the  reduced  British  pressed  against  the 
Channel  ports,  or  the  French  with  a  vast  front  to 
cover. 

During  the  week-end,  therefore,  at  London, 
Paris,  and  Versailles,  disastrous  events  were  dis- 
cussed and  desperate  resolutions  taken;  measures 
for  the  evacuation  of  Paris  were  considered;  late  on 
Saturday  night,  Clemenceau  telephoned  to  the 
President  of  the  Republic  to  get  ready  to  leave 
Paris,  with  the  rest  of  the  Government,  for  Bor- 
deaux. Clemenceau  loudly  declared  he  would 
fight  to  the  Pyrenees,  and  calculations  were  made 
whether  it  would  be  possible  to  re-embark  and  save 

124 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

the  remainder  of  the  British  army.  But  however 
determined  their  statesmen  might  be,  the  two 
nations  might  have  refused  to  make  a  further  effort, 
and  the  fortitude  of  one  might  not  have  endured  the 
loss  of  their  capital,  or  the  patience  of  the  other 
the  destruction  of  their  great  army.  The  loss  of 
Amiens  might  involve  the  loss  of  the  war;  every- 
thing hung  upon  it.  Victory,  therefore,  was  again 
within  the  grasp  of  the  Germans. 

Ludendorff  proudly  says  the  Germans  at  St. 
Quentin  did  what  no  one  else  had  done  in  the  war. 
But  even  the  Germans  must  be  given  their  due,  and 
he  imderstates  his  own  achievement.  After  re- 
sisting for  nearly  two  years  the  attempts  of  Allied 
armies  almost  twice  their  size  to  break  through 
their  front,  the  Germans  themselves  broke  through 
the  Allied  front  with  a  bare  equality  of  forces,  and 
this  with  a  plan  of  operations  that  was  very  faulty, 
and  ought  to  have  proved  fatal.  During  the  week 
the  German  Emperor  gave  Hindenburg  a  decora- 
tion that  has  only  been  given  on  one  other  single 
occasion  in  Prussian  history,  to  Blucher  after 
Waterloo;  perhaps  St.  Quentin  was  the  greatest 
German  victory  of  the  war,  and  their  greatest 
military  operation. 

It  is  certainly  the  greatest  defeat  we  have  ever 

125 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

suffered  in  our  history,  measured  by  any  standard. 
For  in  the  month  of  March,  191 8,  in  ten  days' 
fighting,  we  had  in  casualties  8840  (eight  thousand, 
eight  hundred  and  forty)  officers  and  164,881  (one 
hundred  and  sixty-four  thousand,  eight  hundred 
and  eighty-one)  men.'  This  almost  reaches  July, 
191 6,  the  first  month  of  the  Somme  battle,  which 
has  the  record  in  the  war  for  casualties  in  a  single 
month  with  8709  (eight  thousand,  seven  hundred 
and  nine)  officers  and  187,372  (one  hundred  and 
eighty-seven  thousand,  three  hundred  and  seventy- 
two)  men.  Ludendorff,  however,  did  not  stop 
bleeding  us,  and  in  the  next  month,  April,  19 18,  he 
infficted  losses  on  us  of  6709  (six  thousand,  seven 
hundred  and  nine)  officers  and  136,459  (one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-six  thousand,  fovir  hundred  and 
fifty-nine)  men,  and  in  May,  3452  (three  thousand, 
four  hundred  and  fifty-two)  officers  and  65,597 
(sixty-five  thousand,  five  htmdred  and  ninety- 
seven)  men.  Never  before,  not  during  even  the 
first  three  months  of  the  Somme  shambles,  have 
Englishmen  been  slain  at  such  rate  and  on  such  a 

'  Strictly  speaking,  these  are  our  casualties  for  these 
periods  on  all  fronts,  but  all  except  the  smallest  portion  were 
in  France.  The  historian  will  find  them  in  the  Statistical 
Abstract  of  the  War  previously  referred  to. 

126 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

scale,  and  at  the  end  of  it,  in  June,  the  remainder 
were  still  on  the  brink  of  ruin,  from  which  only 
their  "usual  tenacity"  had  saved  them. 

The  prognostics  of  Sir  Henry  Wilson  and  Foch 
in  the  preceding  autumn  had  been  fulfilled  as  if  by 
programme.  The  Germans,  impelled  by  a  single 
will,  had  in  turn  endeavoured  to  crush  the  separate 
armies  of  the  Allies,  the  Italians  at  Caporetto,  and 
the  British  at  St.  Quentin,  and  very  nearly  sue 
cccded.  The  system  of  three  independent  Com- 
manders-in-Chief had  been  disastrous  on  the 
defensive  for  just  the  same  reason  they  had  pre- 
dicted, that  the  help  which  one  Commander-in- 
Chief  would  give  a  colleague  in  danger  would  be 
either  insufficient  or  too  late,  or  both,  and  could 
only  be  decided  by  a  superior  authority  superior 
to  them  all.  From  the  first  week  of  March,  when 
the  plan  of  a  General  Reserve  was  abandoned, 
Cough's  army  was  doomed,  given  the  actual  dis- 
position of  the  reserve  division  of  Petain  and  Haig, 
as  the  map  shows.  During  the  fortnight  that 
preceded  the  battle  no  one  on  the  immediate  staff 
of  Foch  had  any  doubt  that  a  catastrophe  was  in- 
evitable, and  Foch  himself  told  the  Supreme  War 
Coimcil  so  on  March  15  in  London.  The  future 
historian  of  the  war  can  easily  satisfy  himself  of 

127 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

the  accuracy  of  this  forecast.  There  are  two  docu- 
ments, short  and  simple,  which  for  this,  as  well  as 
every  other  battle  of  the  war,  tell  the  story  of  the 
engagement  at  a  glance :  the  position  of  the  Alhed 
divisions  and  the  Diary  of  G.H.Q.;  these  are 
worth  for  any  battle  all  the  mountain  of  documents 
that  exist.  The  positions  for  March  (which  can  be 
seen  in  the  map  at  the  end  of  this  volume)  show  the 
Allied  reserves  were  so  disposed  that  they  could  not 
reach  Gough  in  time  to  save  him  against  such  an  ava- 
lanche, and  the  Diary  of  G.H.Q.  that  they  did  not. 
Ludendorff  to  this  day  does  not  understand  his 
success,  and  attributes  it  to  surprise.  But  there 
could  not  be  a  battle  in  which  there  was  less  of  the 
unexpected.  As  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  already 
told  the  world,  the  British  staff  at  Versailles  had 
worked  out  the  attack  exactly  as  it  took  place, 
except  that  they  placed  the  main  point  where  the 
Germans  would  try  and  come  through  a  little 
farther  north.  This  accurate  estimate  was  in  the 
main  due  to  Sir  Henry  Wilson.  He  had  formed  his 
staff  so  as  to  admit  of  two  distinct  branches.  One 
branch  was  Allied,  the  other  Enemy,  and  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  Enemy  branch  to  "get  into  the  Ger- 
mans' skins,"  and  to  study  the  attack  from  their 
point  of  view.    The  direction  of  the  coming  attack 

128 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

was  thus  gauged  within  a  few  miles,  and  its  volume 
within  a  few  divisions.  The  conflict  between  these 
branches  was  known  as  the  "war  game."  This 
war  game  was  also  played  out  before  Robertson, 
and  afterwards  before  Haig.  Robertson  asked  a 
number  of  questions,  all  of  which  were  answered, 
and  left  looking  very  annoyed  at  having  such  dis- 
agreeable ideas  as  an  attack  of  this  kind  forced 
upon  him.    Haig  spoke  only  once:  he  asked — 

"What  is  the  meaning  of  anti-tank  defence?" 
and  left  in  the  same  imbroken  silence.  There  was 
only  one  error  in  these  calculations.  By  the  rules 
of  the  war  game,  Ludendorff  ought  to  have  had 
Amiens ;  there  was  one  factor  in  the  problem  which 
the  director  in  the  game,  General  Studd,  had 
not  put  quite  high  enough,  the  proud  obstinacy 
of  English  troops,  however  foolish  their  leading. 
These  anticipations  were  a  reckoning  from  prob- 
abilities, made  in  January.  Ludendorff  has  pub- 
lished his  accoimt  of  the  long  internal  debate  in  his 
own  mind,  before  he  adopted  his  plan  and  took 
consequential  measures.  But  as  fast  as  he  took 
those  measures,  Foch  discerned  his  plan  in  Febru- 
ary.^    As  the  spring  approached  the  prognostics 

^  I  was  interpreter  and  secretary  to  the  Executive  War 
Board  on  all  sittings.    On  reading  Ludendorff 's  Memoirs,  I 
s>  129 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

had  grown  more  precise  still.  General  Cox,  of 
G.H.Q.  Intelligence,  not  only  gave  the  exact  area 
of  the  attack  (a  portion  of  the  German  line  which 
was  lying  hushed  and  motionless  while  the  whole  of 
the  rest  of  it  flared  up  with  raids  and  artillery 
preparation),  but  tipped  the  exact  date  "on  March 
20  or  21."  The  German  strength  was,  of  course, 
known  exactly,  and  its  disposition  roughly.  Even 
the  result  was  not  a  surprise  to  some  of  the  very 
few  who  knew  the  Allied  dispositions  as  shown  in 
the  map.'  It  did  not  need  particular  genius  to  do 
so,  as  any  one  can  convince  themselves  by  looking 
at  it  and  imagining  a  mass  of  eighty  German  divi- 
sions in  front  of  Gough's  army. 

It  might  have  been  far  otherwise.  The  "terrible 
blow,"  as  Major  Grasset  calls  it,  which  Foch  in- 
flicted on  the  Germans  at  the  Mame  in  July,  191 8, 
might  just  as  well,  and  perhaps  more  effectively, 
have  been  dealt  on  the  Somme  in  March.    When  in 

am  struck  by  the  accuracy  with  which  Foch  was  reading  his 
mind  in  February.  On  one  point  only  were  Foch  and  Wey- 
gand  out.  They  were  always  nervous  about  an  outflanking 
movement  through  Switzerland.  Weygand  always  spoke 
anxiously  about  the  great  railway  junction  at  Ulm,  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  suddenly  switching  masses  of 
troops  to  any  part  of  the  Rhine. 
^  See  Map  at  end  of  book. 

130 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

June  Ludendorff  crossed  the  Aisne  and  prepared  to 
cross  the  Mame,  Major  Grasset  says  that  Foch, 
then  Generalissimo,  and  with  power  to  do  what  he 
willed,  "divined  the  error  the  enemy  would  make," 
and  massed  his  reserves  in  the  "wooded  hills  of  the 
region  of  Compiegne — Villers-Cotterets,"  that  is 
to  say,  to  the  north  of  Paris.  He  points  out  that 
it  was  an  irretrievable  mistake  of  Ludendorff 's  to 
cross  the  Aisne  with  a  "master  of  manoeuvre"  Hke 
Foch  in  possession  of  these  wooded  hills.  But 
Ludendorff  had  committed  no  less  an  error  in 
March  (and  Foch  had  anticipated  it),  when  he 
pushed  across  the  Somme.  If  Foch  had  been 
allowed,  as  he  intended,  to  concentrate  the  bulk  of 
his  General  Reserve  in  these  same  wooded  hills  of 
Compiegne,  a  mass  of  Allied  divisions,  issuing  from 
them,  would  have  fallen  on  the  German  flank  in 
March  with  an  even  more  fatal  weight  than  in 
July.  Foch  in  the  summer  only  rettimed  to  his 
original  March  manoeuvre,  just  as  Ludendorff  re- 
turned to  his  original  error.  Foch  in  the  spring 
would  certainly  with  his  plan  have  stopped  the 
charging  German  bull  dead,  and  might  possibly, 
with  a  single  rapier  thrust  of  consummate  deadly 
elegance,  have  pierced  right  to  his  heart,  and  ended 
him,  then  and  there,  for  ever.    Or  our  5th  Army 

131 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

might  perhaps  have  played  the  part  the  5th  French 
Army,  imder  Berthelot,  played  at  the  second  Mame, 
and  by  its  very  retreat  drawn  the  enemy  where  the 
counter-attack  could  club  and  stun  him  more 
effectually. 

After  the  March  disaster  the  defeated  Generals 
heard  no  recriminations.  The  true  spirit  of  patriot- 
ism in  defeat,  that  never  despairs  of  its  country, 
was  shown  both  by  the  King  and  the  War  Cabinet 
who,  with  inflexible  fortitude,  telegraphed  on 
Monday  to  our  armies  to  encourage,  to  thank,  and 
to  congratulate  them:  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  driven 
to  desperate  expedients  by  the  scheming  and 
bimgling  of  others,  boldly  swept  the  home  defences 
clean  to  send  every  man  to  France,  and  dared  (as 
he  ought  never  have  been  compelled  to  dare)  to 
leave  this  island  guarded  only  by  a  few  brigades, 
so  that  he  let  Sir  Douglas  know  he  was  to  be  sent 
80,000  men  at  once,  and  82,000  more  within  three 
weeks.  The  historian  who  wants  to  appreciate  the 
energy  and  courage  of  the  War  Cabinet,  and  what 
a  glorious  pilot  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  in  a  storm, 
should  consult  its  Minutes  at  this  period. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  night  between  Saturday  and 
Sunday,  G.H.Q.  and  the  Grand  Quartier-General 
resumed  their  adjourned  debate,  the  subject  being 

132 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

the  size  of  the  "strong  force  of  French  divisions" 
that  was  to  come  to  our  help.  For  now  the  dyke 
was  burst,  it  began  to  break  down  everywhere. 
The  cracks  in  Cough's  line  that  could  have  been 
filled  up  on  Thursday  with  a  few  divisions,  had  on 
Saturday  become  fissures,  through  which  the  Ger- 
man flood  poured  in,  and  increased  the  pressure  on 
the  whole  of  the  receding  and  reeling  line.  Now  on 
Sunday  great  gaps  were  appearing  in  the  front  of 
the  Fifth  Army,  threatening  ultimate  disjunction, 
which  could  only  be  filled  with  great  forces.  On 
Sunday  Sir  Douglas  wanted  twenty  divisions  to 
reconstitute  the  line.  Petain  had  got  as  far  as 
promising  twelve;  but  he  only  had  five  on  the 
battlefield,  trying  to  take  over  the  line  on  Gough's 
right,  and  mixed  in  a  confused  fight  with  what  was 
left  of  our  3rd  Corps.  His  divisions  fought  furi- 
ously as  they  saw  their  sacred  soil  slipping  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  and  villages  as  yet  untouched 
by  the  long  war  breaking  into  flame,  but  they  were 
insufficient,  and  they  arrived  too  late.  It  was  the 
essential  vice  in  their  own  plan — separate  com- 
mands and  therefore  separate  reserves — that  was 
overthrowing  the  Allied  Commanders.  Each,  as 
the  map  shows,'  had  disposed  his  troops  as  if  his 
^  See  Map  at  end  of  book. 

133 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

own  were  the  only  Allied  front,  and  none  other 
existed,  and  one  of  the  two  was  bound  to  suffer, 
especially  the  smaller  of  the  two.  Experience  at 
last  convinced  Sir  Douglas  of  what  reasoning  had 
been  unable  to  persuade  him.  When  in  19 17  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  had  made  Nivelle  supreme  com- 
mander at  the  Calais  Conference  on  February  27, 
Haig  had  simply  repudiated  Nivelle's  directions  on 
March  4  when  he  received  them.  When  in  19 18 
Foch,  as  President  of  the  Executive  War  Board, 
had  been  in  reality  made  supreme  commander  on 
February  i,  Haig  again  repudiated  his  directions 
on  March  2.  In  each  of  these  years  unity  of  com- 
mand had  been  frustrated  by  his  refusals,  resting 
on  a  character  of  iron  tenacity  and  the  most  gentle- 
manly, attractive  surface,  and  on  a  mind  both 
obtuse  and  extraordinarily  slow.'  The  Command- 
er-in-Chief was  a  knightly  figure,  with  all  the 
bearing  and  temper  of  a  leader,  but  on  a  very  low 
plane  of  human  intelligence,  as  elderly  cavalry 
men  sometimes  are.     Even  on  March  14,  twelve 

*  Sir  Douglas  Haig  certainly  never  protested  at  Versailles 
when  the  plan  of  campaign  for  19 18  was  adopted  by  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  but  it  may  quite  well  be  that  he  did 
not  understand  what  was  being  done.  My  own  impression 
of  him  during  the  discussion  was  that  he  entirely  failed  to 
follow  what  was  being  discussed 

134 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

days  before,  he  had  persisted  in  London  in  reject- 
ing the  scheme  of  the  General  Reserve,  and  there- 
fore in  effect  of  a  single  central  command.  But 
very  early  on  Sunday,  March  24,  he  telegraphed 
to  London  asking  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  come  over 
and  arrange  for  a  single  Supreme  Commander. 
He  had  never  been  able  to  grasp  that  the  system 
of  double  command  might  expose  him  to  being 
forced  to  fight  Ludendorff  all  by  himself,  and  it  was 
not  till  he  had  been  doing  so  for  three  days,  and 
the  prospect  of  continuing  to  do  so  actually  opened 
before  him,  together  with  the  likelihood  of  being 
driven  into  the  sea,  that  he  submitted  to  unity  of 
Command,  and  an  authority  superior  to  his  own, 
for  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  always  striven. 

A  French  writer  who  was  in  the  pubHcity  section 
of  the  Grand  Quartier-General  has  warned  histo- 
rians against  accepting  too  credulously  the  official 
accotmts  of  the  grand  Etat-Major,  and  against  the 
"great  business  of  attenuating  the  truth"  he  saw 
going  on  imder  his  eye."  Attenuation  is  a  good 
word,  and  we  should  be  grateful  to  its  inventor. 

*G.Q.G.,  Secteur  I,  by  Jean  de  Pierrefeu  (I'Edition 
Frangaise:  Paris,  1920):  "  Cette  vaste  en treprise  d' attenu- 
ation de  la  verity,  que  j'ai  vue  s'accomplir  jour  k  jour  sous 
mes  yeux." 

135 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

He  knew  how  the  facts  were  cooked,  for  he  was  in 
the  kitchen.  The  German  General  Staff,  even  in 
its  military  publication,  has  continued  to  season 
and  manipulate  the  original  material  till  it  is  almost 
unrecognisable.  Our  official  records,  also,  are  not 
innocent  of  attenuation,  and  the  Despatches,  like 
the  communiques,  may  be  classed  among  them. 
The  own  pen  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig  has  a  most  in- 
genuous, quite  a  schoolboy,  style,  and  as  far  re- 
moved as  possible  from  their  deceptive  and  plaus- 
ible cleverness.  Our  historians,  like  the  French, 
need  warning:  the  Cambrai  Despatches,  for  ex- 
ample, crumble  at  one  touch  of  one  single  authentic 
document,  the  Diary  of  G.H.Q.'  These  elucida- 
tions may  be  left  to  the  researches  of  the  historian 
and  the  judgment  of  posterity,  which  is  perfectly 
just  because  it  is  perfectly  indifferent.  These  en- 
quiries and  verdict  will  partly  explain  to  our  de- 

'  The  historian  can  find  the  Diary  of  G.H.Q.  for  Cambrai 
in  the  Registry  at  Versailles.  What  the  Despatches  conceal 
about  Cambrai  is  that  the  twenty  divisions  used  in  the 
attack  between  Nov.  20  and  Nov.  29,  were  so  handled  that 
the  signal  success  of  the  first  attack  could  not  be  exploited. 
The  Diary  of  G.H.Q.  shows  this.  There  our  troops  tore  a 
great  open  rent  in  the  German  line,  then  as  on  several  other 
occasions,  but  with  no  result,  and  therefore  to  no  purpose. 
Hindenburg  in  his  Aus  Meinem  Leben  notes  how  often  this 
happened,  and  is  evidently  puzzled  by  it. 

136 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

scendants  why  the  Germans  collapsed  in  France  be- 
fore the  Allies  in  191 8,  when  the  Allies  were  inferior 
or  not  much  more  than  equal,  and  resisted  during 
the  previous  years  when  the  Allies  were  overwhelm- 
ingly superior.  It  is  a  fair  conjecture,  from  their 
results,  that  Haig  conducted  our  armies  in  1916 
and  191 7  by  the  same  methods  as  he  did  in  1918: 
only  the  campaigns  of  19 16  and  19 17  being  offen- 
sives, they  could,  like  Cadoma's  Isonzo  attacks,  be 
trumpeted  as  successes.  But  in  the  case  of  191 8 
an  earlier  correction  of  these  official  fictions  is 
required. 

The  Despatches  on  the  battle  of  St.  Quentin  con- 
ceal the  fact  that  the  Fifth  Army  under  Gough 
received  little  or  no  support,  and  by  their  language 
also  suggest  (without,  however,  any  explicit  state- 
ment) ,  that  it  was  reinforced,  and  therefore  that  it 
failed  partly  at  least  through  its  own  fault.  But 
this  army  was  left  unassisted  and  unrelieved,  and, 
in  a  general  sense,  was  left  alone  to  meet  the  whole 
weight  of  the  German  attack  and  ultimately  aban- 
doned. This,  the  real  fact,  is  to  the  discredit  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  The  Despatches,  by  their 
artful  omissions  and  suggestions,  and  by  their  ab- 
sence of  encomium,  tend  to  transfer  the  blame  for 
this  great  defeat  from  him  to  the  Fifth  Army. 

137 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

But  Gough's  army  deserved  all  praise;  they 
fought  with  heroic  cotirage  and  endurance  against 
the  greatest  odds.  Instead  of  the  mis-esteem,  and 
perhaps  the  reprobation,  which  this  official  accoimt 
has  cast  on  them,  they  deserve  great  honour  and 
still  greater  gratitude,  neither  of  which  they  have 
ever  received.  For  their  resistance  should  not  only 
in  itself  be  memorable  as  a  splendid  feat  of  arms, 
but  it  saved  the  Allied  armies.  As  always  in  the 
war,  the  boundless  devotion  and  self-sacrifice  of 
England's  humble  sons  redeemed  every  stupidity 
and  every  selfishness  of  England's  exalted  chiefs. 

Between  March  21  and  March  29  (inclusive) 
a  hundred  German  divisions  came  into  action. 
G.H.Q.  Intelligence  admitted  between  eighty  and 
ninety  as  identified,  identification  being  a  very 
stringent  and  exacting  test,  and  the  real  numbers 
necessarily  higher.  But  only  thirty-five  British 
and  fifteen  French  had  come  into  action. 

The  battle  of  St.  Quentin  may  perhaps  be  re- 
duced to  these  abstract  terms.  The  two  Allied 
armies,  French  and  British,  were  together  equal  to 
the  German  army,  but  the  German  army  was  two 
or  three  times  as  large  as  the  British.  The  conduct 
of  the  battle  by  the  Allied  commanders  was  such 
that  the  German  commander  was  able  with  his 

138 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

whole  army  to  assault  the  British  army  for  a  whole 
week  without  its  receiving  any  substantial  or  oppor- 
tune assistance  from  the  French  army,  and  such 
that  the  German  commander,  during  the  same 
period,  threw  into  the  battle  at  the  decisive  point 
forces  twice  as  large  as  the  Allied  commanders  were 
able  to  put  in  the  battle  at  the  same  point.  The 
objective  of  the  German  commander  was  a  place 
where,  if  he  could  have  reached  it,  he  would  have 
been  able  to  separate  the  Allied  armies  definitely, 
and  so  subsequently  crush  them  each  in  turn.  This 
objective  he  just  failed  to  attain,  because  the  por- 
tion of  the  British  army  in  front  of  it  sacrificed  it- 
self to  prevent  him,  and  in  so  doing  was  utterly 
destroyed. 

This  defeat  is  the  natural  and  regular  effect  of 
equally  natiiral  and  regular  causes,  which  always 
have  been,  and  always  will  be,  operative  in  war,  and 
was  not  due  to  the  weather,  the  Prime  Minister, 
or  the  shortage  of  barbed  wire,  as  many  think  and 
as  others,  mostly  military  sycophants,  vociferously 
repeat  to  make  them  think  it.  It  is  commanders 
who  lose  battles,  as  it  is  they  who  win  them.  If 
they  are  to  enjoy  the  glory  of  success,  they  must 
also  bear  the  discredit  of  failure,  especially  if  this 
failure  cost  the  lives  of  two  score  thousand  English- 

139 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

men  in  ten  days.'  The  dead  of  the  Fifth  Army 
have  not  the  voice,  and  the  living  have  not  the 
knowledge,  to  plead  its  case. 

Whether  Foch  with  the  Executive  War  Board 
(which  in  practice  could  not  help  becoming  an  In- 
ter-Allied staff  under  him)  could  outgeneral  Luden- 
dorff,  is  debateable,  and  must  remain  uncertain 
and  undecided.  Whether  Ludendorff  could  out- 
general Petain  and  Haig  is  both  certain  and  de- 
cided.   It  is  not  debateable,  because  he  did. 

Other  standards  of  Haig  and  Petain's  general- 
ship exist.  At  equal  strength  the  Allied  defensive 
under  their  direction  broke  down  before  the  Ger- 
man attack;  in  1916,  the  Germans,  not  being  more 
than  half  the  strength  of  the  Allies,  could  not  be 
broken  by  the  Allied  offensive.  Or  again:  Foch 
struck  down  the  enemy  at  the  second  Mame  and 
sent  him  staggering  back  to  the  Hindenburg  line 
with  forces  weaker  than  his;  for  the  nimierical 
superiority  that  passed  from  the  Allies  to  the  Ger- 
mans in  March,  191 8,  did  not  pass  back  again  to 
them  till  September,  when  the  amount  of  American 
effectives  in  the  field  rose  to  about  a  dozen  divi- 
sions.    This  gives  Ludendorff 's  stature;  it  is  not 

'  In  the  first  ten  days  of  St.  Quentin  many  more  English- 
men were  killed  than  in  the  whole  Peninsular  War. 

140 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

high,  but  it  must  have  been  higher  than  that  of  the 
two  opponents  he  overcame  at  St.  Quentin.  Or 
again:  Ludendorff's  attack  could  not  have  been 
more  clearly  foreseen  if  he  had  served  on  us  a 
written  notice  of  it,  with  full  particulars;  it  requires 
no  military  knowledge  at  all  to  perceive,  from  the 
map,  that  hardly  any  dispositions  of  the  Allies 
could  have  been  better  calculated  to  assist  him  in 
overwhelming  Gough  and  reaching  Amiens  than 
those  adopted  by  Petain  and  Haig.  The  military 
student  will  surely  come  to  consider  St.  Quentin  as 
a  model  of  what  a  defeat  ought  to  be,  a  sort  of 
classical  example,  with  a  complete  perfection  of  its 
own;  a  flawless  jewel  of  incompetence,  surpassing 
even  masterpieces  of  the  same  kind  like  Cambrai. 

In  answer  to  Haig's  request  Lord  Milner  and  Sir 
Henry  Wilson  crossed  over  at  once,  and  on  Monday, 
March  25,  met  Clemenceau  and  Petain  and  Foch  at 
Compiegne ;  Petain  was  there,  for  the  Germans  were 
pushing  violently  over  the  line  of  the  Oise,  the  door 
to  Paris,  and  had  got  one  foot  through  this  door, 
which  Petain  was  trying  desperately  to  close.  The 
British  commander  was  absent  at  Abbeville,  and 
Clemenceau  vacillated  between  the  views  of  Foch 
and  Petain.  No  agreement  was  reached,  and  on 
Tuesday  there  was  another  meeting  at  Doullens. 

141 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

While  Lord  Milner  and  the  British  generals  held  a 
meeting  in  the  Mayor's  room  at  the  Town  Hall, 
Poincare,  Clemenceau,  and  the  French  generals 
waited  outside  the  Town  Hall.  ' '  We  walked  up  and 
down  in  that  little  square  for  more  than  an  hour," 
said  M.  Poincare  later  to  Foch.'  "You  cheered  us 
during  this  long  interval  by  repeating  to  us  that 
there  was  nothing  to  despair  about,  that  we  must 
make  an  unyielding  fight  for  every  inch  of  our 
sacred  soil,  and,  at  all  costs,  prevent  the  enemy 
wedging  himself  between  us  and  the  English." 
Clemenceau  has  also  told  us  the  story  of  that  meet- 
ing.'' On  that  "terrible  day,"  he  says,  having 
known  Foch  many  years  but  never  seen  him  on  the 
field  of  battle,  "we  learnt  the  stamp  of  man  Foch 
is.  He  remained  imperturbable  and  confident,  for 
reasons  which  he  deduced  one  from  another  with 
the  rigour  of  a  mathematical  demonstration,  and 
restored  the  courage  of  us  all.  He  evidently  be- 
lieved the  battle  could  be  won,  willed  it,  and  was 
going  to  win  it."  They  then  all  went  up  and  joined 
the  British,  and  a  discussion  on  the  military  situa- 

^  In  his  speech  at  the  reception  of  Foch  in  the  French 
Academy. 

^  Fragment    d'Histoire,    HI,    by    Mermeix    (Ollendorf, 
Paris). 

142 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

tion  took  place.  Haig  declared  he  could  hold  the 
line  as  far  south  as  Amiens,  but  no  further,  and  in- 
sisted on  a  supreme  commander.  Petain  even  now 
had  only  been  able  to  bring  seven  French  divisions 
in  action,  across  the  great  gulf  that  now  yawned 
between  the  two  armies ;  it  was  uncertain  whether  it 
could  ever  be  spanned.  While  this  discussion  was 
proceeding,  Milner  took  Clemenceau  (who  was 
still  fluctuating  between  P6tain  and  Foch)  apart 
and  proposed  Foch  as  supreme  commander.  To 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  whatever 
their  shortcomings,  we  owe,  the  world  owes,  Foch. 

When  Clemenceau  took  Foch  aside  and  offered 
him  the  supreme  command  he  said  to  him,  remem- 
bering the  scene  in  London  a  fortnight  before — 

"You  have  now  got  the  place  you  wanted." 

Foch  answered  angrily — 

' '  What  do  you  mean.  Prime  Minister?  You  give 
me  a  lost  battle  and  you  ask  me  to  win  it.  I  con- 
sent, and  you  think  you  are  making  me  a  present. 
I  am  disregarding  myself  entirely  when  I  accept 
it."^ 

Foch  was  not  asked  to  extricate  two  unlucky  or 

^  "II  faut  toute  ma  candeur  pour  accepter  dans  de  telles 
conditions."  See  Foch's  own  report  of  this  dialogue  in  Le 
Matin,  Nov.  8,  1920. 

143 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

iinskilful  generals.  He  was  asked  to  risk  his  whole 
reputation  to  save  two  commanders  from  the  con- 
sequence of  errors  against  which  he  had  never 
ceased  to  warn  them,  but  in  which  they  had  per- 
sisted; two  commanders  who,  to  evade  measures 
Foch  had  proposed  in  their  own  best  interest,  and 
for  our  common  security,  entered  into  an  intrigue 
that  a  meaner  spirit  could  not  have  forgiven,  and 
for  which  he  has  never  even  reproached  them.  If 
his  success  in  supreme  command  gives  the  measure 
of  his  genius,  his  acceptance  of  it  gives  the  measure 
of  his  magnanimity. 

Von  Hutier,  according  to  plan,  was  due  in  Amiens 
on  Sunday,  but  had  been  kept  back  by  the  "usual 
tenacity"  of  our  troops,  which  (as  Hindenburg  says 
in  his  lately  published  Aus  Meinem  Lehen)  so  often 
repaired  the  errors  of  their  leaders.'  On  the  Tues- 
day, however,  the  Germans,  racing  along  the  St. 
Quen tin- Amiens  Road,  with  their  artillery  and 
supplies  left  far  behind,  suffering  from  hunger,  and 
with  little  strength  left  in  them,  were  only  12,000 

^  We  should  do  well  to  ponder  Hindenburg's  opinion  of 
our  High  Command;  it  was  such,  he  says  in  Aus  Meinem 
Lehen,  that  our  armies  never  gave  him  any  real  alarm  (as 
contrasted  with  the  French) .  Whether  right  or  wrong,  there 
is  no  reason  to  think  the  old  German  warrior  is  expressing 
himself  otherwise  than  sincerely. 

144 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

or  13,000  yards  away  from  the  town.  The  exact 
distance,  therefore,  within  which  the  Germans 
came  to  winning  the  war  may  perhaps  be  exactly 
computed  in  yards;  it  is  the  space  along  this  road 
which  separated  them  from  Amiens.  The  meeting 
at  Doullens  was  not  very  sanguine  of  saving  it,  and 
Foch  outlined  his  plans  of  defence  in  case  Paris 
had  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  British  armies  were 
driven  back  to  the  coast.  On  returning  to  London, 
Sir  Henry  Wilson  reported  to  the  War  Cabinet 
next  day,  not  very  hopefully,  that  the  safety  of 
Amiens  depended  on  whether  the  French  could 
collect  sufficient  troops  there  in  time  to  defend  the 
town.  For  between  Amiens  and  the  upper  waters 
of  the  Oise,  a  space  of  front  well  over  forty  miles, 
Foch,  when  he  took  over,  had  nothing  but  the  frag- 
ments of  the  Fifth  Army,  broken  by  six  days'  con- 
tinuous unrelieved  fighting  in  retreat,  and  seven 
French  divisions,'  breathless,  hard  pressed,  and 
suffering  heavily,  a  thin  worn  screen  that  a  single 
German  cavalry  division  would  have  burst,  and  no 
immediate  help  in  sight  but  three  French  divisions 
due  the  next  day.  On  Simday  Petain  had  just 
thought  it  possible  that  the  connection  between  the 
two  armies  might  be  preserved,  but  on  Monday 
^  The  125th,  9th,  loth,  62nd,  22nd,  133rd,  35th. 

145 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

both  he  and  Haig  had  given  up  hope  and  were  pre- 
paring to  retreat,  the  one  to  the  sea  and  the  other  to 
Paris.  This,  as  Foch  has  since  said,  meant  the  loss 
of  the  war.' 

The  very  words  of  the  agreement  signed  by 
Clemenceau  and  Lord  Milner  seem  to  anticipate 
separation  as  inevitable :  he  was  not  made  general- 
issimo of  one  combined  army,  his  authority  was  to 
co-ordinate  the  action  of  the  two  armies. 

Thus  the  two  Commanders-in-Chief  had  re- 
signed themselves  to  being  parted,  and  to  ceding 
Amiens  to  Ludendorff  before  it  was  in  his  hands. 
Not  so  Foch.  As  at  the  Mame,  the  more  desperate 
the  situation,  the  fiercer  grew  his  determination 
and  the  more  resourceful  his  ingenuity,  as  if  his 
spirit,  the  higher  misf  orttines  rose,  could  always  rise 
to  a  still  greater  height.  The  same  old  gentleman, 
now  nearly  three-score  years  and  ten,  who  in  19 14 
had  snatched  the  race  from  the  Germans  in  the  last 
few  strides  both  in  Lorraine  and  Champagne,  was 
again  to  do  so  in  Picardy  in  191 8,  always  with  the 
same  calculating  audacity.  As  at  the  Mame,  he 
divined  the  point  where  the  last  thrust  of  which  the 
exhausted  enemy  were  capable  would  come,  and 

^  "C'etait  la  defaite,"  are  his  own  words  to  describe  this 
projected  retreat.    See  the  issue  of  Le  Matin  of  Nov.  8, 1920. 

146 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN 

again  risked  all  to  parry  it  with  the  same  desperate 
manoeuvre. 

He  was  only  appointed  towards  the  middle  of 
the  day  on  Tuesday.  But  at  a  quarter  to  five,  a  few 
hours  after  his  appointment,  he  managed  to  get 
through  to  Debeney,  now  commanding  the  ex- 
treme French  left,  on  the  telephone:  Foch  now  had 
authority  to  command.  He  at  once  ordered  De- 
beney to  take  all  his  troops  out  of  the  line  farther 
south  on  a  front  of  six  miles,  risk  leaving  a  gap 
there,  and  send  them  up  in  front  of  Amiens. 
Against  these,  on  the  Wednesday,  the  last  effort 
of  the  spent  German  wave  broke  itself. 

So  Foch,  as  soon  as  he  was  given  a  chance,  foimd 
in  himself  at  once,  then  as  before  in  19 14,  the  means 
of  retrieving  the  faults  and  errors  of  other  leaders, 
and  so  saved  them,  but  only  just,  on  the  edge  of 
ruin.  Again,  as  in  1914,  nothing  less  than  the  fate 
of  the  civilised  world  had  for  a  few  days  trembled  in 
the  balance,  and  again  he  threw  in  the  weight  of  his 
own  indomitable  will  and  turned  the  scale.  Within 
six  months  of  the  day  when  he  was  given  the  ap- 
parently hopeless  task  of  commanding  armies  de- 
feated and  pressed  back  to  positions  of  the  most 
imminent  disaster,  those  same  armies  under  his 
leadership   were   thtmdering   victoriously   at   the 

147 


AT  THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL 

gates  of  the  Hindenburg  line,  the  safeguard  and  the 
symbol  of  German  domination,  and  the  leaders  of 
the  invincible  German  hosts  who  had  awed  Europe 
for  half  a  century  and  very  nearly  overwhelmed  it, 
had  decided  upon  imconditional  submission. 


148 


APPENDIX  A 


149 


APPENDIX  A 

The  Relations  between  General  Robertson,  General  Maurice, 
and  Colonel  Repington 

General  (now  Field- Marshal  Sir  William)  Robert- 
son was,  from  the  end  of  191 5  to  the  beginning 
of  19 1 8,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff. 

General  Matirice  was,  from  the  middle  of  1916  till 
General  Robertson  ceased  to  be  C.I.G.S., 
Director  of  Military  Operations;  thus  he  was 
General  Robertson's  chief  Staff  Officer  and  his 
inseparable  companion. 

Colonel  Repington  left  the  army  many  years  before 
the  war  and  became  a  journalist.  He  was  the 
military  correspondent  of  the  Times  till  the 
end  of  19 1 7,  when  he  joined  the  Morning 
Post. 

The  articles  written  by  Colonel  Repington  in  the 
Times  have  never  been  republished.  They  are  al- 
most models  of  their  kind,  clear,  sprightly,  telling, 
almost  classical  journalism:  he  has  also  lately  pub- 

151 


APPENDIX  A 

lished  a  book  entitled  The  First  World  War  (Con- 
stable &  Co.),  in  the  form  of  Diaries  of  the  war, 
very  inferior  to  his  articles,  both  in  candour  and 
style.  He  appears  in  these  Diaries  as  a  man  of  ex- 
treme quickness  and  cleverness,  with  gifts  which, 
if  he  had  continued  in  his  military  career,  ought  to 
have  carried  him  to  the  very  highest  place;  but  also 
as  a  man  of  morbid  vanity  and  egoism,  that  at 
times  almost  take  him  out  of  the  limits  of  sanity. 
The  Diaries  shed  a  great  light  upon  the  relations 
between  this  journalist  and  our  General  Staff  when 
Robertson  was  at  the  head  of  it.  The  evidence 
as  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  supplied  by  the 
Diaries  and  the  articles  of  this  journalist  is  worth 
examining. 

I.    Relations   between  our    General   Staff 

AND   RePINGTON   DURING    I916   AND    I917 

Robertson,  the  Chief  of  our  General  Staff,  found 
sufficient  leisure  to  see  Repington  twenty  times 
during  the  year  191 6  {Diaries — February  2  and  25; 
March  23;  April  9  and  15;  May  9  and  23;  June  12; 
August  4  and  9;  September  7,  11,  and  27;  October 
3,10,  and  30 ;  November  13  and  22 ;  December  6  and 
30).     Most  of  these  interviews  took  place  at  the 

152 


APPENDIX  A 

War  Office  or  at  Robertson's  residence;  but  he  had 
enough  time  to  go  round  to  Repington's  house 
(March  29  and  April  9)  to  give  him  an  interview; 
he  is  so  indispensable  that  he  sends  for  him  (Sep- 
tember 7  and  October  10),  and  two  or  three  letters 
written  by  Robertson  are  quoted.  Evidently  this 
journalist  was  indispensable  to  Robertson  in  win- 
ning the  war. 

From  January  to  November,  1 9 1 7 ,  eleven  months, 
the  same  close  relations  persist  between  the  two; 
they  had  seventeen  interviews  (Diaries — January 
10  and  12 ;  February  3, 8,  and  12 ;  March  17  and  31 ; 
April  10  and  13;  May  21 ;  June  25;  July  5  and  21; 
September  21  and  29;  November  13  and  21). 

Most  of  these  interviews  are  not  short  or  casual 
meetings.  Repington's  accotmt  of  most  of  them 
covers  page  after  page  of  his  long  book.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  summarise  them,  but  this  might  be  done  by 
saying  that  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff 
regularly,  about  every  three  weeks,  reports  on  the 
war  to  the  journalist:  he  furnishes  him  with  a 
methodical,  detailed,  and  comprehensive  survey  of 
it  from  every  point  of  view. 

During  the  war  a  great  machine  of  censor- 
ship, counter-espionage,  and  legal  prosecution  was 
clamped  on  to  the  population  outside  the  Govem- 

153 


APPENDIX  A 

ment  service  to  prevent  military  information  reach- 
ing the  enemy.  For  example,  in  May,  1916,  a  man 
called  Bright  was  found  guilty  of  obtaining  the 
secret  by  which  a  material  of  military  importance 
was  being  manufactured  in  Sheffield,  though  with 
no  proved  intention  of  communicating  it  to  the 
enemy;  the  judge  sentenced  him  to  penal  servitude 
for  life.  Inside  the  Government  service,  whether 
military  or  civil,  even  more  rigorous  rules  existed: 
the  most  trifling  indiscretions,  the  chance  mention 
of  the  most  unimportant  detail,  involved  the  most 
serious  punishments.  Repington  is,  as  his  Diaries 
show,  indiscreet  by  nature;  as  a  journalist,  he  is 
besides  indiscreet  by  profession.  The  following  are 
a  few  examples  of  what  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  who  was  in  possession  of  all  our 
essential  military  secrets,  was  telling  him. 

In  February,  19 17,  he  describes  to  him  the  situa- 
tion in  Russia,  Mesopotamia,  and  Egypt,  and  the 
working  of  the  Derby  system;  in  March,  our  posi- 
tion in  France,  "We  should  soon  have  forty  di- 
visions in  France";  in  April,  the  Mesopotamian 
situation  again;  in  May,  the  results  of  his  visit  to 
France;  in  June,  the  decision  to  abandon  the  offen- 
sive at  Salonika:  "  .  .  .all  our  troops  in  France 
will  attack" ;  in  August,  all  our  casualties  in  France; 

154 


APPENDIX  A 

in  September,  Hindenburg's  plans  and  our  own; 
the  maps  of  the  German  defence;  the  state  of  our 
recruiting;  the  date  at  which  Mesopotamian  rail- 
ways will  be  finished ;  and  the  whole  Balkan  situa- 
tion; in  October,  the  position  of  Roumania,  and  our 
Home  Defences;  in  November,  of  oiu^  man  power; 
and  in  December,  the  same  again,  and  our  whole 
Eastern  situation. 

In  19 1 7  Robertson  is  no  less  loquacious.  His 
disclosures  about  our  man-power  situation  are  con- 
stant:  "  There  are  sixty  German  divisions  opposing 
us."  At  times  he  carefully  goes  over  every  theatre 
of  war  for  Repington  (May);  in  June,  he  tells 
Repington  about  the  great  French  mutiny,  one  of 
the  most  closely  kept  secrets  of  the  war.  In  July, 
Repington  says,  "  I  did  not  think  that  the  choice  of 
Gough  for  this  operation  was  good.  .  .  .  Robert- 
son was  inclined  to  agree."  He  explains  to  Reping- 
ton how  we  stand  in  aviation  and  the  East  and  in 
Russia  (September);  and  in  November,  "we  stud- 
ied Cambrai  on  large  maps."  Thus  Robertson 
systematically  disclosed  to  Repington  all  our  es- 
sential military  secrets. 

Every  technical  adviser  of  a  Government  is 
bound  to  be  silent  about  his  relations  to  that 
Government;  otherwise  he  could  not  be  trusted  as 

155 


APPENDIX  A 

an  adviser  at  all,  for  he  could  subject  the  Govern- 
ment to  his  will,  or  to  the  will  of  some  one  else. 
This  rule  of  discretion  is  observed  by  civilians  in 
the  Civil  Services  to  a  degree  very  nearly  ridicu- 
lous. But  there  is  a  still  stronger  obligation  on  a 
soldier;  for  outward,  as  well  as  real,  subordination 
to  a  superior  is  the  rule  of  his  life.  Without  this 
framework  an  army  would  collapse.  The  following 
are  some  of  the  remarks  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff  was  making  about  his  superiors  to 
this  journalist,  even  when  his  superior  happened 
to  be  a  soldier  like  Lord  Kitchener.  In  February, 
1916,  Robertson  remarks  he  "hopes  politicians  will 
let  him  alone"  (February  2);  Robertson  said,  "He 
is  not  so  pleased  with  Lord  Kitchener  as  he  was, 
and  begins  to  think  we  shall  not  get  on  until 
Kitchener  goes"  (February  25),  Lord  Kitchener 
being  not  only  his  superior,  as  Secretary  of  State 
for  War,  but  a  famous  soldier.  About  a  Conference 
in  France  Robertson  "complained  bitterly  that  our 
ministers  did  not  take  the  lead  in  the  debates" 
(March  29).  On  April  9  Robertson  confided  to 
Repington,  "It  was  three  months  since  he  had  laid 
the  whole  situation  before  the  Cabinet  .  .  .  noth- 
ing had  been  done  ...  no  good  could  be  done 
with  the  present  ministers.    ...     It  was  useless 

156 


u.  &  u. 


RT.    HON      DAVID    LLOYD    GEORGE 


APPENDIX  A 

to  have  a  Secretary  of  State  for  War  who  .  .  . 
Lansdowne  who  was  too  old  and  indefinite.  Bal- 
four and  Chamberlain  no  good"  (April  9).  A  few 
days  later  Robertson  tells  Repington  "recruiting 
is  a  farce,"  and  both  again,  "What  a  Government 
and  what  a  War  Office' '  (April  1 5) .  Again,  in  May, 
Robertson  declares  to  him  "it  is  impossible  to 
carry  on  with  Asquith  at  the  War  Office";  and  in 
September,  ' '  Lloyd  George  declares  that  we  have 
been  all  wrong  in  our  offensive."  A  little  later  and 
this  was  their  dialogue :  "  I  said  I  found  it  hopeless 
to  teach  the  politicians  strategy,  as  they  could  not 
understand.  He  was  of  the  same  opinion,  and  had 
told  Lloyd  George  that  the  latter  must  take  his, 
Robertson's,  opinions  without  long  explanations, 
because  Lloyd  George  to  understand  would  have 
had  to  have  had  Robertson's  experience,  and  no 
amount  of  explanation  could  make  up  for  the  want 
of  it."  On  October  3  Robertson  was  complaining 
to  him  that  ' '  such  a  lot  of  his  time  had  to  be  given 
to  the  Secretary  of  State";  a  little  later  that  "his 
time  was  much  taken  up  by  having  to  explain  every 
detail  to  the  War  Committee.  Lloyd  George  was 
always  holding  him  personally  responsible."  In 
November  Robertson  "grumbled  at  the  Cabinet," 
and  exclaimed,  "What  on  earth  is  the  War  Com- 

157 


APPENDIX  A 

mittee  up  to?"  In  December  Robertson  wrote  to 
Repington  that  "he  had  had  a  hell  of  a  week,"  and 
told  him  "the  Cabinet  have  no  clear  ideas  about 
anything  .  .  .  Milner  is  little  help  .  .  .  they 
take  up  his  time  but  do  not  take  his  advice  .  .  . 
a  little  body  of  politicians  was  trying  to  rim  the 
war  themselves." 

In  191 7  the  tone  of  Robertson  in  the  Diaries  is 
the  same.  "He,  Robertson,  had  been  very  firm. 
Lloyd  George  had  resented  his  attitude."  "The 
discussion  had  been  twice  put  off  by  the  Cabinet" 
(January).  "One  had  to  temporise  with  these 
politicians"  (Robertson  speaking) ,  "  in  this  manner 
time  was  gained."  "He  did  not  intend  to  lose  the 
war  by  giving  in  to  the  politicians"  (February). 
In  April  he  tells  Repington  ' '  he  had  had  to  fight  for 
Murray  before  the  War  Cabinet."  "The  War 
Cabinet  were  really  not  helping  him  .  .  .  they 
were  not  really  placing  the  war  first,  and  when  they 
did  discuss  it  they  understood  little  about  it." 
"The  War  Cabinet  idea  about  Italy  was  preposter- 
ous .  .  .  the  manners  of  the  War  Cabinet  had  not 
altered"  (June).  At  the  news  of  a  success  this  is 
Robertson's  sarcasm:  "The  War  Cabinet  will 
think  to-morrow  they  have  won  the  war"  (Septem- 
ber) ;  and  when  the  Supreme  War  Coimcil  is  estab- 

158 


APPENDIX  A 

lished,  "We  talked  over  the  Paris  plan  and  are  both 
contemptuous."  Thus  the  sole  and  exclusive 
military  adviser  of  the  Government  criticised  it  to 
an  irresponsible  person  like  Repington,  and  thus 
violated  his  duty  to  his  superiors. 

There  is  another  sect  of  remarks  to  be  culled  from 
the  Diaries.  They  are  directed  at  our  Allies.  In 
19 1 6  Robertson  was  saying  this  sort  of  thing:  "The 
French  are  no  good  for  more  than  one  more  serious 
effort";  that  he  has  dissensions  with  Joffre;  that 
he  hoped  "to  squeeze  Joffre";  "The  Roumanian 
strategy  was  rotten";  "There  is  no  love  lost  be- 
tween Russia  and  Roumania" ;  "Joffre  is  in  trouble 
again";  "The  French  have  not  kept  their  prom- 
ises." In  January,  19 17,  Repington  learns  from  him, 
"Briand  has  tried  very  hard  to  stampede  our 
people"  (January);  and  in  March  that  Robertson 
"preferred  Joffre  to  Nivelle";  in  April  that  "the 
Russian  position  is  rotten,"  and  that  he  is  "un- 
easy about  French  politics,"  which  have  no  "stabil- 
ity." He  expresses  his  scorn  of  Russia  (May),  and 
tells  him  in  November  that  "the  debacle  in  Italy 
is  indescribable."  Every  Ally  is  dissatisfied  with 
every  other  Ally,  but  every  one  feels  it  is  indelicate 
to  say  so.  The  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
who  should  have  set  an  example  of  loyalty  to  them, 

159 


APPENDIX  A 

did  not  do  so ;  he  disparaged  them  to  a  man  who  was 
extremely  likely  to  disseminate  his  words. 

Maurice,  his  chief  Staff  Officer,  was  compul- 
sorily  retired  from  the  Army  in  May,  191 8,  and 
having,  like  Repington,  been  compelled  to  leave 
the  Army,  he  also,  like  Repington,  became  a 
journalist. 

The  offence  for  which  the  Army  Coimcil  took  dis- 
ciplinary measures  against  him  in  May,  1918,  was 
for  carrying  on  an  agitation  in  the  Press ;  but  from 
the  very  first  this  Director  of  Military  Operations 
seems  to  have  been  Director  of  Press  Operations 
as  well  for  General  Robertson.  "Major-General 
Fred  Maurice,  the  new  Director  of  Operations," 
says  Repington  (August  16,  19 16),  "dined  with  me 
at  the  Savoy  at  8.  .  .  .  He  suggests  that  I 
should  use  this  event  as  a  peg  on  which  to  hang  a 
comparison  between  the  situation  of  Ma}^  and 
August,  19 1 6.  We  went  all  through  the  different 
points,  but  as  these  will  be  in  the  article  when  it 
comes  out,  it  is  tmnecessary  to  refer  to  them 
here" ;  again  (March  10,  1917),  "saw  Fred  Maurice, 
who  wants  me  to  write  about  the  question  of  em- 
ployment of  officers  of  the  Old  and  New  armies." 

Maurice  allowed  Repington  to  use  his  office  of 
D.M.O.  as  if  it  was  Repington 's  own  office,  and 

160 


APPENDIX  A 

was  not  behind  Robertson  in  zeal.  He  and  Reping- 
ton  "laughed  a  good  deal  about  Lloyd  George's 
description  .  .  .  of  his  visit  to  the  front "  (August 
1 6,  19 1 6).  "Maurice  and  I  are  convinced  that 
nothing  will  convince  our  politicians  what  war 
means"  (February  20,  19 17).  "Maurice  thought 
that  we  ought  to  have  a  chair  at  some  University  to 
teach  budding  statesmen  the  rudiments  of  war" 
(September  26,  19 17). 

Maiirice  has  praised  these  Diaries  of  Repington 
as  "among  the  greatest  diaries  of  our  literature."^ 
Therefore  Repington 's  account  of  his  relations  with 
Maurice  should  be  true.  Robertson  has  never  dis- 
avowed Repington' s  account  of  their  relations; 
besides,  Maurice  as  a  journalist  is  Robertson's 
champion,  and  bellows  with  rage  at  any  criticism 
of  him.^  If  Repington  had  misrepresented  his  own 
relations  with  Robertson,  Maurice  would  not  have 
lavished  praise  on  the  Diaries.  Thus  Repington's 
account  of  his  relations  with  Robertson  should  also 
be  true. 

Repington  cannot  be  blamed  for  these  trans- 
actions. As  a  journalist  it  was  his  business  to  get 
information.    His  articles  in  the  Times  show  what 

'  Daily  News,  Sept.  10,  1920. 
^  National  Review,  Oct.,  1920. 
"  161 


APPENDIX  A 

Robertson  got  in  return.  The  articles  are  far 
superior  to  the  Diaries:  more  genuine,  because  they 
have  not  been  retouched  to  suit  the  subsequent 
course  of  events;  more  talented,  because  their 
bright  clarion  notes  are  not  mixed  with  the  jarring 
snobbery  of  the  Diaries;  more  interesting  and  val- 
uable, because  the  historian  can  find  in  them  the 
ideas  with  which  Robertson  guided  the  war. 

Repington  proclaims  the  greatness  of  Robertson. 
Victory  is  anticipated  because  "Sir  William  Robert- 
son has  a  free  hand"  (the  Times,  May  8,  19 16). 
Everything  was  wrong  till  "Sir  William  Robertson 
came,"  and  then,  but  then  only,  "we  returned 
finally  to  the  right  paths"  (August  24,  1916).  Vic- 
tory has  been  delayed  but  it  is  now  in  sight  because 
we  "are  in  a  fair  way  at  last,  following  the  advice 
of  competent  soldiers,  amongst  whom  General 
Cadoma  and  Sir  William  Robertson  are  in  the 
front  rank"  (January  15,  19 17).  The  first  service 
which  Repington  rendered  to  Robertson  was  public 
adulation. 

Repington  preaches  the  ideas  of  Robertson. 
They  are  very  interesting.  Unity  of  Command 
is  rejected.  It  would  "risk  upsetting  everything 
and  everybody  by  radical,  untimely,  dangerous 
changes' '  (December  18,1917).     The  right  strategy 

162 


APPENDIX  A 

is  "wearing  Germany  down"  (November  24,  1917) ; 
and  the  right  method  is  to  raise  more  men,  sixty 
divisions  more,  in  addition  to  the  seventy  odd  we 
already  had.  He  comes  back  to  this  man-power 
question  again  and  again:  "Victory  or  defeat,"  he 
declares  (May  8, 191 7),  "depends upon  man-power, 
and  nothing  else  stands  between  us  and  success." 
"Will  the  British  democracies  allow  history  to  say 
that  they  have  failed  in  courage  and  resolution" 
(August  II,  19 1 7),  by  not  loading  themselves  with 
an  army  almost  as  great  as  the  German,  as  well  as 
almost  the  whole  naval  and  financial  burden  of  the 
war.  This  was  the  very  point  of  difference  between 
Robertson  and  the  War  Cabinet,  who  presimied  to 
think  there  might  exist  a  less  primitive  strategy. 
Repington  is  used  by  Robertson  to  direct  the  pres- 
sure of  public  opinion  against  the  Cabinet.  For 
this  end  Repington  spreads  the  fiction  (though  per- 
haps he  is  rather  dupe  than  deceiver)  that  we  are 
weaker  than  the  enemy.  If  Robertson  can  get  more 
men,  we  will  fight,  he  says  (August  1 1, 1917),  "with 
something  near  an  equality  of  forces."  This,  of 
course,  was  untrue:  the  Allies  had  long  been  over- 
whelmingly superior  to  the  Central  Powers.  The 
Allied  soldiers  had  never  been  able  to  use  the 
very  great  preponderance  the  Allied  politicians  had 

163 


APPENDIX  A 

given  them.  Thus  the  second  service  which  Rep- 
ington  renders  to  Robertson  is  a  press  agitation  in 
favour  of  Robertson's  ideas. 

Repington  denounces  Robertson's  civilian  supe- 
riors. He  unintermittently  criticises  * '  amateurish- 
ness in  the  Cabinet  and  Defence  Committee,  the 
harassing  and  hampering  interference  of  poH- 
ticians"  (February  8,  1916).  "The  Government 
allows  .  .  .  incompetent  administrators  to  mis- 
handle" the  army  (May  8,  1916).  "The  Cabinet  of 
the  war  period  can  claim  no  merit  .  .  .  except 
that  of  letting  things  slide"  (August  24,  1916). 
They  suffer  from  the  '  *  hopeless  incapacity  of  ama- 
teurs to  conduct  a  business  of  which  they  know 
nothing"  (same  date).  "It  is  known,  of  course, 
that  every  politician  thinks  he  knows  all  about 
war"  (August  25,  1916).  "The  politician  is  for 
ever  fuming  and  fretting  and  trying  to  interfere" 
(same  date).  "Allied  politicians  would  neither 
acknowledge  the  sphere  nor  appreciate  the  func- 
tion of  strategy"  (July  15,  19 17).  "A  party  in  the 
late  Cabinet  ...  no  hesitation  in  assigning  the 
main  responsibility  for  the  prolongation  of  the  war 
to  them"  (same  date).  He  refers  to  "inefficiency 
of  our  War  Cabinets"  (August  4,  191 7).  "It  would 
have  been  better  if  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  adhered 

164 


APPENDIX  A 

to  the  facts"  (November  17,  1917);  and  so  on. 
Repington  echoes  the  abuse  Robertson  poured  in 
his  ear,  as  far  as  the  Censor  would  allow.  His  elo- 
quent advocacy  was  intended  to  make  our  states- 
men, in  the  mind  of  the  public,  responsible  for 
Robertson's  inability  to  conduct  the  war,  an  in- 
ability proved  by  the  incontrovertible  and  quite 
plain  fact  that,  as  soon  as  he  left,  it  ended  in  our 
favour  almost  at  once.  Thus  the  third  service 
which  Repington  renders  to  Robertson  was  public 
denimciation  of  Robertson's  superiors,  the  Cabinet, 
for  the  advantage  of  Robertson. 

Perhaps  all  this  evidence  from  the  Diaries  and 
the  articles  can  be  summarised  in  this  way.  Rep- 
ington was  the  instrument,  the  very  effective  in- 
strimient,  of  Robertson  and  his  assistant  Maurice 
in  the  Press.  Robertson  criticised  to  Repington 
the  Government  of  which  he  was  the  technical 
military  adviser,  and  thus  violated  his  duty  to  his 
superiors ;  disclosed  to  him  all  our  essential  military 
secrets ;  and  disparaged  our  Allies  to  him.  Reping- 
ton's  services  to  Robertson  were  public  adulation: 
press  agitation  in  favour  of  Robertson's  ideas;  and 
public  denunciation  of  Robertson's  superiors,  to 
the  advantage  of  Robertson.  Thus  the  closest  con- 
nection existed  between  them. 

165 


APPENDIX  A 

II.    Robertson  and  the  Morning  Post 
Prosecution 

Repington's  article,  publishing  to  the  world  our 
military  secrets  for  the  purpose  of  overturning  the 
Government,  appeared  in  the  Morning  Post  of 
February  ii,  191 8.  He  and  the  editor  of  the 
Morning  Post,  Mr.  Gwynne,  were  convicted  and 
fined  at  Bow  Street  on  February  2 1 .  Now,  Robert- 
son had  been  present  at  every  meeting  of  the 
Supreme  War  Coimcil,  and  knew  quite  well  that 
Repington  had  disclosed  our  military  plans  to 
the  enemy.  In  his  Diaries  (February  26,  1918), 
Repington  prints  the  following  letter  he  received 
from  Robertson : . 

February  25,  191 8. 

My  Dear  Repington, 
I  shall  return  to  London  in  about  a  week's 
time,  after  which  I  shall  have  a  good  deal  of  in- 
spection work  to  do,  but  I  will  not  fail  to  arrange  a 
talk  with  you.  My  present  feelings  are  that  I  am 
more  or  less  retired  from  the  Public  Service,  except 
so  far  as  my  own  particular  command  is  con- 
cerned. I  am  heartily  sick  of  the  whole  sordid  busi- 
ness of  the  past  month.  Like  yourself,  I  did  what  I 
thought  was  best  in  the  general  interest  of  the  coun- 
try, and  the  result  has  been  exactly  as  I  expected 

166 


APPENDIX  A 

would  be  the  case.  I  am  in  no  way  surprised  at  the 
turn  events  have  taken ;  in  fact  I  felt  sure  from  the 
first  that  they  would  be  as  they  have  proved  to  be. 
The  country  has  just  as  good  a  Government  as  it 
deserves  to  have.  I  feel  that  your  sacrifice  has  been 
great,  and  that  you  have  a  difficult  time  in  front  of 
you.  But  the  great  thing  is  to  keep  on  a  straight 
course,  and  then  one  may  be  sure  that  good  will 
eventually  come  out  of  what  may  now  seem  to  be 
evil. 

Yours  very  truly, 

W.  Robertson. 

The  meaning  of  this  letter  is  not  quite  clear,  and 
this  is  perhaps  less  due  to  a  deliberate  purpose  than 
Robertson's  inability  to  express  general  ideas, 
which  is  usual.  But  Repington  treats  it  as  a  letter 
of  consolation  at  his  conviction,  and  reports  that 
at  his  first  interview  with  Robertson  (March  15), 
after  this  conviction,  Robertson  said,  "few,  except 
Gwynne  and  I,  had  stood  by  him."  In  any  event, 
this  letter  is  too  inimitably  in  the  style  of  Robertson 
to  be  anything  but  genuine.  From  its  text  two  sets 
of  observations  arise. 

The  first  set  of  observations  are  these: 
First. — That   Robertson   considered   Repington 
to  have  been  doing  the  work  of  a  patriot  in 
167 


APPENDIX  A 

publishing  the  article  for  which  he  was  prose- 
cuted. For  Repington  is  treated  as  having 
' '  done  what  he  thought  best  in  the  interest 
of  the  country." 
Secondly. — That  he  had  acted  nobly  ("your 
sacrifice  has  been  great")  and  rightly  ("the 
great  thing  is  to  keep  on  a  straight  course"). 
Therefore  Robertson  congratulates  Reping- 
ton on  his  conduct,  as  the  noble  work  of 
a  patriot,  and  condoles  with  him  on  his 
conviction. 

Maurice  also  writes  {Diaries,  February  24)  that 
he  has  ' '  been  ordered  not  to  talk  to  him  about  the 
war"  (Robertson  has  left  the  War  Office),  but  that 
"I  have  the  greatest  admiration  for  your  deter- 
mination and  courage." 

Repington  and  Robertson  had  interviews  of  the 
friendliest  kind  on  March  15,  March  25,  April  3, 
April  II,  May  10,  July  20,  August  15,  October  25, 
19 1 8.  Repington 's  behaviour  did  not  diminish  but 
increased  the  cordiality  of  their  friendship. 

The  second  set  of  observations,  to  which  Rob- 
ertson's letter  dated  February  25  gives  rise,  are 
these : 

First. — Robertson  writes  as  if  he  and  Repington 
had  been  engaged  in  a  common  enterprise: 
168 


APPENDIX  A 

"Like  yourself,  I  did  what  I  thought  was 
best." 

Secondly. — Robertson  writes  as  if  it  was  rather 
an  improper  enterprise:  "The  sordid  busi- 
ness of  the  past  month." 

Thirdly. — Robertson  writes  as  if  this  enterprise 
had  started  about  January  25 — "the  past 
month";  the  Session  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council  in  question  in  Repington's  article 
began  a  few  days  after  January  25. 

Fourthly. — Robertson  writes  as  if  the  object 
of  this  common  enterprise  had  been  to  up- 
set the  Government,  but  that  it  had  failed: 
"The  country  had  just  as  good  a  govern- 
ment as  it  deserved  to  have";  "The  result 
has  been  exactly  as  I  expected  would  be  the 
case." 

Fifthly. — P.obertson  writes  as  if  the  publication 
of  the  Mor7ii7ig  Post  article  had  been  part  of 
this  enterprise:  "Your  sacrifice  has  been 
great." 


Therefore  this  letter  strongly  suggests  that  dur- 
ing the  previous  month  Robertson  and  Repington 
had  been  collaborating  in  a  joint  enterprise,  called 
"sordid"  by  Robertson  himself,  of  which  the  ob- 
ject wa.s  to  upset  the  Government,  and  that  the 
publication  of  Repington's  article  had  been  part  of 

169 


APPENDIX  A 

this  enterprise.  This  is  the  supposition  which  the 
language  of  Robertson's  letter  almost  exactly  fits. 

A  violent  dispute  had  arisen  between  Robertson 
and  the  War  Cabinet  on  the  Versailles  decisions  in 
the  second  week  of  February.  On  Thursday,  Feb- 
ruary 14,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  decided  to  replace 
Robertson  by  Sir  Henry  Wilson  as  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff. 

Repington's  article  disclosing  the  Versailles  de- 
cisions and  the  military  plans  of  the  Alliance  ap- 
peared during  the  second  week  of  February,  on 
February  1 1 ;  he  invited  the  House  of  Commons  to 
withdraw  their  confidence  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George  be- 
cause he  had  participated  in  these  decisions  and 
formed  these  plans. 

On  February  5  the  then  leader  of  the  Opposition, 
Mr.  Asquith,  had  asked  the  Government  what  the 
Versailles  decisions  had  been,  but  had  been  refused 
all  information.  Not  knowing  what  they  were,  he 
could  not  make  them  the  ground  for  attack  on  the 
Government.  On  February  12  the  business  of  the 
House  was  to  be  the  Debate  on  the  Address,  which 
always  gives  the  Opposition  the  opportimity  of 
attacking  the  Government  on  any  ground  it  likes 
to  choose.  Repington's  article,  on  February  11, 
gave  Mr.  Asquith  the  knowledge  he  required,  and, 

170 


APPENDIX  A 

armed  with  it,  he  attacked  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on 
February  12,  but  without  success. 

The  Repington  article,  therefore,  was,  in  fact, 
used  inside  the  House  of  Commons  against  the 
Government  at  a  moment  when  Robertson  was 
quarrelling  with  the  Government,  and  he  was  on 
the  point  of  ceasing  to  be  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff. 

III.    Repington's  Informant 

Who  gave  Repington  the  information  about  our 
military  plans  which  he  disclosed  to  the  public,  and 
therefore  to  the  enemy,  in  his  Morning  Post  article 
of  February  11? 

Repington  has  given  an  explanation  in  his  Dia- 
ries. An  account  of  the  debate  and  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  War  Council  was  given  to  him,  so  he  de- 
clares, by  Clemenceau  on  February  3.  This  he 
reproduced  in  his  Morning  Post  article.  In  his 
Diaries  there  is  a  long  account  of  his  interview  with 
Clemenceau,  and  various  opinions  and  items  of 
information  are  put  in  the  mouth  of  Clemenceau. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  accept  this  explanation. 

Here  I  must  very  reluctantly  thrust  myself  for- 
ward.   I  acted  as  interpreter  at  the  debate  in  ques- 

171 


APPENDIX  A 

tion,  as  I  did  in  nearly  all  inter- Allied  discussions  at 
Versailles  while  there.  Any  of  the  members  of  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  or  of  the  Military  Repre- 
sentatives, or  of  the  Executive  War  Board,  and 
several  other  committees,  would  speak  at  full  tilt 
for  four  or  five  minutes  in  English  or  French,  and 
then  halt.  It  was  then  my  duty  as  the  interpreter, 
with  the  help  of  a  few  hurried  notes,  at  once  to 
translate  all  they  had  said  into  the  opposite  lan- 
guage. This  used  to  go  on  for  hours,  so  that  the 
interpreter  more  or  less  committed  the  whole  de- 
bate to  memory.  As  amendments  in  either  lan- 
guages, French  or  English,  were  introduced  into 
the  bilingual  resolutions  submitted,  it  was  my  duty 
as  interpreter  and  secretary  to  alter  the  bilingual 
text;  so  that  I  became  very  familiar  with  the  text 
of  their  decisions.  As  assistant  secretary  it  was 
my  duty  on  that  particular  occasion  subsequently 
to  draft  the  minutes  of  the  meeting;  and  jointly 
with  the  secretary,  I  also  had  control  of  all  these 
written  records  of  the  Supreme  War  Council, 
resolutions,  minutes,  decisions,  and  all  copies.  As 
assistant  secretary,  too,  previously  to  the  meeting, 
all  the  information  on  which  the  resolutions  were 
founded  had  passed  before  me,  and  all  documents 
returned  into  the  joint  custody  of  the  secretary  and 

172 


APPENDIX  A 

myself.  The  part  I  played  was,  therefore,  very 
subordinate  and,  if  difficult,  rather  mechanical. 
But  my  knowledge  of  this  debate  and  decisions  (as 
of  nearly  all  inter-Allied  discussions)  was  not  an 
impresson  acqiiired  by  hearsay,  or  as  a  casual 
hearer;  it  was  an  impression  stamped  into  me  by  a 
process  drastic  and  multiple  in  itself,  and  arduous 
and  exhausting  to  me,  and  giving  me  a  knowledge  of 
it  minute,  complete,  and  profound,  far  greater  than 
that  possessed  by  any  of  the  great  Olympians  (who 
never  listened  to  each  other  with  anything  like  the 
attention  I  was  compelled  to  use),  and  checked  by 
the  possession  of  all  necessary  documents.  This 
knowledge  was  still  clear  and  exact  when  Reping- 
ton's  Morning  Post  article  appeared  on  February 
II,  and  even  now  it  is  not  altogether  effaced. 
This  knowledge  prevents  me  accepting  his  ex- 
planation. 

This  close  pursuit  and  reproduction  of  a  speaker's 
words  also  constitute  a  microscopic  examination 
of  his  mind,  especially  when  the  same  interpreter 
usually  acts  for  the  same  people,  and  this  study 
is  also  reinforced  by  reading  at  leisure  documents 
drafted  by  these  speakers.  The  speaker,  however 
eminent,  places  his  mind  as  if  imder  a  powerful 
magnifying  lens  for  the  observation  of  the  inter- 

173 


APPENDIX  A 

preter.    I  mention  this  because  this  almost  involun- 
tary study  is  the  base  of  most  of  my  opinions. 

No  doubt  an  interview  took  place  with  Clemen- 
ceau,  and  some  parts  of  Repington's  explanation 
look  real,  but  as  a  whole  the  account  can  hardly  be 
accepted  as  quite  genuine,  for  two  reasons: 

First. — The  views  put  in  the  mouth  of  Clemen- 
ceau,  and  the  views  expressed  in  the  Morn- 
ing Post  article,  are  not  the  views  of  M. 
Clemenceau. 

Secondly. — The  items  of  information  put  in  the 
mouth  of  M.  Clemenceau,  and  still  more  the 
items  of  information  divulged  by  Repington 
in  the  Morning  Post  could  not  be  obtained 
from  M.  Clemenceau,  but  only  from  records 
of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  which  were 
not  then  in  the  hands  of  M.  Clemenceau. 

But  the  views  attributed  to  M.  Clemenceau  and 
the  views  expressed  in  the  Morning  Post  were  the 
views  of  General  Robertson;  and  particular  copies 
of  the  records  from  which  alone  Repington  could 
obtain  his  information  were  in  the  hands  of  General 
Robertson. 

The  evidence  of  this  contention  must  necessarily 
be  elaborate  and  detailed,  and  can  hardly  be  set  out 
here. 

174 


APPENDIX  A 

While  the  Session  took  place  at  Versailles, 
Robertson  and  Maurice  stayed  in  Paris;  so  did 
Repington. 

When  Repington  was  prosecuted,  Maurice  is 
mentioned  by  the  Press  as  having  attended  at  the 
police  court  during  the  opening  of  the  case  for  the 
Crown. 

Therefore,  as  it  is  difficult  to  accept  Repington's 
explanation  that  he  obtained  his  information  from 
the  French  source  he  mentions ;  as  the  only  possible 
source  of  his  information  was  copies  of  the  records 
of  the  Session  of  the  Supreme  War  Council  in  the 
hands  of  General  Robertson ;  as  he  expressed  in  his 
Morning  Post  article  the  views  of  General  Robert- 
son; as,  in  his  letter  dated  February  25,  Robertson 
uses  language  strongly  suggesting  that  the  publica- 
tion of  the  article  was  intended  to  assist  Robertson 
in  upsetting  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  it  was,  in  fact, 
so  used  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  these  considera- 
tions, taken  together  with  the  previous  and  sub- 
sequent relations  existing  between,  form  a  mass  of 
circimistantial  evidence  pointing  with  imdeviating 
finger  at  General  Robertson  himself  as  having  sup- 
plied Repington  with  the  information  he  published. 

If  all  Robertson's  Staff  Officers  were  as  eager 
Press  agents  as  his  chief  Staff  Officer,  Maurice, 

175 


APPENDIX  A 

there  could  be  no  difficulty  in  doing  so.  Almost  all 
the  papers  officially  sent  by  the  Military  Represen- 
tatives at  Versailles  to  Robertson  in  London  in 
December  and  January  must  have  been  seen  by 
Repington,  or  numerous  entries  in  his  Diaries  would 
be  impossible;  and  they  could  not  have  been  seen 
by  him  unless  Robertson  was  willing  they  should  be. 

To  this  conclusion,  so  damaging  to  Robertson, 
converge  the  many  forms  of  proof  supplied,  quite 
involuntarily,  by  Repington ;  it  is  Repington's  des- 
tiny to  give  evidence,  in  the  intoxication  of  his 
vanity,  against  the  very  party  in  whose  favour  he 
comes  forward  to  testify. 

If  this  supposition,  that  Robertson  was  the  in- 
formant, seems  shocking,  it  is  no  more  shocking 
than  the  fact  that  Robertson  approved  of  Reping- 
ton's disclosures,  both  by  his  words  and  his  acts. 
The  difference  in  culpability  between  applauding 
and  instigating  such  conduct  is  faint  and  shadowy, 
if  it  exists  at  all.  The  same  censure  applies  to 
Maurice,  who  is  so  hardened  in  these  practices, 
that  even  now  he  writes  as  if  unconscious  that  dis- 
closure of  one's  country's  military  plans  to  the 
enemy  in  time  of  war  is  wrongful,  however  obtained 
and  whatever  the  object.' 

*  See  his  article  in  National  Review,  Oct.,  1920. 

176 


APPENDIX  A 

IV.     General  Conclusions 

One  more  incident  in  the  relations  of  Robertson, 
Repington,  and  Maurice,  is  worth  mentioning. 

On  May  6,  Maurice  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Press, 
which  was  published,  and  which  accused  the  Prime 
Minister  of  being  untruthful.  It  led  the  Army 
Council,  on  May  12,  to  place  him  forthwith  on 
retired  pay.  On  May  9,  the  Maurice  letter  was  dis- 
cussed in  the  House  of  Commons,  which  again  sup- 
ported Mr.  Lloyd  George,  just  as  it  had  supported 
him  on  February  12  and  20,  in  spite  of  the  Reping- 
ton article.  On  May  10,  the  trio,  Robertson,  Mau- 
rice, and  Repington,  dined  together  {Diaries,  May 

10). 

Repington  does  not  record  their  feelings  or  con- 
versation at  this  melancholy  feast,  but,  by  way  of 
showing  what  I  believe  their  motives  to  have  been, 
I  will  imagine  what  it  was. 

They  deplored  that  the  Repington  article  had 
failed  to  upset  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  February :  if  it 
had,  Mr.  Asquith  would  again  have  been  Prime 
Minister,  and  he  never  would  have  substituted  Sir 
Henry  Wilson  for  Sir  William  Robertson,  as  chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff;  they  also  deplored 
that  the  Maurice  letter  had  failed  to  upset  Mr. 

177 


APPENDIX  A 

Lloyd  George  the  day  before:  if  it  had,  Mr.  As- 
quith  would  again  have  been  Prime  Minister,  and 
he  might  have  dismissed  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  and 
restored  Robertson.  The  text  itself  of  the  Maurice 
letter  affords  some  evidence  of  this.  He  loudly  dis- 
claims acting  with  or  for  any  one  else,  and  an- 
nounces that  he  speaks  only  for  himself.  But  he 
protests  too  much.  If  this  was  strictly  true,  it  prob- 
ably would  not  have  occurred  to  him  to  mention  it. 
Either  of  these  two  little  coups  d'etat  would  have 
made  Robertson  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff  and  Maurice  Director  of  Military  Operations 
till  we  lost  the  war,  and  satisfied  the  personal  feud 
of  Repington  with  Sir  Henry  Wilson.'  These  were 
the  real  motives,  in  the  time  of  their  country's  ex- 
treme peril,  of  this  trio,  who  still  persist  in  address- 
ing the  public  as  if  the  spirit  of  military  duty  was 
incarnate  in  themselves  and  in  themselves  alone. 
Maurice  in  this  respect  is  egregious.  In  spite  of  be- 
ing compulsorily  retired  from  the  army  for  a  breach 
of  the  regulations,  he  writes  articles  as  an  authority 
on  the  conduct  becoming  an  officer.^  Though  his 
offence  was  the  discussion  of  military  affairs  in  the 

^  This  personal  feud  and  its  origin,  were  fully  discussed  in 
an  article  in  the  Observer,  in  191 8. 

*  See  The  National  Review,  Oct.  issue,  1920,  p.  196. 

178 


APPENDIX  A 

Press,  he  takes  it  upon  himself  to  rebuke  "subordi- 
nates at  Versailles, ' '  among  whom  he  knows  by  some 
extraordinary  chance  that  "gossip  was  rife,"  for 
this  indulgence.'    His  effrontery  is  sublime. 
*  See  same  article  in  National  Review. 


179 


APPENDIX  B 


i8l 


APPENDIX  B 

Unity  of  Command  in  JQ17 

I  WAS  personally  a  witness  of  the  events  of  the 
spring  of  19 18  in  which  Sir  Douglas  Haig  declined 
to  obey  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  War  Council. 
There  is  an  almost  exact  parallel  between  these 
events  and  those  of  19 17,  as  given  in  the  despatch 
of  the  French  Prime  Minister,  M.  Briand,  dated 
March  6,  1917,  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  herein 
set  out  below. 

This  despatch  is  quoted  in  several  French  semi- 
official accounts,  such  as  Major  de  Civrieux's 
U Offensive  de  191 7  (Gamier,  Paris),  and  Fragments 
d'Histoire,  III,  by  Mermeix  (Ollendorf,  Paris). 

M.  Briand  does  not  set  out  Sir  Douglas  Haig's 
letter  of  March  4,  19 17,  to  Nivelle;  but  this  letter 
was  evidently,  from  his  analysis  of  it,  confused  and 
almost  imintelligible.  While  Sir  Douglas  refused 
to  obey  the  decisions  of  the  Calais  Conference,  he 
evidently  avoided  any  justification  of  this  refusal 
by  introducing  irrelevant  topics;  in  these  respects 

183 


APPENDIX  B 

it  is  exactly  like  his  letter  of  March  2,  191 8,  to 
Foch  and  the  Executive  War  Board.  The  historian 
who  wishes  to  gauge  the  intellectual  calibre  of 
Haig  (and  he  will  never  understand  the  war  other- 
wise) should  collect  all  his  personal  communications 
and  memoranda  with  the  War  Cabinet  and  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  and  read  them. 

In  one  of  the  above  works,  V Offensive  de  191 7, 
a  French  Military  Attache  in  London,  Berthier  de 
Sauvigny,  is  quoted  as  officially  reporting  a  con- 
versation of  two  hours  between  himself  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  in  Colonel  Hankey's  room  in  Lon- 
don on  February  15,  1917:  in  it  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
assures  him  of  the  eagerness  of  the  War  Cabinet 
for  a  single  supreme  command,  though  "the  pres- 
tige of  Marshal  Haig  with  the  Army  and  the  Eng- 
lish people  make  it  difficult  to  subordinate  him  to  a 
French  Commander."  The  anonymous  author  of 
Fragments  d'Histoire — who  is,  however,  not  very 
reliable — declares  that  after  the  receipt  of  this 
despatch  of  M.  Briand,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  told  the 
French  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  compel  Haig. 
This  is  what  Briand  asks  for:  "Le  mar^chal  Haig 
doit  ^tre  mis  en  demeure  " ;  but  it  was  certainly  not 
done,  and  a  compromise,  dictated  by  Haig,  adopted 
in  London,  March  13. 

184 


APPENDIX  B 

The   Despatch   of   M.   Briand   to   Mr. 
Lloyd  George: — 

March  6,  191 7. 

General  Nivelle  has  just  communicated  to  the 
Comite  de  Guerre  Frangais,  the  memorandum  of 
March  2nd  sent  by  Marshal  Haig  to  General 
Robertson.  This  document  gave  rise,  on  the  part 
of  the  Comite  de  Guerre  Frangais,  to  the  following 
remarks : — 

On  February  2"^,  immediately  after  the  Confer- 
ence of  Calais,  General  Nivelle  sent  a  letter  to 
Marshal  Haig  which  reached  him  the  same  day, 
in  which 

1 .  He  confirmed  the  plan  of  operations  and  the 
date  of  the  offensive. 

2.  He  asked  for  the  orders  given  to  the  British 
forces. 

3.  He  asked  for  the  organization  of  the  Etat- 
Major  of  the  English  Mission,  the  creation  of  which 
had  been  decided  upon  at  the  second  meeting  of  the 
Conference  of  Calais.  Six  days  later,  March  4, 
Marshal  Haig  replied  by  a  letter  in  which  he  merel}^ 
stated : — 

I .  His  opinion  on  the  subject  of  the  German  re- 
pulse {repli)  on  the  Ancre. 

185 


APPENDIX  B 

2.  His  hypothetical  fears  on  the  subject  of  a 
German  attack  in  Flanders. 

3.  His  doubts  of  the  utility  to  the  G.Q.G. 
Frangais,  of  the  Organized  Mission,  and  of  the 
possibility  of  being  ready  to  attack  on  the  date  set. 

To  this  letter  was  attached  a  copy  of  the  note 
sent  by  him  to  General  Robertson  to  be  submitted 
to  the  War  Committee. 

From  this  note  resulted : — 

1.  The  determination  not  to  accept  the  deci- 
sions of  the  Conference  of  Calais. 

2.  The  constant  tendency  to  question  again  the 
plan  of  operations  accepted  by  the  Conference, 
where  the  chiefs  of  the  English  and  French  Govern- 
ments were  assembled,  furnished  with  the  full 
powers  of  the  two  Governments,  and  of  their  War 
Committees — a  tendency  all  the  more  dangerous 
as  the  time  for  the  offensive  drew  near. 

3.  A  marked  tendency  to  give  up  taking  the 
initiative  of  the  operations,  manifested  by  making 
much  of  all  that  the  Germans  might  do  or  plan, 
without  reflecting  that  we  might  profit  by  the  same 
advantages.  For  example:  i^"  alinea  du  A;  i^ 
du  By  tout  le  D,  enfin  tout  le  F  qui  envisage  au 
dernier  alinea.  The  reduction  of  the  British  co- 
operation and  even  the  abandonment  of  the  plan. 

186 


APPENDIX  B 

The  general  spirit  of  this  document  indicates  a 
feeHng  opposed  to  the  offensive. 

The  plan  ascribed  to  the  Germans  of  attacking 
in  the  North  is  possible,  but  rests  on  no  certain 
basis;  for  that  matter,  one  can  make  ntimerous 
hypotheses  of  the  same  sort  in  regard  to  all  the 
points  of  the  Front :  Rheims,  Soissons,  Champagne, 
Lorraine,  Alsace. 

Only  one  real  fact  exists,  which  existed  already 
at  the  time  of  the  resolutions  of  Calais,  and  that  is 
the  repulse  {repli)  on  the  Ancre. 

General  Nivelle  has  decided  in  consequence — 

1.  That  no  change  will  be  made,  unless  new 
events  arise,  in  the  plan  of  general  operations. 

2.  That  only  the  secondary  attack  on  the  Ancre, 
of  which  the  end  is  partly  attained,  was  suppressed, 
thus  creating  a  release  (disponibilite)  of  about  6 
divisions  which  for  the  moment  will  be  left  at  the 
disposal  of  Marshal  Haig.  The  abandonment  of 
this  attack  is  calculated  to  strengthen  the  attack  on 
Arras  and  to  hasten  its  preparation,  since  there  is 
now  only  one  front  of  attack  to  provide  with  stores 
and  munitions. 

The  repeated  tendency  of  Marshal  Haig  to  avoid 
(se  derober)  the  instructions  given  to  him,  to  ques- 
tion incessantly  the  offensive  itself,  the  plan  of 

187 


APPENDIX  B 

operations,  and  that  at  a  moment  so  near  the  time 
of  execution,  would  render  the  co-operation  of  the 
British  forces  illusory,  and  make  impossible  the 
exercise  of  a  sole  command. 

Consequently,  Marshal  Haig  should  be  obliged, 
without  further  delay,  to  conform  to  the  decisions 
of  the  Conference  of  Calais,  and  to  the  instructions 
given  to  him  by  General  Nivelle. 

It  is  important,  moreover,  that  General  Nivelle 
should  have  as  soon  as  possible  the  use  of  a  qualified 
intermediary  between  him  and  the  English  forces, 
in  order  to  be  advised  of  the  disposition  of  these 
forces  and  to  communicate  his  instructions  to  them. 
The  Comite  de  Guerre  Frangais  urges  that  General 
Wilson,  who  has  already  acted  in  a  similar  capacity 
at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  be  appointed  to 
this  position. 

In  case  the  War  Committee  should  not  see  the 
way  to  remedy,  without  delay,  the  serious  disad- 
vantages cited,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  the 
French  Commander-in-Chief  to  secure  unity  of 
operation  on  the  western  front,  and  the  French 
Government,  to  its  great  regret,  could  only  deplore 
this  situation. 


i88 


APPENDIX  G 


189 


Keystone  View  Co.,  Inc. 


COLONEL    CHARLES    REPINGTON 


APPENDIX  C 

General  Cough's  Confidential  Report 

The  despatches  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig  on  the 
battle  of  St.  Quentin  conceal  the  fact  that  the  5th 
Army  under  Gough  received  little  or  no  support, 
and,  by  their  language,  also  suggest  (without, 
however,  any  explicit  statement)  that  he  was 
properly  reinforced,  and  therefore  that  it  failed 
through  its  own  fault.  But  this  Army  was  left 
unassisted,  unrelieved,  and,  in  a  general  sense,  was 
left  alone  to  meet  the  whole  weight  of  the  German 
attack,  and  abandoned.  This,  the  real  fact,  is  to 
the  discredit  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig.  The  Despatches, 
by  their  artful  omissions  and  suggestions,  and  ab- 
sence of  any  encomium,  tend  to  transfer  the  blame 
for  this  great  defeat  from  him  to  the  5th  Army. 

But  the  5th  Army  incurred  no  blame.  On  the 
contrary,  they  fought  with  heroic  courage  and  en- 
durance against  the  greatest  odds.  Instead  of  the 
mis-esteem,  and  perhaps  reprobation,  which  this 
official  accovint  has  cast  on  them,  they  deserve  great 

191 


APPENDIX  C 

honour  and  still  greater  gratitude,  neither  of  which 
they  have  ever  received.  For  their  resistance 
should  not  only  in  itself  be  memorable  as  a  splendid 
feat  of  arms,  but  it  saved  the  Allied  armies. 

My  version  of  the  events,  especially  the  late  and 
insufficient  assistance  we  received  from  the  French, 
as  against  the  official  version,  was  called  into  ques- 
tion by  several  critics  when  I  published  it.  The 
honour  and  credit  of  Cough's  Army  seemed  to  me 
to  be  sufficiently  important  for  me  to  produce  my 
evidence.  As  to  whether  he  was  adequately  sup- 
ported or  not,  there  could  be  no  better  witness  than 
Gough  himself.  I  therefore  applied  to  General 
Gough  for  permission  to  publish  extracts  from  his 
confidential  Report  on  the  battle,  made  for  and 
sent  to  G.H.Q.,  and  obtained  his  permission.  The 
following  are  the  relevant  extracts : — 

Extracts  from  General  Gough' s  Confidential 
Report  on  the  Battle  of  St.  Quentin. 

"The  5th  Army  consisted  of  fourteen  Infantry 
divisions  and  three  Cavalry  divisions. 

•  •  •  •  • 

"Preparations: — 

"  It  was  evident  before  March  i  that  a  great 
attack  was  pending  on  the  5th  Army. 

192 


APPENDIX  C 

"I  held  several  conferences  with  Corps  Com- 
manders in  which  the  situation  was  clearly  laid 
before  them. 

"It  was  pointed  out  that  within  a  seventy-five 
mile  radius  of  the  centre  of  the  army  front  lay  some 
thirty  to  fifty  German  divisions,  who  could  con- 
centrate on  the  army  by  road  and  rail  in  three 
days. 

"The  utmost  energy  was  urged  on  all  corps  to 
get  on  with  the  necessary  defensive  works  of  all 
kinds,  and  time  for  rest  and  training  was  reduced 
to  a  minimimi. 

•  •  •  •  • 

"  The  Battle  :— 

"At  or  just  before  5  a.m.,  March  21,  a  very  heavy 
bombardment  opened  all  along  the  army  front. 

"By  5.15  A.M.  all  corps  received  orders — 'Man 
Battle  Stations.' 

"Up  to  8.30  A.M.  no  infantry  action  was 
reported,  but  bombardment  was  heavy. 

"  Between  9.40  a.m.  and  10.30  a.m.  reports  came 
in  of  hostile  attacks. 


13 


193 


APPENDIX  C 

"Between  10.30  a.m.  and  11.30  a.m.  reports 
came  in  showing  that  the  attack  was  general  along 
the  whole  army  front. 


"Between  11.30  a.m.  and  1.30  p.m.  it  became 
evident  that  the  hostile  attack  was  being  made  in 
overwhelming  masses  along  nearly  all  the  army 
front. 

"In  fact  it  was  becoming  evident  to  me  about 
this  time  and  during  the  afternoon,  that  I  would 
shortly  have  to  make  a  decision  between  fighting  a 
decisive  battle  with  the  5th  Army  or  carrying  out  a 
delaying  action,  which,  while  inflicting  heavy  loss 
on  the  enemy,  held  him  up  as  long  as  possible,  but 
always  maintained  an  intact,  even  though  battered 
and  thin  line,  between  him  and  the  arrival  of  the 
General  Reserves,  in  the  hands  of  the  British  and 
French  Chiefs. 

"I  was  aware  that,  from  the  British  sources,  I 
could  only  expect  one  division  at  a  time,  at  intervals 
of  seventy-two  hours,  and  that  the  first  to  arrive 
could  not  be  expected  for  seventy-two  hours. 

"The  French  division,  after  the  first  two,  would 
not  arrive  any  faster. 

194 


APPENDIX  C 

"Such  Reserves  were  bound  to  appear  too  slowly 
to  enable  me  to  maintain  my  whole  front  of  forty 
miles  for  several  days  with  the  divisions  at  my  dis- 
posal, when  that  front  was  being  attacked  along 
its  whole  front  and  when  every  division  I  possess 
was  being  hard  pressed  and  would  require  relief 
in  two  or  three  days. 


"In  the  case  of  the  French,  these  divisions  would 
be  arriving  without  their  guns,  their  transport,  or 
any  sufficient  signal  or  other  staff  organisation. 


"By  nightfall,  March  21st,  the  situation  on  the 
army  front  was  as  follows : — 


"Thus  the  Army  front  on  the  battle  zone  of 
forty  miles  remained  intact  except  for  three  serious 
breaches  and  one  minor  breach. 


"The  situation  as  the  result  of  one  day's  fighting 
against  immense  odds  and  holding  such  a  long  line 
so  thinly  imder  the  very  adverse  conditions  of  a 
dense  fog,  might  have  been  considered  very  satis- 

195 


APPENDIX  C 

factory  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  fact  that  very  few 
Reserves  were  at  hand  to  fill  the  gaps,  to  organise 
counter-attacks,  or  to  sustain  the  struggle  for  six 
or  eight  more  days,  and  that  the  losses  had  been 
severe. 

"Friday,  March  22: — 

"This  morning  a  thick  mist  again  enveloped  the 
battlefield,  rendering  all  observation  for  more  than 
fifty  yards  impossible. 

"By  1 1  A.M.  it  became  apparent  that  the  enemy 
was  continuing  his  attack  as  heavily  as  ever. 


"During  the  rest  of  the  day  heavy  fighting  con- 
tinued along  the  whole  army  front. 

"  In  consequence  of  this  situation,  the  exhaustion 
of  the  troops,  the  inadequacy  of  their  numbers  to 
hold  seriously  the  length  of  front  involved,  and  the 
knowledge  that,  except  for  one  French  division  and 
some  French  cavalry  in  the  3rd  Corps  area,  no 
support  could  possibly  reach  the  fighting  line  before 
Sunday  morning,  the  24th  inst.,  I  decided  on  a 
further  withdrawal  behind  the  Somme. " 

(This  French  division,  of  which  the  distinguish- 

196 


APPENDIX  C 

ing  number  is  not  given  by  General  Gough,  must, 
I  think,  be  the  125th,  who  arrived  during  the  night 
and,  in  company  with  a  few  companies  of  our  i8th 
Division,  counter-attacked  at  6  a.m.  on  Saturday 
on  the  Crozat  Canal,  but  without  success.  The 
ist  Division  of  French  cavalry  seems  to  have  been 
dismounted  and  amalgamated  with  it.  These  were 
the  first  French  troops  to  take  part  in  the  battle, 
but  were,  I  believe,  without  guns,  and  had  only  50 
roimds  of  ammimition  a  man.) 

"Accordingly,  the  following  Army  Orders  were 
issued  by  II  p.m.,  22nd  inst. 


"Information  from  G.H.Q.  informed  me  that 
two  French  divisions  and  one  French  cavalry  divi- 
sion might  be  expected  about  Noyon  during  the 
course  of  Friday  night,  22nd  inst.,  and  the  8th 
British  Division  would  be  detraining  at  Nesle  and 
west  of  it  during  Saturday  and  Sunday  night. 

"None  of  these  troops  could  be  expected  in  the 
firing-line,  and  then  only  gradually,  till  Saturday 
afternoon  and  Sunday  morning,  when  the  first 
brigade  of  the  8th  Division  was  able  to  take  post 
along  the  line  of  the  Somme. 

"Information  also  reached  me  that  the  35th 

197 


APPENDIX  C 

British  Division  was  to  join  me,  but  this  was  not 
due  till  after  the  arrival  of  the  8th. 

"Saturday,  March  23: — 

"During  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  reports 
arrived  saying  that  the  enemy  had  forced  the 
passage  of  the  Crozat  Canal. 

"During  the  day  heavy  fighting  again  continued 
along  the  whole  of  the  army  front. 

"At  about  4  P.M.,  3rd  Corps  reported  that  the 
French  troops  were  coming  into  action — one  regi- 
ment, 9th  Division,  south  of  Flavy  le  M artel,  and 
two  regiments  of  the  same  division — to  meet  the 
threat  on  the  left  flank,  in  the  direction  of  Golan- 
court;  while  the  loth  Division  was  coming  up  still 
farther  to  the  west  and  filling  what  was  tending  to 
become  a  gap  between  the  3rd  Corps  and  the  right 
of  the  i8th  Corps." 

(Thus  the  first  reinforcements  of  any  kind  that 
ever  reached  Gough  were  these  imits  of  the  French 
9th  and  loth  Divisions,  late  on  Saturday  afternoon, 
and  the  other  French  division  mentioned  before, 
which  I  believe  was  the  125th  French  Division.) 


198 


APPENDIX  C 

"During  the  night  of  the  2T,rd-2^th,  the  8th 
Division  commenced  to  reach  the  line  of  the  river 
{i.  e.  the  Somme),  coming  up  as  they  detrained. 

"  Nothing  in  the  way  of  a  detailed  reconnaissance 
or  deliberate  occupation  of  the  position  was  possi- 
ble ;  nevertheless,  this  division  successfully  got  into 
position,  an  operation  for  which  it  deserves  much 
credit. 

"I  may  here  say  that  in  all  the  subsequent  heavy 
fighting  the  division  showed  its  fine  spirit  and  good 
training  to  great  advantage.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  whether  the  jimction  with  the  i8th  Corps 
was  ever  satisfactorily  established." 

(This  8th  British  Division  was  the  first  and  only 
British  reinforcement  that  ever  reached  Gough.) 

"Simday,  March  24: — 

"During  this  day  the  enemy  continued  his  pres- 
sure on  the  3rd  Corps  and  the  French,  who  were 
now  coming  into  this  area.  .  .  . 

•  •  •  •  • 

"As  the  command  passed,  from  this  date,  to 
the  3rd  French  Army,  I  do  not  propose  here  to 
deal  further  in  detail  with  the  operations  of  the 
3rd  Corps.  ..." 

199 


APPENDIX  C 

(The  new  French  troops  coming  into  this  area 
on  Sunday  were  the  62nd  and  elements  of  the 
22nd  Division,  besides  those  that  came  in  on  Satur- 
day.) 

"By  2  P.M.  the  right  of  the  8th  Division  had 
been  pushed  back  west  of  Potte.  ,  .  . 

•  •  •  •  * 

"During  the  afternoon  of  24th  and  night  of 
24th-25th,  some  brigades  of  35th  Division  arrived, 
I  beHeve,  and  went  into  Hne  north  of  the  Somme 
under  the  orders  of  the  7th  Corps." 

•  •  •  •  • 

(After  the  8th  British  Division,  these  brigades  of 
the  35th  Division  were  the  only  other  British  troops 
to  reach  Gough,  but  on  Monday  morning  these  were 
taken  away  from  him,  and  passed  under  Byng.) 

"  Monday,^ March  25 : — 

"Early  on  this  morning  the  French  Command, 
under  orders  of  General  Fayolle,  took  over  up  to 
the  Somme." 

•  •  •  •  • 

(Fayolle  even  then  only  had  the  133rd  French 
Division,   which   came  into   action   on   Monday, 

200 


APPENDIX  C 

besides  the  French  divisions  that  had  been  heavily- 
engaged  on  Saturday  and  Sunday,  viz.  125th,  9th, 
lOth,  62nd,  and  22nd;  not  more  than  six  in  all,  and 
these  certainly  insufficiently  equipped,  and  prob- 
ably by  no  means  complete;  on  Tuesday,  the 
French  35th,  and  on  Wednesday  the  French  56th, 
162nd,  and  i66th  came  into  action:  ten  French 
divisions  only,  therefore,  came  into  action  during  a 
continuous  battle  lasting  one  week. 

During  that  week  of  continuous  fighting,  the 
only  British  reinforcement  that  reached  Gough 
was  the  8th  Division. 

These  French  divisions  were  the  framework 
of  the  3rd  French  Army  under  Himibert,  and  the 
1st  under  Debeney,  Fayolle  being  commander  of 
the  Army  group.) 


201 


''"^iTrtp'^ 


SHOWING 


ON  OF  ALL  ALLIED  DIVISIONS  IN  FRANCE 


IN    THE    THIRD    WEEK    OF    MARCH    I9l3. 
BEFORE  THE   BATTLE  OF  ST.  QUENTIN. 


yn  of  th«  BHtlsn  Olvltloni  wat  obtained  from  G  H  Q  th«  potltlon 
•i  Otvlaiona  from  tha  Franch  aectloo  of  tha  Supreme  war  Counc<> 
ubtcdiy  correct-     I  mentiol  tins  twcaute  tha  C  H  Q  Mae  waa  marked 


very  forcibly  '  —  T*.i  vt.l'<«f 


'i-t*  Qf  '.neat  Map*  at 


IIErEn£NCE& 
•ilish     OiviSion shown  thus 

encli 
rench  „  (o.sivounied) 

«fican 
oriuguese  .,  

'D..iiio..<  cf  Itt  Bt!f..-  Anil)  ,».c  nr.  lho»i» 


Coblenti  o 


:■  DUCHY  '1 


THE  POSITIOK  OF  ALL  ALLIED  DIVISIONS  IN  FRANCE 


The  Mirrors  of  Downing  Street 

By  "A  Gentleman  with  a  Duster" 

800.  With  12  Portraits 

A  selection  from  a  host  of  reviews  of  an  amazing  and 
brilliant  volume: 

'*  Since  Lytton  Strachey  shocked  and  amused  us  by  his  Eminent  Victorians,  no 
book  written  by  an  Englishman  has  been  so  audacious,  so  reckless,  so  clever, 
and  so  full  of  prejudices,  apparently  based  on  principles." — Maurice  Francis 
Egan  in  the  New  York  Times. 

"Of  fascinating  interest,  with  a  style  pungent  and  epigrammatic  .  .  .  does  not 
contain  a  dull  line  .  .  .  there  is  scarcely  one  of  the  great  controversies  which 
agitated  British  political  waters  during  and  since  the  war  that  is  not  touched 
on  .  .  .  the  author  is  partisan  in  his  friendships,  and  he  is  a  good  hater,  so 
his  work  is  altogether  engaging." — New  York  Herald. 

"A  very  serious  book,  without  being  heavy,  a  daring  work,  without  being 
reckless.  It  is  judicial  in  tone,  endeavoring  to  give  each  man  his  due,  setting 
down  naught  in  malice  or  partiality  ...  a  work  of  keen  interest  and  highly 
illuminating." — Cincinnati  Times-Star. 

"  This  book  of  scintillating  wit  and  almost  uncanny  power  of  vivid  phrase- 
making." — N.  Y.  Evening  Mail. 

"Some  of  his  characterizations  fairly  take  one's  breath  away.  His  epigrams 
are  as  skillful  as  those  of  '  E.  T.  Raymond,'  and  his  analysis  is  reminiscent  of 
Lytton  Strachey.  .  .  .  This  book  has  created  a  sensation  in  England,  it  will 
create  another  in  America." — News-Leader,  Richmond,  Va. 

"It  is  a  book  that  every  intelligent  person  should  read,  dispelling,  as  it  does, 
a  number  of  the  illusions  to  which  war  conditions  have  given  birth  .  .  .  the 
book  is  one  to  be  read  for  its  light  on  specific  facts  and  on  individual  men. 
Often  the  author's  least  elaborated  statements  are  the  most  startling  .  .  . 
it  is  written  with  the  vim  and  audacity  of  Lytton  Strachey's  Eminent 
Victorians,  and  it  has  in  addition  a  very  vivid  news  interest,  and  it  is  just 
both  in  its  iconoclasm  and  in  its  frank  hero  worship — of  the  right  heroes." 
— Chicago  Post. 

"  It  is  one  of  the  few  cases  of  a  startling  work  being  also  a  fine  piece  of 
literature  .  .  .  the  author  is  obviously  on  the  inside.  No  merely  imaginative 
person  could  have  produced  such  a  picture  gallery." — N.  Y.  Evening  Telegram. 

"One  of  the  most  interesting  studies  that  has  been  presented  to  English 
or  American  public." — Troy  Record. 


New  York  G.  P.  PUTNAM^S  SONS  London 


A  Defence  of   Liberty 

By 

Oliver  Brett 

"Socialism  is  conservatism.  The  Roman 
Empire  and  Karl  Marx  are  twins.  So  holds 
Oliver  Brett,  who  explains  the  purpose  of  his 
book  by  declaring  emphatically  that  *  Socialism, 
far  from  being,  as  its  friends  and  many  of  its 
enemies  believe,  a  dangerous  movement  to  the 
left  in  politics,  is  in  reality  a  dangerous  reaction 
toward  primitive  conservative  ideas.*  If  there  be 
any  who,  hearing  this  statement  of  Mr.  Brett's 
purpose,  come  to  scoff,  they  had  better  take  the 
chance  on  remaining  to  pray.  For  he  deals  a 
man's  size  blow,  and  all  the  laughing  a  Socialist 
will  find  to  do  will  be  at  that  initial  statement 
of  whom  he  is  going  to  hit  and  where.  If  Mr. 
Brett's  Defence  of  Liberty  does  not  remain  a 
constantly  growing  stone  wall  for  Socialists  to 
butt  their  heads  against  in  years  to  come,  it  de- 
serves to  do  so." — A^.  Y,  Times, 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


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